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I I
Although we are small and very limited in numbers, not a powerful people, and 
many times have been subjugated by foreign kingdoms, yet too, many deeds of 
bravery have been performed in our land which are worthy of record, but which 
no one has troubled to write down (Movses jKhorenat^i,|in Walker, 1990, p.9).
History will search in vain for the word ‘Armenia’ (Winston S. Churchill in 
Marsden, 1994, p.36).
After all, who now remembers the Armenians? (Adolf Hitler discussing the use 
of his death-squads. Quoted in Marsden, 1994, p.36).
I l l
ABSTRACT
The main purpose of this thesis is to present a study of the Armenian people in history 
and, from that study, to deduce exactly what lies behind their extraordinary story of 
survival. How and why have this ancient people managed to preserve a sense of 
national identity and cohesiveness when so many other civilisations have perished? I 
have also attempted to discuss, albeit briefly, whether the Armenian people, having 
reached this particular stage in their history, can build a truly sovereign and 
independent nation from the remnants of the ousted communist regime; in short, can 
they continue to survive? I believe that this latter theme undoubtedly deserves further 
research.
After thorough investigation of both the geographical and historical elements, it was 
established that this sense of cultural uniqueness and national cohesiveness is 
probably the result of a number of factors and has been maintained despite many 
obstacles. Such obstacles have been surmounted in the face of Turkish, Russian and 
Persian interests and the countless wars and partitions that have taken place within 
and around Armenia’s borders.
In conclusion, I have isolated what I believe to be the main factors which have 
contributed to this sense of nationhood and which have greatly aided the Armenian 
people in their struggle for survival.
The Armenian sense of uniqueness has been enhanced by a diaspora which, although 
separated from its homeland because of the 1915 Genocide, still maintains an 
association between itself and that homeland.
The early Gregorian Church’s rites and liturgy as well as its sacred literature have
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been the inspiration for the subsequent renaissance of the early modem era. In its 
tum, the Armenian form of Christianity has been reinforced by, and has, itself, 
reinforced the Armenian community and language.
The invention of the Armenian alphabet in the early fifth centuiy has created a new
barrier to assimilation and a powerful weapon for religion, education and evangelical 
work.
It is also possible that Armenian self-awareness has been strengthened by continual 
warfare in and around the Caucasian region. Armenian reliance for protection on 
outside forces, namely Russia, as well as cultural preservation based upon fear of the 
Turk and Islam may well have contributed, in part, to their longevity as a people.
The concurrent policies of ‘Modernisation’ and ‘Nativisation’ initiated during the 
Stalinist era can also be said to have encouraged, in their way, nationalist sentiment 
which seethed just below the surface of the Armenian psyche; nationalist feeling 
which inspired and kept alive, for each Armenian, the dream of independence and a 
new homeland. The Armenians share a common sense of history, a collective name, 
a sense of solidarity and identity, family ties, a past involving exile, a certain pride 
and belief in themselves, all of which can be said to have contributed to their desire to 
survive and their success in doing so. Ultimately, I have concluded that this tenacious 
people have been bound together and separated from outsiders, by, for the most part, 
their distinctive traits of language and religion.
I have also concluded that the Armenians can certainly move forward from this point 
in their history and achieve ‘true independence’ if a change in attitude and strategy 
towards their neighbours is initiated and built upon. Although centuries of reliance 
upon Russia for protection and a policy of self-preservation based upon fear of the
Turk, and perpetuated by the diaspora and the political parties, may have helped to 
add to this sense of being and feeling Armenian, this sense of being a cohesive and 
somewhat unique ethnic unit, one fact remains: only when fear of annihilation by the 
Turk is eliminated from their psyche will the Armenians be able to rely on themselves 
for protection. Only then will they, free from outside manipulation, engaging in 
frequent cross-republic trade and forging new alliances with neighbours, be firmly on 
the road to genuine nationhood. There is undoubtedly a way forward and this is it.
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INTRODUCTION
The first historical records of a people, ‘the Armenians’, and their country, 
‘Armenia’, date back to the middle of the first millennium BC, but the survival of the 
Armenian people to the present day, when so many of the other ancient nations of the 
region have disappeared, was the result of later developments.
The primary aim of this work, therefore, lies in the examination of these later 
developments in order to ascertain how much of a part they have played in the 
survival of these unique people and their land.
Armenia’s history, as we shall discuss, has involved, more often than not, a 
succession of wars, conquests and partitions (see fig.l). Indeed, the country’s 
geographical location has made it not just a natural bridge for the many conquering 
armies it has had to face but also a borderland between powerful states centered on 
the Iranian and Anatolian plateaux. From time to time, parts of Armenia have been 
able to achieve a temporary partial independence between powerful neighbours, 
however, such moments of independence have been both rare and brief. In the distant 
past the Roman Empire and Sassanian Iran fought over Armenia whilst later, 
Byzantium and the Arab Caliphate attempted to gain ultimate sway over Armenian 
territory. Then, the conquering armies of the Seljuq Turks swept over the land in the 
eleventh century. Thereafter, there was no independent Armenian state in historic 
Greater Armenia until 1918. The Seljuq armies were quickly followed by those of the 
legendary Genghis Khan and Timur, each bringing new massacres, the consequent 
flight of more of the Armenian population, and the loss of the land to growing 
numbers of Turkish nomads. Turkey and Persia (Iran) battled over possession of 
Armenia and eventually succeeded in partitioning it into Western and Eastern halves. 
This division was given permanence by the development of distinct Western
12
Fig 1: Armenia; Timeline (Source: C.I.S. and Eastern Europe on File, 1993)
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and Eastem languages. In the nineteenth centuiy tsarist Russia gained Eastem 
Armenia from Persia, and then managed to wrest part of Westem Armenia from the 
Ottoman Turks.
As the century progressed, the already fragile and complex ethnic jigsaw of the 
Ottoman Empire began to break up with the emergence of Westem-style, secular 
nationalism among Turks, Armenians and the other peoples of the region. This was 
nationalism that brought with it a new element of overt racism and new territorial 
ambitions to secure national homelands. Nationalism was mainly restricted to the 
educated and progressive elites of the big cities, particularly Istanbul and Tbilisi, and 
was characterised by a fierce attachment to the religion, language, literature and 
ancient history of the Armenian people, and by an ambition to achieve independence 
from the Ottoman Empire. This ambition was strongly influenced by the example of 
the Balkan independence movements, by the comparative freedom of Armenians 
under Russian rule, and by contemporary European thought and literature. It was the 
new nationalism of both the Turks and the Armenians that paved the way for the 
national tragedy of 1915, invariably referred to by Armenians everywhere as ‘The 
Genocide’. That year, a desperate Turkish government facing a Russian attack, 
determined to prevent the Armenians on its eastem borders from assisting the enemy, 
by eliminating them conclusively. As a result of the execution, massacre and forced 
marches across Turkey to concentration camps in Northern Syria, at least 1.5 million 
people died. Tens of thousands more fled to Russian-controlled Eastem Armenia, the 
Middle East and the Westem hemisphere. Thus, the Armenian population of the 
westem part of what is termed ‘Historic Greater Armenia’, was bmtally wiped out.
In order to answer as fully and effectively as possible, the questions posed at the 
outset of this work, it is important to discuss Armenia from both a historical and 
geographical perspective. A basic knowledge of Armenia from both perspectives will
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provide the reader who is unfamiliar with the area and its people with the necessary 
background to successfully interpret the remainder of this work. The reader may 
perhaps formulate his own conclusions as to how and why this sense of cultural 
uniqueness, of national identity has been maintained.
The initial sections of this thesis will examine Armenia from a geographical vantage 
point with particular attention being paid to size, location, geological structure and 
vegetation, climate, resources, farming, population and wildlife.
The larger part of this work will focus upon the history of the Armenian people, a 
discourse that will begin with an examination of their origins and their nation in 
ancient times.
I will also attempt to discuss how the Armenians fared under the tsarist system of 
government, beginning with the reign of Peter the Great and ending with that of 
Nicholas II and the Genocide of 1915.
Following sections concerning independent Armenia (1918-1920) and the republic 
during the Soviet period, the Armenian Apostolic Church, alphabet, language, 
diaspora, political parties and the question of Nagorno-Karabakh will also be 
discussed. With regard to the sections that concern the future for the Annenian 
Republic, particular attention will be paid to traditional Armenian dependence on 
foreign forces (namely Russia) for protection, past and future Anneno-Turkish 
relations, the perceived threat of Pan-Turkism and the future for the diasporan parties.
The final chapters of this work will be devoted to a discussion of post-Soviet 
developments in the republic and some theories concerning the phenomenon of 
Armenian national identity and cohesiveness. The thesis will be completed with the
15
concluding section which, in the light of what has been discussed, will attempt to 
offer an answer to the questions posed at the outset; against what overwhelming odds 
have these people survived, and how and why have they managed to maintain a sense 
of national identity? How can they use their achievements to date, as a foundation for 
the establishment of a new and successful nation-state?
16
1.0 Armenia: A Geographical Overview
1.1 Size and Location
Known historically as Great Armenia, the homeland of the Armenians comprises a 
large area of mountainous country. These uplands are situated on the northern 
borders of the Near East, above Syria and Mesopotamia, and form what can be 
regarded as a natural barrier between Iranian Azerbaijan and the rest of the Anatolian 
Plateau.
The Armenian Republic (as it is known today), occupies an area totalling 29,800 sq. 
km in size (Mini World Factfile, 1993, p. 19). Situated in the centre of the 
Transcaucasian region, it borders the Georgian Republic in the North, the Republic of 
Azerbaijan in the east, Turkey in the southwest and Iran in the southeast. 
Nakhichevan, an autonomous region that is part of Azerbaijan, also forms part of the 
southern border (see figs 2 & 3).
In contrast to the Armenia of today, the territory of Great Armenia was much more 
extensive and exceeded in size that of England and Wales combined. In effect, it 
amounted to some 100,000 square miles (2,000 years ago) and covered an area 
between longitudes 37° and 49° East and latitudes 37.5° and 41.5° North (Lang & 
Walker, 1987, p.3). Lesser Armenia, during the Middle Ages was a district of 
northwestern Armenia, adjoining what is now the Turkish-Kurdish city of Erzincan.
It should also be noted that from the eleventh to the fourteenth centuries, there existed 
in Cilicia what was an important Armenian kingdom (see fig.4). This is north of the 
Gulf of Alexandretta, and includes the modem city of Adana and St Paul’s birthplace. 
Tarsus. This kingdom was ruled by the Armenian dynasty of the Rupenids and then 
by the French Lusignans, falling to the Mamluks of Egypt in 1375 AD. Cilicia is also 
known as Little Armenia. Of the 100,000 square miles of Great Armenia, only 11,175
17
Fig 2: The Republic of Armenia (Source: Ronald G. Suny, Looking Toward Ararat: 
Armenia in Modem History, 1993)
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Fig 3: Amienia; Factsheet (Source: C.I.S. and Eastem Europe on File, 1993)
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Fig 4; Amienia; Physical Features (Source: C.I.S. and Eastern Europe on File, 1993)
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square miles were included within the Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic, 10% of 
the territory of ancient Great Armenia. Most of the remainder went to form the 
eastem ‘vilayets’ or provinces of the Turkish Republic.
The main Armenian plateau has an average height of between 4,500 and 5,500 feet 
above sea level, although there are a few areas where it drops below 3,000 feet (as in 
the Middle Araxes Plain); at Debedashen on the Georgian border, it plummets to 
1,200 feet.
It remains a fact that almost everywhere Armenia is higher than its surrounding 
neighbours. It is also cut off from them by natural barriers such as mountain peaks 
and great hills. To the west the country shades off into the uplands of Central 
Anatolia, but access to the Black Sea is impeded to the northwest by the Pontic Alps 
and the densely wooded slopes of Lazistan.
The Armenian highlands, stretching from Lake Van to Lake Sevan and from the 
River Hrazdan to the Euphrates, not only guaranteed the domination of the most 
important trade routes of the Ancient World, but also offered a most powerful 
position in military terms in respect of the neighbouring countries. This explains 
why, from the very beginning of its history, Armenia became the bone of 
contention between the great powers of the world. The result was that our 
country was forever a battlefield (Emin, 1981, p.94).
To Armenia’s north lies Georgia, mnning up to the Great Caucasian range. The 
country is, however, cut off from the shores of the Caspian Sea by Azerbaijan. The 
southern marches of Armenia are enmeshed with the territory of their age-old rivals, 
the Kurds. A particularly hard fact of geography is Armenia’s lack of access to the 
sea (see fig.5). Cut off from Russia by the main Caucasus range, Armenia’s nearest 
maritime outlets are ports like Trebizond in Turkey, Batumi in Georgia and, 
(formerly) Baku in Azerbaijan. From 1080 to 1375 AD, the Cilician Kingdom of 
Armenia had direct access to the eastem Mediterranean through several excellent
21
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ports, but this was only a temporary affair. This apart, Armenia is entirely landlocked 
and has, as a result, suffered both economically and politically.
Apart from having a cursed history, it was also doomed to have a cursed 
geography. Hers was the tragedy of a people who were forced to build houses on 
the banks of flooding rivers, around volcanic craters (Emin, 1981, p.95).
23
1.2 Geological Structure
It was Macdonald Kinneir who, writing in a ‘Theocritan’ vein in 1813, described the 
country thus:
The country is mountainous, diversified, with extensive plains and beautiful 
valleys and the inhabitants are blessed not only with the necessaries but even the 
luxuries of life. Almost every kind of grain is cultivated with success, and the 
gardens, with which the towns and villages are surrounded yield abundance of 
the most delicious fruits, such as grapes, olives, oranges, peaches, apricots, 
nectarines, mulberries, plumbs, apples, pears, walnuts and melons. Wax and 
honey are procured from the mountains and raw-silk, hemp and cotton are 
exported to Constantinople and Russia. The mineral productions are silver, 
copper, loadstone, saltpetre and bitumen. The country is intersected by 
innumerable streams of water, the majority of which contribute towards the 
formation of three great rivers, the Tigris, Euphrates and Araxes (Walker, 1990,
p.20).
The latter had obviously observed, amongst other things, Armenia’s rather interesting 
geological structure, one that is essentially composed of most of the phases of the 
earth’s history, from the pre-Cambrian right down to the Quaternary epoch.
Gevorg Emin, the Armenian writer and poet, referred to his country thus:
Indeed, Armenia is a land of stones............ Popular legend has it, that the Lord,
while creating the world, stood on the top of one of our mountains. The mess 
that He originally created, he sifted through a huge sieve, pouring soft soil to one 
side and dumping the remaining stones on the site of present day Armenia (Emin, 
1981, p.43).
The entire area of modem Armenia had been engulfed by the sea that remained for 
the longest period of time in the Araxes valley. Long phases of relative stability were 
interrupted by violent crustal disturbances that culminated in the formation of great 
folds and ridges composed of marine deposits that had accumulated on the sea bed 
over millions of years. These convulsions also threw up from the inner depths of the 
earth’s crust, vast quantities of lava and friable volcanic products.
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According to exponents of continental drift theory, it seems that a general shift of 
land from the North towards the equator took place during the Tertiaiy period, 
perhaps 50 million years ago, bringing about the great belt of folding which extends 
from the Himalayas westwards to the Alps and to the Atlas Mountains in North 
Africa.
Of this great belt, the Taurus and Ararat systems in Anatolia are but a small part. The 
final phase of these colossal upheavals resulted in the retreat of the ocean waters that 
had covered Armenia and the extrusion of vast mountain ranges in a succession of 
upward thrusts:
In two areas, the Hindu Kush and Armenia, the folding was particularly intense. 
Here, the outward thrust from the North was met by a degree of resistance from 
the South; the mountain ranges were most constricted and vividly articulated 
(Walker, 1990, p. 19).
Such ranges only came into being in the Neogene or newer Tertiary period, about 25 
million years ago-a comparatively modem phase in the formation of the earth’s cmst. 
Such processes, of course, left virtually the whole of Armenia and Eastern Anatolia 
covered in extinct volcanoes in various states of decay. In fact, Christopher Walker, 
the historian, suggests as much:
The distinctive nature of Armenia’s landscape developed from this massive 
folding of the earth’s crust. Her most characteristic physical aspect is of volcanic 
tablelands, broken up by soaring mountain systems topped by peaks of which 
Ararat, is the highest (Walker, 1990, p. 19).
The sheets of lava that flowed down from such volcanoes in the remote past have 
created tablelands often much higher than the plains which form their foundation. 
The otherwise monotonous landscape does have a ‘saving grace’ in that it is 
punctuated by a few ranges that are not of volcanic origin and which manage to
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protrude through the volcanic overlay.
The most famous natural feature which Armenia has to offer is Mount Ararat, reputed 
to be the legendary resting place of Noah’s Ark. Amongst the proponents of this 
Tegend’ is the author of the Hebrew Book of Genesis, who speaks of the Ark meeting 
its resting place on the submerged summit of Ararat, a mountain 17,000 feet (5,180 
metres) high.
The waters prevailed so mightily that all the mountains were covered more than 
twenty feet deep. All flesh died; everything on dry land in whose nostrils was the 
breath of life died. Man and animals, creeping things and birds-all were blotted 
out from the earth. Only Noah and those with him in the Ark were left. The 
waters prevailed upon the earth a hundred and fifty days, but God remembered 
Noah and all with him in the Ark. He made a wind blow, and the waters 
subsided. The rain was restrained, the waters receded, and in the seventh month, 
on the seventeenth day of the month, the Ark came to rest upon the mountains of 
Ararat (Reader’s Digest Bible, 1990, p.30).
Indeed, according to one old explanation of the name of the Armenian capital city of 
Erevan:
It was the first piece of land to have been seen by Noah after the flood receded. 
‘Yerevats! Yerevatsl’ (Tt’s in sight!’) Noah is supposed to have joyfully 
exclaimed after catching sight of this dry piece of land (Emin, 1981, p.52).
Mount Ararat is situated about halfway between Lake Van to the southwest in Turkish 
Armenia, and Lake Sevan to the northeast. The massif of Ararat rises on its north and 
east sides out of the rich alluvial plain of the River Araxes, which flows here at 
between 3,000 and 2,500 feet above sea level. On the southwest, it sinks down into 
the plateau of Bayazid, about 4,500 feet high, on the frontier between Persia and 
Turkey. On the northwest of Ararat, a col nearly 7,000 feet high connects it with a 
long ridge of volcanic mountains running further westwards into Asia Minor. Out of 
the Ararat Massif rise two peaks, their bases merging at a height of 8,800 feet, their
26
summits standing about 7 miles apart.
Great Ararat is a huge broad-shouldered mass, more like a dome than a cone; Little 
Ararat is an elegant pyramidal cone, rising with smooth, steep, regular sides to a 
comparatively sharp peak. On the north and west, the slopes of Great Ararat are 
covered with glittering fields of neve. There is a glacier on the northeast side, at the 
bottom of a great chasm running far into the heart of the mountain. The permanent 
snow-line begins at the unusually high level of some 14,000 feet; this is due to the 
small amount of rainfall, and to the upward current of dry air from the plain of the 
River Araxes. Both Great and Little Ararat consist of volcanic rocks, mostly andésites 
and pyroxene andésites, with some obsidian. In medieval times, the lower slopes of 
Ararat were wooded, but now they are stark and bare.
Today, Mount Ararat stands just within the frontier of the Turkish Republic. Over the 
border, to the northwest of Erevan, the immense bulk of Alagoz (Aragats) extends 
across the horizon. This massive group of extinct volcanoes occupies a space up to 
40 miles long, from close to Lake Sevan, westwards to Arpa Chai, a tributary of the 
Araxes.
Other ‘Armenian’ mountains of note include the mighty Bingol Dagh, which David 
Marshall Lang, an authority on the Caucasus, describes as the ‘Mountain of the 
thousand Tams’ (Lang, 1970, p.20). This Goliath towers over the land directly south 
of Erzemm and is the parent mountain of both the Araxes and the principal tributaries 
of the Euphrates. The volcanic mass of Bingol Dagh (or the ‘Cauldron of a thousand 
Pools’ as it is also known) rises, at its highest point, to 10,770 feet.
Another ancient volcano of topographical import is that of Nimrud Dagh (9,900 feet) 
close to Tatvan at the southwestern comer of Lake Van. Nimmd Dagh played an
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important part in determining the present conformation of Lake Van; thick streams of 
lava flowing out of Nimrud Dagh in the remote past blocked up a former branch of 
the Murat Su, and gradually confined the waters of the present lake behind a natural 
dam of volcanic deposits.
This formidable collection of peaks together with the Ararat Massif, divide Armenia 
into two halves, the southwestern Vannic area (historical Vaspurakan), and the north­
eastern Araxes plain. Lake Sevan and the Karabagh region (historical Siunia). The 
existence of this great barrier and the consequent difficulty of communications, 
played a role in the division of Armenia into rival feudal principalities and hindered 
the creation of a united Armenian state. Today, this is not the only geographical 
barrier cutting through the Armenian landscape. The range of the Lesser Caucasus 
runs up to the northwest from above Lake Sevan, and forms a natural barrier between 
the cultural sphere of the Hayk (Armenian) and the Kartvelian peoples, the Georgian 
nation of today.
Lake Van, which played a central role in the cultural evolution of Urartu in Assyrian 
times, lies at a height of 5,640 feet above sea level. It is about 80 miles long and 35 
miles across between Suphan and Gevash, where it is widest. Roughly triangular in 
shape, it covers 1,460 square miles and is bordered by fertile arable plains on the 
north and east sides. The ruins of the ancient city of Van, and the new Turkish town 
nearby, stand on the eastern shore of the lake.
Lake Sevan, however, is veiy different. Known in Turkish as ‘Gokche’, ‘the Blue 
Lake’, and to the ancients as ‘Lychnitis’, the lake is, on the northern side, confined by 
the long ridge of mountains which cut off Armenia from Georgia and Azerbaijan. To 
the south, the lake is impeded by the volcanic plateau of Akhmangan, which rises in 
places to a height of approximately 12,000 feet. The lake itself stands at a level of
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6,340 feet and, according to the historian David Marshall Lang, in an area as striking 
in severity as it is in beauty:
For travellers approaching Armenia by road from Tbilisi in the north, Sevan with 
its grandiose backcloth of mountains forms one of the first vistas to greet the eye 
after cresting the lofty pass above the health resort of Delijan with its streams and 
orchards. The voyager is brought face to face with a stark and uncompromising 
landscape which leaves an indelible impression on the beholder (Lang, 1970,
p.22).
In conclusion, with its mighty mountains topped by eternal snow, two great lakes, 
countless ravines and canyons, almost two-thirds of the territory of historical Armenia 
can be classified as unfit for settled habitation. Large tracts ofArmenian plateau can 
only yield a scanty living to the nomads and their herds. Although its territory once 
equalled that of England and Wales together, Armenia has never supported a 
population of more than 5 or 6 million. It must, however, be stressed that modem 
industry and cultivation methods have worked wonders in that portion of the land 
which was formerly under Soviet control, though the former Turkish Armenia 
remains, since the great massacres, largely sterile and waste.
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1.3 Climate
Owing to the generally high elevation, Armenia has a continental climate with dry, 
hot summers (average July temperatures range from 16°C to 23 °C) and cold winters 
(average January temperatures range from -12°C to -9°C). The average yearly 
precipitation is 12 to 25 inches (300-635 mm) (Collier’s Encvclopedia. 1990, Vol. II, 
p.662). Climatic differences are great. Soils in the river valleys are partly alluvial 
and volcanic in origin and afford good yields under irrigation. The elevated sections 
are steppe-like, with predominant black earth and chestnut soils. Still higher, lie the 
alpine meadows, used for pasture by Armenian herds.
In bygone ages, if the conqueror was ever tempted to invade, the climate, more often 
than not, did not encourage him to linger. The Armenian winter is unrelenting, with 
long, bitterly cold winters resulting from the extreme elevation of the plateaux, and 
snow lying for as long as 8 months. On several occasions the Armenian winter has 
trapped more than one rash general. Lucullus, for example, was ‘caught out’ in 68 
BC, an Ottoman Turkish army was compelled to desist in its attempt to seize Erevan 
from the Persians in 1616, and, most notably, the Turkish War Minister, Enver Pasha, 
taking personal command, was defeated at Sarikamish in 1914-15: this was more a 
result of the intensely cruel weather of the Armenian uplands than the outcome of any 
defeat that the Russian army could inflict upon the advancing Turk (Walker, 1990, 
p. 19). The intense cold has certainly taken on a legendary mantle. The Turkish 
traveller Evliya iChéîebi relates how a dervish, asked whether there was any summer 
in Erzemm, replied:
By God, I remained there eleven months and nine and twenty days, the people 
said that summer was coming, but I did not see it. It happened however, that a 
cat, which ran over the roofs of the houses, became froze there while in the act of 
mnning, and remained so for the space of nine months, when, the spring arriving, 
the cat began to thaw, cried ‘Miau’ and fell down (Walker, 1990, p. 19).
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In much of Armenia, the severity of economic conditions is aggravated by the harsh 
climate of the mountainous and upland areas. Over the exposed plains of Erzemm, 
Kars and Ardahan, the winter blows with freezing intensity. In northern areas, snow 
falls for between 50 and 60 days annually and can lie for up to 7 months in certain 
regions. In such areas, the Armenian peasantry felt compelled, in ancient times, to 
build semi-underground houses and burrows in order to survive the harsh winter 
seasons. After all, temperatures towards the end of the year have been known to fall 
to -40°C. The Araxes valley provides a notable exception to these conclusions; here, 
the winters are mild, although the summer heat is intense, with temperatures reaching 
90°C. The most climatically agreeable areas of Armenia are those which lie around 
Lake Van, and in the north, the wooded mountains and the hills of Lori, Zangezur and 
the Karabagh, where trees give shade in the summer, as well as protection from 
winter gales.
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1.4 Soils
Typical soils encountered in Armenia are the following:
a) The light brown alluvial earth of the Ararat Valley and the Araxes plain, which are 
set at an average height of 2,500 to 4,000 feet above sea level. The soil is rich in marl 
but poor in humus, and has been irrigated, manured and cultivated over many 
centuries. Much of this area it taken up by cereal and vegetable crops, cotton, 
vineyards and orchards. Parts of the region are still occupied by salt flats and 
marshes.
b) The rich brown soil of the drier hill country, lying in the south between 4,000 and
5,000 feet above sea level, and, in the northeast, between 1,200 and 2,500 feet, where 
all kinds of crops can be found. These range from com to valuable plantations of 
fhiit and nut trees.
c) The mountain black-earth districts, occupying a large portion of the higher steppes 
of the Armenian uplands, at heights between 4,500 and 7,000 feet. Covered in snow 
for the most part of the year, and littered with loose stones, this land has the potential 
for improvement. It can be made to yield excellent crops of hardier varieties of 
cereals and vegetables during the brief spring and summer season.
d) The higher meadow lands, covering the slopes of Armenia’s great hill and 
mountain ranges, between 5,000 and 10,000 feet, in the sub-alpine zones. These 
rugged highland meadows, often steeply sloping, yield little apart from hay and 
fodder for flocks and herds, but play an essential part in the country’s economy by 
providing summer pasture for sheep and cattle. The rearing of these is traditionally 
the domain of the Kurdish and Tartar tribes which have led a nomadic life throughout 
the region since time immemorial.
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Much of Armenia’s soil is formed in part from the detritus of volcanic lava, and is 
rich in nitrogen, potash, phosphates and other useful chemicals. Where irrigation is 
available, and surface stones and debris cleared away, fertile fields can be formed 
even from quite unpromising terrain; much labour, however, is usually required for 
farming in Armenia. The novelist Garegin Sevunts remarked that through the ages, 
the Armenian people have literally been compelled to ‘wrest bread from among 
stones’ (Lang, 1970, p.31).
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1.5 Vegetation
The flora and vegetation in Armenia are no less varied than the climatic landscape. 
Only one-tenth of the landscape is taken over by forest and even this has fallen victim 
to indiscriminate felling and depredations by the flocks and herds of the nomads.
The oak, beech and hornbeam are fairly common and are often to be found growing 
side-by-side and in close proximity to the lime, ash and maple. The wooded areas of 
Armenia also contain the plane tree, the yew, walnut and hawthorn. In northern 
regions, small forests of pine and spruce occur.
One can also flnd birch woods mixed with barberry, wild currant, wild rose and 
mountain ash. Armenia is rich in wild fruits of many kinds, including the vine, the 
cornelian cherry, the wild pear, crab-apple, damson, medlar, cherry, raspberry and 
dew-berry. Botanists agree that as well as being the natural habitat of the vine, 
Armenia, as well as neighbouring Georgia are the original home of many trees, 
bushes and plants now found all over Europe in cultivated state.
The volcanic peaks such as Ararat, Suphan and Nimrud have climatic conditions 
incompatible with an abundant plant life; the porous and loose volcanic soil tends to 
reduce the ground moisture available for plants. The lower slopes of these peaks are 
covered mainly with steppe grasses, well suited to dry conditions. Uncultivated parts 
of the middle Araxes valley tend to be covered with brushwood and salt steppe and 
marshes, with camel thorn and other plants tolerant of such conditions. Sand steppes 
found in higher reaches have wormwood, spurge and Helichrysum. Between 4,000 
and 6,000 feet, wild rye and several other grapes flourish, while river gorges favour 
bistort, juniper and prickly cushions of a type of sea lavender (Acantholimon 
Glumaceum). Above 7,000 feet, the ground is often stony and the vegetation sparse, 
except for a few alpine meadows which are notably beautiful in springtime. Northern
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types of plant able to survive the biting cold are characteristic of these higher reaches.
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1.6 Wildlife
In Armenia alone, 454 species of vertebrates, that is, animals, birds and fish have 
been classified. About 10,000 kinds of insect, and over 1,000 invertebrate creatures 
have also been discovered. The vertebrates include 76 species of mammal, 304 kinds 
of bird, 44 varieties of reptile, 6 sorts of amphibious animal, and 24 species of fish. 
The mammals comprise insectivorous types such as the mole and hedgehog, 
cheiroptera, such as the bat, and various beasts of prey, such as the leopard, panther, 
porcupine, hyena, polecat and wildcat. Also part of this group of mammals are 
several species of rodent, as well as a vast range of domesticated animals. The wolf 
and the jackal are fairly common, even in areas which are quite densely populated. 
There are also a few badgers and bears left in the country as well as wild boar, 
roebuck, mountain goat, and mottled deer (although the latter are quite rare).
Fur-bearing animals include the . squirrel, marten, otter, fox and also the coypu. The 
weasel takes toll of mice and other small rodents and the hare is fairly common. In 
the remote districts south of Lake Van, wild sheep are found on open uplands and 
ibex, on crags and cliffs. Grey bear and wild pig are to be found near Shatak, and 
lynxes lurk in the deep gorges.
Of freshwater fish, the most notable are the Ishkhan salmon trout of Lake Sevan, the 
whitefish, the carp and the barbel. Birdlife is varied; this includes the raven, crow, 
vulture, hawk, falcon, owl, Caucasian grouse, partridge, quail, hazel-grouse and snipe. 
The pigeon and the dove are common, and there are plenty of water-fowl, such as the 
coot, the teal, the pochard and sundry species of duck. Flies and mosquitoes, both 
disease carriers, are troublesome on marshy ground. Poisonous snakes and scorpions 
are fairly frequently found. In Turkish Armenia, swarms of locusts from the Kurdish 
hills may ravage the eastern plains in April and May.
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1.7 Resources
It is the unique geological features of the Armenian highlands which help to account 
for the land’s unusual richness in metals, minerals and a wide range of stones useful 
for industrial purposes.
The fusion of vast floods of liquefying magmas with the subsoil of Armenia in 
remote epochs resulted in extremely rich deposits of copper, molybdenum, 
aluminium, lead, zinc, gold, silver, iron, chrome and other metals; the latter include 
quartzite, asbestos and various other minerals with fire-resistant properties and 
industrial uses. It was volcanic action which resulted in the formation of several 
types of stone with high-grade constructional qualities; tufa of several colours and 
shades, basalt, andésite, pumice, slag and granite. These are currently widely 
employed in building and construction in Armenia and used to be exported to other 
regions of the (former) Soviet Union. The fact that Armenia was, for millions of 
years, covered by sea water, led to the precipitation and solidification in sedimentary 
form, of lime, dolomite, gypsum, rocksalt, high-grade clays, phosphorite, diatomite 
and many other substances useful in agriculture and industry. The crystallisation of 
limestone has produced a high-grade marble, much vaunted for its constructional and 
decorative qualities. Annenia also has a flourishing cement industry.
Mines of precious metals, especially gold and silver and also copper and iron mines 
were exploited in antiquity, gold and copper being refined in Armenia from around
3,000 BC. In Annenia, prospecting for new mines and sources of metals and minerals 
was constantly carried on ( up until the conflict with Azerbaijan over the tract of land 
known as Nagorno-Karabakh) (see fig.6). In Turkish Armenia, even those mines 
(particularly copper and silver) which were well-known in ancient times and the 
Middle Ages, are now in a languishing condition, due to the disappearance of the 
once industrious Armenian population.
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Fig 6 Armenia: Industry and Minerals (Source: C.I.S. and Eastern Europe on File,
1993)   :------- :---- ;-----------------------------------  ;--- --------- ---------
Armenia: Industry and Minerals
Alaverdi
Kalinino* 
Stepanavan# k
•  Tumanian
AI
•  Vanadzor•Gyumri
Hrazdan# 
Charentsavan* IjhAnipemza
Ashtarak# 
Echmiadzin
k
Abovian 
9  Yerevan
O k ® - ^
Gavor
Armavir
Artashat
Ararat* eu
8
Sisian
Kapan
. o
Kaiaran
Meghri
Agarak
Minerals
AI Aluminum 
Cu Copper
Industry
Chemicals
Ferrous and nonferrous mining 
and metallurgy
Food processing
Machinery, metal goods, building 
materials and cement
Textiles and clothing
38
Petroleum and natural gas have not yet been discovered in Armenia in commercially 
viable quantities. Soviet Armenia was easily supplied with these from Baku, the great 
oil town in neighbouring Azerbaijan. Now, however, the Armenian Republic is the 
ex-Soviet republic with the bleakest energy situation of them all in the short run. The 
war with Azerbaijan over the enclave of Nagorno-Karabakh (in the Azeri Republic) 
and the civil war in nearby Georgia, have played a major part in creating an energy 
crisis within the region. The oil and gas pipelines which provided for so long an 
energy lifeline to the republic have constantly been disrupted, deliberately so in the 
case of Azerbaijan, which put Armenia through a blockade, reducing its fossil fuel to 
a mere trickle:
For two days Armenia had not received one cu m of gas, Armenian radio, 
Yerevan, reported on the 25 January. The gas pipeline which entered Armenia 
through Georgia’s Mameulskiy rayon had been blown up, with the result that the 
republic was no longer receiving 4-4.5 cu m of gas per day. The radio noted that 
Mameulskiy rayon was inhabited predominantly by Azerbaijanis. An 
exceedingly grave situation had arisen with regard to energy ‘which can only be 
described as a disaster’, the radio said (Russia Express, April/May 1993, p.9).
Following discussions between Armenia’s President Levon Ter-Petrossian and 
Russian and Georgian leaders, an agreement was reached which involved the issue of 
supplying electricity from Russia to Armenia and the organisation of a special team 
to carry out the repair of the damaged pipeline. The Turkish premier even discussed 
the possibility of the supply of grain and power to the stricken republic. The situation 
remained critical, even after the Armenian plea to various international organisations 
to assist in the easing of the economic blockade against the republic. This was a plea, 
however, which unfortunately fell, ‘upon deaf ears’.
Itar-Tass News Agency, Moscow, on 25 January reported that the Armenian 
Foreign Ministry had asked the UN, the CSCE and the CIS to ‘use all political 
measures’ to ease the ‘economic blockade’ against Armenia and assist the 
republic after the destruction of the pipeline, which the ministry characterised as 
a ‘barbaric terrorist act planned and perpetrated by the Azerbaijani side as a
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means of exerting power pressure on Armenia’ (Russia Express, April/May 1993, 
p9).
As far as supplies of electric energy are concerned, these were once assured by a 
series of hydroelectric stations built along the River Razdan (Zanga) which flows out 
of the northwestern comer of Lake Sevan. The Razdan River lies at an altitude of 
6,250 feet (1,905 metres) and joins the Araks River after a course of 65 miles (105 
km) and a drop of 3,300 feet (1,000 metres). The largest of the hydroelectric stations, 
at Gyumush, had a generating capacity o f224,000 kilowatts. In total, 40% of the total 
hydroelectric power potential (H.E.P.) was utilised.
In view of the disastrous situation in Armenia and its continuing involvement in the 
conflict with its Muslim neighbour, new measures were taken by the Armenian 
government. In fact, Armenia’s Energy Minister, Sepukh Tashdzhyan, told 
parliament on the 1 February 1993, that unless the blockade of the country was lifted, 
he would have to continue with energy austerity measures for the remainder of that 
year (Russia Express April/May 1993, p. 10). Despite this, he also believed that by the 
year 2000 Armenia would be energy-sufficient by the reactivation of its one nuclear 
power station (shut down in 1988 because of the earthquake), by reaching the design 
capacity at the Razdan Thermal Power Station, and by the modernisation of a number 
of smaller hydroelectric schemes. In addition, Tashdzhyan expressed support for the 
construction of a new nuclear power station in Armenia. Armenia’s energy supplies 
were cut off to such a degree that industrial production plummeted to near zero, while 
its domestic fuel supply consisted mainly of firewood which rapidly ran out. Winter 
1993 and those that followed, meant more trees in the capital, Erevan, were denuded 
of their branches. The Armenians themselves remained sceptical of any new 
governmental schemes designed to hoist the country back to its feet. Many thought 
that by the time the crisis was resolved they would have expired anyway.
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In view of the critical energy situation in the republic, the Armenian government also 
made the decision to reopen, on 15 January 1993, the coal field in Idzhevan, which 
had not been used since the late 1940s. Daily coal extraction was estimated to be at 
least 50 tonnes according to forecasts by specialists (Russia Express. April/May 1993, 
p. 10). Talks also took place between Armenia and Iran on the construction of a gas 
pipeline which was expected to supply the beleaguered republic with 3m cu per day. 
Armenia was to supply consumer goods and chemicals in return.
The extremely grave situation that has developed in recent years with regard to energy 
sources, and the blockade of Armenia, have forced specialists to intensify their search 
for alternative sources of energy. The frantic search has been crowned with success. 
Indeed, in the early part of 1993, the Energan partnership drew up plans for the 
construction of an experimental two-megawatt solar electric power station; the 
emphasis was on efficiency. Energan had the technology to produce special mirrors, 
which were to be the main component of the installation; these were capable of 
utilising up to 85% of the sun’s rays, whereas this index barely reached 60% in the 
best foreign prototypes.
Experts were so convinced of this design’s success that, simultaneously with 
construction on an experimental small-scale station, they started developing a 
computer model for a gigantic 2,000-megawatt solar installation. This meant, that 
barring any problems, Armenia would be able to meet its electricity needs in full, and, 
moreover, sell spare kilowatts to neighbouring states.
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1.8 Farming
Although Armenians farmers are in need of new equipment, agriculture remains a 
mainstay of the Armenian economy. In general, Armenia is self-sufficient in 
foodstuffs and produces surplus crops for export (particularly so before the blockade). 
The Armenian government is still in the process of breaking up the large, state-owned 
collectives established under Soviet rule. Smaller plots are being sold to individual 
owners, who are allowed to sell their crops on the open market. These farmers may 
be able to achieve greater yields, especially if better equipment and methods become 
available.
With irrigation, Armenian farms can raise cereal grains, such as wheat, barley and 
oats. Farmers plant wheat, Armenia’s leading crop, in western, central, and southern 
parts of the country. Most of the grain becomes flour, while oats and barley are used 
as animal feed and in the brewing industry.
Vine grapes and fruits are also grown, along with the wheat and barley, on the slopes 
of the mountains and on most of the steppes. The Leninakan Steppes in the west, and 
the Lori Steppe, in the north, are the main farming areas on the Armenian highland. 
The best farmlands of Armenia are, naturally, the irrigated lands in river valleys, 
where cotton, tobacco and orchard trees are cultivated.
Sericulture is widespread in the Erevan area and fishing is an important occupation at 
Lake Sevan. Fanners grow hardy vegetables, such as yams and sugar beets, on the 
remaining collective farms and on private plots for local markets and canneries. 
Sunflowers are cultivated for their oil on poor soil that cannot be used for other types 
of crop. Cotton fields thrive in the warm strip of land in western Armenia. Grapes 
are raised on flat land and on hillside terraces in the northeast. Commercial dairy 
farming is quite new to Armenia and limited numbers of cattle and sheep can be
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found throughout the country on farms established by the Soviet government. 
Nevertheless, most of Armenia’s milk and cheese still comes from goats.
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1.9 Population (UAyJGs
Armenians make up the bulk of the republic’s population (about 88%%  ^There were 
also other groups in Soviet Armenia which included the Azerbaijan or Azeri Tartars 
(6%), Russians and Ukrainians (3%) and Kurds (1.5%). There were substantial 
Armenian minorities living in the two other parts of Soviet Transcaucasia; for 
example, the communities in Georgia and Azerbaijan amounted to about half a 
million in each case (Lang & Walker, 1987, p.9). Smaller groups of Armenians also 
live in Turkey, Syria and other Middle Eastern countries. The major cities of the 
republic are (following the 1988 earthquake) Kumayri and Karaklis. The population 
of the republic itself, according to one source, is in the region of about 3,324,000 
which, of course represents half the world-wide number of Armenians (Mini World 
Factfile, 1993, p. 19). The country has a population, according to 1993 figures, of 
around 112 people per sq. km and over half of the republic’s inhabitants live in urban 
areas.
Erevan itself now contains over a third of the entire population of the Armenian 
Republic. This rapid urban growth (see fig.7) reflects the world-wide drift of rural 
farmers into big cities, resulting from industrialisation and the search for town 
comforts and amenities. This somewhat artificial situation in Armenia also results 
from the deliberate concentration of industry in the capital, and from the stony, 
inhospitable character of much of the countryside.
The Armenians are a mobile and widely-scattered people, this state of affairs having 
resulted in difficulty in establishing the total world population of Armenians at any 
given time. Estimates, even seemingly reliable ones, vary widely. According to one 
source, explains the historian Christopher Walker, the trend in the world’s Armenian 
population is upward.
44
Fig 7; Armenia: Demographic Statistics (Source: C.I.S. and Eastern Europe on File,
1993) ______________________________________________________________________
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Figures given in 1966 in the Erevan periodical ‘Hayreniki Dzayn’, show that at that 
time there was a world-wide total of 5.5 million Armenians, sub-divided as follows 
(Lang & Walker, 1987, p. 12):
USSR 3,500,000
Rest of the World 2,000,000
The Soviet Armenian community was classified as follows:
Armenian SSR 2,000,000
Azerbaijan SSR 560,000
Georgian SSR 550,000
Russian SSR 330,000
Others 60.000
Total: 3,500,000 (1979 Soviet Census total: 4,151,241)
Outside the Soviet Union, the main communities were estimated to comprise:
USA and Canada 450,000
Turkey 250,000
Iran 200,000
France 200,000
Lebanon 180,000
Syria 150.000
Total: 1,430,000
This leaves (at 1966 figures) 570,000 to be divided between such countries as Great 
Britain (about 6,000), Germany, Italy, Austria, Switzerland, Bulgaria (about 25,000),
46
Romania, Poland, Cyprus, Egypt, South America, India, Burma, Singapore, China and 
Australia. The inflated figure of 250,000 for Turkey is suspect, and must include 
many ‘camouflaged’ Armenians who have taken Turkish names and adopted Islam to 
avoid persecution.
It is also noticeable that the birthrate in Armenia has shown a significant decrease 
since the peak year of 1958, when it reached 41.1 per thousand inhabitants, as against
8.1 deaths per thousand. By 1984 the growth rate had shrunk to 18.4 per thousand. 
Infant mortality in 1993 was at the rate of 20 deaths per thousand (Mini World 
Factfile. 1993, p. 19). However, this is counteracted by the fact that the Armenian 
population is increasing at the rate of about 61,000 per annum (Lang & Walker, 1987, 
p. 13).
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2.0 Historical Background
2.1 The Origins of the Armenian people
It has been said that the present-day Armenians represent a fusion of various ancient 
peoples, with two groups predominating: the Urartians, who flourished in the early 
centuries of the first millennium BC and may have been related to the Hurrians (see 
fig. 8), and Indo-European invaders called the Armens, who were probably an offshoot 
of the Phrygians (Collier’s Encyclopaedia. Vol. II, 1990, p.663).
The origins and formation of any people are shrouded in mist and this is 
especially true of the sources of the Armenian people. The origins of the 
Armenian people can be traced back into the remote past when nations had still 
not been historically formed in the greater part of Asia Minor and tribes lived 
separately as formed unions as, for instance, in the country of Nairi (Emin, 1981, 
p. 17).
**Lang suggests that the geographical name ‘Ararat’ is closely linked with that of Urartu, which is the 
name given by the Assyrians to the ancient kingdom which once existed on the territory of historical 
Armenia (Lang, 1988, p.39).
(Lang & Walker, 1987, p.4). This people founded a kingdom of some import in the 
Ancient Near East, a kingdom based around the city of Van in the south of the region 
(see fig.9). However, up until the formation of the Urartian state the region had been:
Inhabited by ancestors of the Armenian tribes who called their countiy Nairi (this 
possibly explains the expressions found in Urartian cuneiforms, such as ‘We 
came, conquered and captured’, referring to various parts of Armenia) (Emin,
1981, p.l3).
The historian Seton Lloyd states that the land of Urartu first appeared under the name 
‘Uruartri’ in Assyrian inscriptions of the thirteenth century BC and that by the ninth 
century it was inhabited by a tribal federation of Hurrian extraction. (Lloyd, 1967, 
p. 108). However, many facets concerning the foundation of Urartu remain unclear:
First of all, we should say, that in spite of the research carried out by highly 
qualified historians and specialists, many facts about Urartu are still baffling and
<u
H
e00
û
&01
ü
ü3OG/]
CJCû
oo
ôo(N(N
6
a
W
5  
z
c
■Sio
c
<
<u
H
06 
_üû
lÜ
\ooo
o
00
C
O
' i
4-
O
C
'5b
"C
O
o
'c
_c
tS
' < <  //f ^
< < r
v 1 W '- ' 11: I
49
^ 2
11!
-  S g
r f u i  >
gOS
î
S
<•
u
I
I
1
t
3
c/5
I
I
•s
§-
ON
to
50
at times too contradictory to determine, for instance, how long the state existed or 
what its geographical contours were (Emin, 1981, p. 12).
This federation was united under a ‘king’ named Aramé or Aramu:
The founder of the Urartu state and its first king was Arameh or Aram (860-843 
BC). His name has been preserved in Armenian pagan legends and tales ‘and is 
obviously the reason why foreign peoples subsequently began calling our people 
or one of its tribes Aramens or Armens and the country Armeh’ (Brain, 1981, 
pl3y
Following the defeat of Aramé in battle at the hands of Shalamanser III, a new 
Urartian dynasty was founded and the kingdom was extended to include provinces as 
far afield as Brzincan in the northwest, Erevan which is now in the Republic of 
Armenia, and in the south the Rowanduz area of Kurdistan. The centre of this 
kingdom, however, was still located around the city of Van.
This mountainous citadel proved virtually impenetrable to a succession of invading 
armies amongst whom were the powerful Assyrians. During the century which 
followed, the Urartians were thus able to extend the perimeters of their homeland to 
incorporate Lake Urmia in the east. Much territory was also gained in the west 
(extending as far as northern Syria); the result of such acquisition was that the main 
trade routes of the Assyrian Empire were severely disrupted. The first Assyrian 
monarch to deal effectively with the evident threat of encirclement was Tiglath- 
Pileser III (747-727 BC) who drove the Urartians out of Syria, on the way 
unsuccessfully attacking Van itself. In 713 BC Sargon Ill’s famous eighth campaign 
resulted in the sacking of the Urartian southern provincial capital, Musasir, and the 
annexation of the Urmia area. Early in the 7th Century BC, the Urartians also faced a 
grievous military threat from the north. This threat first manifested itself in the shape 
of the Cimmerians and then the Scythians and Assyrians (the latter, ruled over at the 
time, by Rusa II) (see fig. 10). From then on, although in a weakened position, the
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State managed to survive; this was achieved through various treaties with the powerful 
Assyrians. The kingdom continued to exist until the end of the seventh century BC 
and then, in 612 BC, the Scythians and Medes (of northern Persia), hitherto, 
tributaries of Assyria, overthrew their imperial masters and seized the reins of empire 
for themselves. Two or three years later they sacked the Urartian capital and 
incorporated the state into their own.
According to one source, it appears that a people calling themselves ‘Hayasa’ were 
part of the invading force which bore down on the Urartians. Whether these ‘Hayasa’ 
and the ‘Armens’ were one and the same is unclear. The historian Christopher 
Walker states that Herodotus believed the ‘Hayasa’ settled there from Phrygia 
(western Asia Minor)(Walker, 1990, p.20). Exactly who the ‘Hayasa’ were, their 
origins and how they established their power amidst the people of Urartu are still 
open to speculation. Walker also attests to the fact that there have been other 
‘theories’ propounded as to the origin of the ‘Hayasa’ (Walker, 1990, p.20); others 
have suggested that they originated farther east than Phrygia and that they were 
indeed a native people who had perhaps extended their power locally.
Emin states that the first Armenian state was formed after the fall of Urartu, 
occupying the same territoiy and having the same capital of Tushpa (Tosp, Van);
The Armenian tribes became consolidated while the Urartu state was still in 
existence, and by the time Urartu fell, the Armenian people were already able to 
found an independent state. According to Strabo, all the tribes living on this 
territory were already speaking the same language-Armenian. This explains why 
an Armenian state emerged immediately after the fall of Urartu. For this reason 
also the ancient tribes and peoples for a long time yet continued to call us 
Armenians, Urartians, and Armenia-the country of Urartu (Emin, 1981, p. 18).
Whatever deliberations might be forthcoming upon this subject, what is clear is that 
the inhabitants of Urartu did not die out, but became intermingled with the
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aforementioned invading elements.
Apart from their somewhat mysterious origin, the name which the Armenians use to 
describe themselves presents a problem; to this day an Armenian calls himself ‘Hai’, 
and Armenia is known as ‘Haiastan’. ‘Hai’, suggests Christopher Walker, is 
traditionally derived from ‘Haik’, the heroic patriarch of Armenia, who slew the titan 
Bel in an epic battle beside Lake Van (Walker, 1990, p.21). According to Ronald 
Suny, an Armenian scholar of some repute, ‘Hayk’ (or ‘Haik’) was the son of 
Torgom, great-grandson of Japeth, son of Noah himself (Suny, 1993, p.6). 
Alternatively, says Walker, the word might also come from ‘Khayasha’, the eastern 
region of the Hittite Empire (pre-1200 BC) (see fig. 11). Even more uncertain is the 
origin of our word ‘Armenia’ for which there has been offered little explanation.
Some historians assert that our people named themselves after our ancestor Haik, 
about whom we read an ancient legend in the ‘History of the Armenian People’ 
by the 5th century historian, Movses Khorenatsi. According to this legend, the 
hero Haik lived with his tribe on vast fertile lands which were, however, at the 
mercy of the tyrant Bel. For this reason Haik decided to move with his all his 
tribe to the barren mountain crags to gain independence (Emin, 1981, p. 18).
The antiquity of the Armenians is well attested in historical record. When, for 
example, Darius the Great became ruler of Persia in 522 BC, he recorded a series of 
victories on the Rock of Behistun (modem Bisitun, in northwest Iran). One of the 
satrapies of his empire mentioned there is called ‘Armina’.
In the Behistun cuneiform inscriptions, the Persian king Darius I (522-486 BC) 
was the first to refer to the state of Armenia as ‘rebellious’ and ‘indomitable’. 
The text in old Persian refers to the ‘country of Armenia’ while the parallel 
Babylonian text uses the name ‘Urartu’. After the Behistun inscription the 
ancient Greeks and Mars called our country Armenia and our people, Armens, 
after the Armeh (or Ummeh) tribe who lived in the district of Aghtsnik and who 
in the 8th-7th centuries BC invaded Tushpa, the capital of Urartu, with the Mars 
(Emin, 1981, p. 18).
54
g
£
00
Q
o
<
<L>
£=3O
IV]
UCÛ
oo
Ciôo
o
c3w
c
oc<
<D
H
tû
\o
00
ON
o  t/2
Z £
ai
z
c
'5b"C
O
0 
'c
1
ef œ 1- 1 ë .2 w1 iïi yE1II îl II 1 îc ' UJ .i  ' c
f; s il 11 . ^ 8 1g; J-3 1
I
w
s(N
i
55
From that time until Persia’s destruction by Alexander the Great two centuries later, 
Armenia was part of the Achaemenid Persian Empire, and as such, flourished and 
prospered. At the beginning of the next century the local ruler in Armenia, Orontes, 
was able to establish a dynasty which was virtually independent of the Persian 
Empire. Nevertheless, neither Orontes nor his successors were able to throw off the 
empires that surrounded them; a pattern gradually began to emerge. This was an 
Armenia with a wide measure of autonomy within the orbit of whichever great power 
happened to be in the ascendant.
**The term Tndo-Hittite’ is used by those scholars who believe that Hittite and the other Anatolian 
languages are not just a branch of Indo-European but rather co-ordinate with all the rest put together; 
thus Indo-Hittite is used for a family consisting of Indo-European proper plus Anatolian. This view has 
neither been proved or disproved and thus the conventional view is to use the term ‘Indo-European’. 
Hittite is the main Anatolian language. (The New Encvclopaedia Britannica. Vol. 22, 1993, p.582).
invasion, adopted a new language which would later be referred to as ‘Armenian’ and 
would be described as a distinctive member of the Indo-European language group. 
This language may well have been that of the ‘Hayasa’, but again sources remain 
scarce upon the subject (see section 5.2 for a discussion concerning the Armenian 
alphabet and language).
The Armenians of today can therefore trace their origins back to an ancient 
ethnogenesis, which seems to be the result of a mingling of the Urartian and the 
Armen. Perhaps there are genetic connections between these ancient peoples and 
those living in the Annenian Republic and diaspora today. However, having lived in 
a region of volatile East-West migration, invasions, conquests, and brutal 
exterminations, modem Armenians are more the product of ethnic intermingling than 
they are the direct and pure biological heirs of Urartu. Their language may well be 
connected in some way, but at the same time it is also distant and different. In terms 
of basic culture and social stmcture, the two most fundamental aspects of a people.
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the differences between the present-day Armenians and their ancestors remain great. 
What links the past with the present is the idea that they are the same people, and that 
they possess a sense of solidarity and community which is the basis of nationhood 
itself.
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2.2 Armenia in Ancient Times
Armenia, after the fall of Urartu, and in the ensuing centuries, became a battleground:
Armenia is not only a land of earthquakes, cold and hot lava, and extinct and live 
volcanoes, it has also been the epicentre of many national and social volcanoes 
and earthquakes and a plaything of historical underground tectonic forces which 
have savagely moulded this land and its history (Emin, 1981, p.95).
In about 190 BC the Armenian Orontid royal dynasty was overthrown by a local ruler 
named Artaxias (Artashes). His newly-acquired power was confirmed by the 
Romans, and he was the instigator of a vigorous and successful period in Armenian 
history.
Within Persia a new power had also come to the fore: the Parthian dynasty. This had 
established itself less than a century after the empire had been brought down by 
Alexander the Great. Parthia was, it seemed, destined to rival Rome in military 
strength. Armenia, striving to maintain its autonomy, linked itself by treaty with 
Rome while at the same time exercising considerable diplomatic skill in the conduct 
of its relations with the Parthian (Arsacid) royal house; Armenia was much closer, 
geographically, to Persia and thus considered good relations with its powerful 
neighbour wise. Such a state of affairs did not, however, preclude Armenia from 
taking the initiative when the moment was opportune in the first century BC.
Parthia was weak at this time and Rome had internal troubles of its own, including an 
uncertain foreign policy. Rome was also unpopular as an imperial power in Asia. 
The Armenian king, Tigranes II (95-55 BC), a monarch of the Artaxiad dynasty, 
forged an alliance with Mithridates, the king of Pontus (on the southern shore of the 
Black Sea). After a series of victories against Rome, Parthia and the Seleucids (a 
Macedonian dynasty existing between 305-64 BC), Tigranes succeeded in uniting all
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the territories inhabited by the Armenians, and added northern Syria and 
Mesopotamia, as well as Cilicia and Phoenicia to his conquered domains. By 70 BC 
he was ruler of an empire which stretched from the Caspian to the Mediterranean. He 
had a new capital built, Tigranakert (in Armenian; ‘built by Tigran’) and adopted the 
Parthian title ‘King of Kings’. The site of Tigranakert cannot, states Christopher 
Walker, be determined with accuracy, but it is probably the modem town of Silvan, to 
the northeast of Diyarbekir (Walker, 1990, p.23).
To Rome, however, the empire o f Tigranes posed a grave threat, and in the autumn of 
69 BC a Roman army under the command of Lucullus, laid siege to the capital, 
Tigranakert, and captured it. In the following year the Roman forces were compelled 
to withdraw from a besieged Tigranes and his ally Mithridates (in the eastern 
Armenian capital of Artashat) after they were affected by the bitter Armenian frost 
and much sickness.
In 66 BC Tigranes surrendered to Pompey the Roman general. Thus, the all too brief 
interlude which was the first Armenian ‘experiment’ in self-rule, came to an abmpt 
end. Armenia then reverted to its position as a semi-autonomous state lodged 
between an eastern and a western empire; in this case, Rome and Parthia. Within 
Armenia itself, the Artaxiad (of which the founder was Artaxias) dynasty came to an 
end in the first century AD.
During a period of Parthian dominance, a new and important dynasty was established 
in Armenia-one which the Armenians of today have imprinted upon their memoiy. 
This was the Arshakuni (or Arsacid) dynasty, (53-428 AD). The first representative 
of this dynasty. King Tiridates (Trdat I), was the brother of the Parthian monarch. On 
his ascendancy of the Armenian throne, Rome sensed that Parthia was perhaps 
gaining too much of a foothold in the area. Following the inevitable clash between
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Parthia and Armenia, the parties eventually compromised and a negotiated settlement 
was reached whereby Nero crowned Tiridates in Rome in 66 AD.
Such political stability was not, unfortunately, to last for long. The emperor Trajan, 
eager to display his military prowess and, yearning for the spoils of victory, attacked 
Parthia in 113 AD and killed the king of its ally, Armenia. The vigorous assault led 
by Trajan was enough to prompt the decline of that empire and led, ultimately, to its 
eventual overthrow in 226 AD by the militant and nationalist Sassanid dynasty.
Such a serious and implacable foe did the Sassanids represent for Armenia that the 
latter was forced to revitalise its association with Rome. The bases of Sassanid 
ideology were the re-establishment of the borders of the Achaemenids and the 
enforcement of the Zoroastrian religion. As a result of Sassanid attempts to ‘hauT 
Armenia back into the Persian sphere of influence and supplant the deeply-held 
Armenian paganism with Zoroastrian reverence for the ‘sacred elements’ of earth, air, 
fire and water, Armenia and Rome grew close again.
For over 150 years Armenia became the victim of competing powers and suffered the 
consequence of bitter struggles: partition. The land became a theatre of perpetual 
war, a fact which has been frequently referred to by various historians, amongst them. 
Sir John Mandeville who stated: ‘Armenia never had peace, but always war’ 
(Mandeville in Marsden, 1994, p.230). In 387 AD the spoils were once again divided 
between Rome and Persia, the Sassanids receiving the greatest share of a ravaged 
Armenia (see figs 12 & 13). The area which was partitioned stretched from (to 
accord them their modem names) Erzerum to Moush.
Amidst the preoccupation with the partition of the country, the Armenians prepared 
themselves for the coming conversion to Christianity. This had reached Armenia
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fairly early on, tradition relating that Thaddeus and Bartholomew (of the Twelve 
Apostles) were the first to preach the Gospel throughout the land. It seems that this 
preaching had quite an effect since there were martyrs during the persecution of the 
second and third centuries. The Armenian Church can thus be said to be of Apostolic 
origin, and to have grown up independently of the Greek Church, an important point 
in the conflicts of the succeeding centuries. The date of Armenia’s actual conversion 
to Christianity is usually said to be 301 AD; estimates vary, however, between 286 
and 314 AD.
It seems that the adoption of Christianity had the effect of making Armenia look 
westward and northward rather than eastward; but at the time it was not a sign of 
political identification with any particular power bloc. At the time of the adoption of 
the Christian faith Rome remained pagan. Christianity had reached Armenia not in 
the form of the teachings of missionaries from Europe, but rather as an Asiatic, 
Palestinian religion.
O A  ArROLUVD
The invention of the Armenian alphabet in^04 AD by the scribe Mesrop-Mashtots 
was an event which served to further unify the Armenian people. This alphabet 
precisely reflected the sounds of the Armenian language and it was written from left 
to right, initially with 36 letters.
The fifth century not only heralded the invention of a new alphabet for the Armenian 
people; this was a period which marked the beginning of a new era of erudition and 
spiritual and cultural enlightenment. New scribes and academics made an appearance 
in the centuries that followed, all inspired by the spiritual and cultural renaissance 
that had taken place earlier. For example, St Gregory of Narek, a famous Armenian 
poet and theologian of the tenth century was the author of a series of valuable works; 
the Prayer Book, known as “ Nareg’ (also known as the ‘Book of Lamentations’), is
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his most outstanding, creative achievement The ‘Book of Nareg’ consists of ninety- 
five chapters, the first of which bears the title: ‘A word with God from the Depth of 
(my) Heart’. ‘Nareg’ for centuries has become the second Bible in every Armenian 
home.
St Nerses the Graceful (Shnorhali), Catholicos of all Armenians in the twelfth century 
composed sharagans (hymns) and chants for the Armenian Church, most of which 
have survived up until the present time. His prayers, among which is ‘I confess with 
Faith’, are well-known to every Armenian worshipper, and he is considered to be one 
of the greatest refomers of the Armenian Church.
Say many Armenians:
We are justifiably proud that our forefathers created the culture, lived in the spirit 
of the culture, and kept their identity through their culture in the family of 
nations. Despite their unbelievably trying political hardships, shifting from place 
to place, handicapped by hunger and persecutions, our forefathers produced 
masterpieces which they transferred to us. Our innumerable architectural 
monuments and remnants, countless manuscripts, and other writings, attest to the 
world that our forefathers were immensely creative and people of genius 
f Armenian Vicarage Newsletter. 1995, p.2).
Armenian, meanwhile, had rapidly progressed to the status of a literary tongue and 
had found itself on a par with those languages of scholarship, Greek and Syriac (see 
section 5.2). That alphabet is still in use today, and has, without doubt, assisted the 
survival of the Armenians as a people. The country, however, remained partitioned 
and without clear political direction. Those who possessed the spoils of victory had 
their own plans; Roman Armenia (the Byzantine Empire) was determined to weaken 
its portion of the country, whilst in Persian Armenia, the nobility petitioned the 
Persian ‘King of Kings’ to abolish their their own monarchy. As a result of such 
action Eastern Armenia became a province of the Sassanid Empire. Christianity in
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Armenia attracted foes; indeed, within a few years the Persians took advantage of 
Armenia’s inner weakness and launched a campaign to obliterate Christian belief. 
The replacement was to be Zoroastrianism. The Armenians however, stubbornly 
refused to have a pagan belief thrust upon them and, after facing the Persians at the 
battle of Avarayr in 451 AD, an agreement was reached with the enemy whereby 
Armenia was granted liberty of Christian worship.
The ensuing centuries brought with them further struggle between Rome and Persia. 
This time, however, a new conquering force appeared on the horizon; this was Islam. 
By the middle of the seventh century Islamic armies had laid siege to and captured 
Palestine, Syria and Egypt. In a series of battles they shattered the Persian Empire.
The Arabs first appeared in Armenia in 640 AD. Armenia was then in the position of 
having to struggle to maintain its autonomy in the face of oppression from both 
Byzantium and the Arab caliphate. The more flexible nature of the caliphate 
appealed to the Armenians and, as a result, a peace was negotiated with Mu’awiya I 
in 653-4 AD. Armenia was, thenceforth, to be recognised as an autonomous tributary 
state.
The tolerable peace which had been concluded with the Arabs was, unfortunately, not 
to last for long. Fifty years after the agreement many of the Armenian nobility were 
lured to Nakhichevan and slaughtered. A large number of Armenian families fled to 
the domains of Byzantium as a result. Although Arab imperial oppression of Armenia 
was heavy following the Abbasid seizure of the caliphate in 750 AD, revival still 
seemed to be possible. In the words of Professor Toumanoff:
The Saracen insistence on collecting taxes and tribute in money, not in kind, led 
to an economic revival. The nobility and peasantry found themselves obliged to 
abandon their autarkic, rural economy and to produce a surplus of raw and
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manufactured products for sale. Thus commerce and urban economy, stifled 
during the upheavals of the Sasanid and Saracen domination, recovered; the 
middle class revived; new cities like Ani, Kars, Balesh (Bitlis), Artanuji, rose 
beside the old, such as Artaxata, Dvin, Theodosiopolis, Tiflis, Partav (Bardha’a). 
Caucasia once again became the nexus of trade-routes connecting Europe and 
Asia, and the prosperity of the medieval period was founded (Toumanoff, 1966, 
p.605).
In the centuries that followed Tife and love blossomed amid the fertile Armenian 
uplands, when art and poetry flowed like wine’ (Walker, 1990, p.29). Of the Bagratid 
capital, Ani, the historian, Aristakes of Laztivert wrote;
Princes v^th joyous countenances sat on the princely thrones; they were clad in 
brilliant colours and looked like spring gardens. One heard only gay words and 
songs. The sound of flutes, of cymbals, and of other instruments filled one’s 
heart with the comfort of great joy (S. Der Nersessian, 1945, p. 10).
In the early eleventh century Byzantine policy towards Armenia became rather 
expansionist and annexationist. The Armenian nobility were bribed to cede their 
domains to the empire and were rewarded with lands firmly within its borders (mostly 
in Cappadocia). Mass transfers of the Armenian population took place and Armenian 
rulers showed themselves to be divisive and eager for short-term gains. It was not 
only the Byzantine Empire which threatened the Armenians; the Muslim dynasts from 
Azerbaijan invaded and a shadow was cast over the length of Armenia by the bands of 
Seljuq Turks which appeared in the Van region.
However, it was Byzantine pressure which became the main factor weakening the 
foundations of Armenia. One by one the smaller independent principalities were 
extinguished and the Armenian (Bagratid) king found himself fighting against the 
combined forces of east and west, which on this occasion were those of Byzantium 
and the Emir of Dvin, whom the Byzantine emperor had incited against the 
Armenians.
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In 1045 many Armenian kingdoms were incorporated into the Byzantine Empire; 
these included the kingdoms of both Kars and Ani. Armenia, now fatally weakened 
by its powerful neighbour, was overrun by the Seljuq Turks who set about attacking 
and destroying Ani. ‘The Turks had a dagger in either hand, and a third held between 
their teeth’ (Walker, 1990, p.30). Too late, the Byzantine Empire realised the folly of 
its policy of weakening vital frontier provinces and after a series of attempts to defeat 
the Turks the Byzantines themselves were catastrophically defeated at Manzakert in 
1071. Thereafter, Armenia came under Seljuq Turkish control and many Armenians 
fled, becoming pioneers of the world-wide dispersion of Armenians. With them they 
were careful to take their language, their alphabet and their faith.
The centuries that followed showed an Armenia plagued by almost uninterrupted woe 
and disaster. All social organisation was wrecked and the people were left virtually 
leaderless, except for the clergy. Although northern Armenia did revive somewhat 
during the expansion of Georgia in its golden age-especially under Queen Tamar 
(1184-1212 AD)-the decline that followed was irreversible.
The greatest disaster was the Mongol invasion of 1236 AD. The sheer destruction 
wrought by the Mongols left the country open to nomadic tribesmen, who flocked in 
when Mongol power was ebbing away. The Mongol Ilkhanate became Muslim in 
1302 AD, with Armenia coming under the control of Ghazan Khan, ruling from 
Tabriz. Although this monarch reorganised his domains and established a sound civil 
service, at the local level the adoption of Islam meant a deterioration in the position 
of Armenians in relation to their Muslim neighbours. Armenian morale was at its 
lowest ebb during this period. Deprived of their lands, heavily taxed, and subject to 
unstable, capricious rule, it is surprising how the Armenians clung to their culture. 
All this was despite ‘bitter and grievous times’ (Walker, 1990, p.31). One thing, 
however, remained clear; most of the great feudal families who had negotiated
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Armenia to its carefully balanced position between the great powers had virtually 
disappeared. Moreover, the quality of the imperial dynasties which surrounded 
Armenia was vastly inferior to anything it had ever been ruled by before:
The Seljuqs, Mongols and (especially) the Turkoman tribesmen who ruled 
Armenia in these dark centuries had nowhere near the level of culture or 
sophistication of any of the past empires, stretching right back to Achaemenid 
Persia. It was indeed tragic that as Europe was beginning her renaissance, 
Armenia was sunk beneath semi-barbarian conquest (Walker, 1990, p.31).
Worse was to come in the shape of the most violent and destructive conqueror 
Armenia has ever had to face; Timur-lenk (Tamarlane). His campaigns of 1386-8 in 
northern Persia and the Caucasus brought devastation and death on a scale hitherto 
unknown. Yet neither Timur (who died in 1405) nor his successors could be said to 
have ruled Armenia or what remained of it; power lay rather with two rival Turkoman 
dynasties, the ‘White Rams’ (Ak-Koyunlu), based at Diyarbekir, and the ‘Black 
Rams’ (Kara-Koyunlu), based at Van. Both dynasties emerged as sovereign in 1378 
AD. Their power was, to a great extent, circumscribed by their relations with their 
powerful eastern neighbour, the empire that Timur left; but as this empire declined 
into mediocrity, so local dynasts were able to strengthen their authority.
Following the decline of the two Turkoman dynasties (the White Rams having been 
defeated at the battle of Sharur in 1502 at the hands of the Safavids), the modem era 
in Armenia dawned. Within the medieval period Armenia had shifted its sovereign 
power some six or seven hundred miles to the southeast. During the tenth century a 
large number of Armenians had been settled in Cilicia by the Byzantines, following 
the Byzantine victories over the Muslims. Many more followed as conditions in 
Greater Armenia worsened and as Byzantine emperors encouraged them to move.
The new arrivals in Cilicia were dominated by two families; those of Hetum and.
later, Rupen. Diplomatically, Cilician Armenia showed the same scepticism toward 
its two powerful neighbours, the Byzantine Empire and the Muslim caliphate. This 
was illustrated by the way in which Armenia forged alliances with nations far beyond 
its borders. One such link was nurtured with the Mongol court at Karakorum, 
something which proved to be a rather hasty move on the part of the Cilician 
Armenians, as the Mongols had adopted Islam in 1302 AD. The other alliance that 
Cilicia forged was with the Crusaders. This predated that with the Mongols but was 
fashioned with the same motive: outflanking the neighbouring big power.
The fostering of such links had the desired effect of aiding the Cilician Armenians in 
the establishment of their state. However, in the longer term, it also meant that the 
state was denied more than a brief period of existence. Moreover, the energetic 
‘courting’ of the Franks left quite a division within the Armenian community as the 
Franks were keen to make the Armenians apostasise from their mother Church and 
accept the authority of Rome.
Despite the fluctuating fortunes of those allies which Cilician Armenia had gained for 
itself, the Armenians steadily consolidated their position amid the craggy mountains 
and fertile plains of their newly-adopted homeland. Indeed, much of the twelfth and 
early thirteenth centuiy was a period of stability and cultural development for the 
Cilicians: the epoch of Kings Leo (1186-1219 AD) and Hetum I (1226-1269 AD) has 
been called Armenia’s ‘Silver Age’. Economically, Cilicia flourished as the main 
entrepôt for east-west trade, exporting spice, perfume and silk to Europe. Culturally, 
perhaps the most notable achievement was the religious poetry of Catholicos Nerses 
IV Shnorhali (‘the Gracious’), the manuscript illuminations of Toros Roslin, and the 
medical advances of Mekhitar Heratsi. In the late thirteenth centuiy, however, 
repeated assaults were launched upon Cilicia from the Seljuqs in the north and the 
Mamluks to the south. The result of the onslaught was that the country’s prosperity
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evaporated and political nightmares became all too real.
Cilicia itself was wracked by internal dissension during the fourteenth centuiy; rival 
members of the ruling family struggled for the throne, and pro- and anti-Latin factions 
fought for supremacy. In addition to such internal problems, the papâcy insisted that 
the Armenians submit to the authority of Rome. Some of the leaders complied, these 
being the forerunners of the Catholic Armenians of today, but the mass of the people 
remained loyal to their own Apostolic Church.
In 1342 AD the Armenian throne passed, through the female line, to Guy de Lusignan. 
Armenia was now a Frankish state. The new ruler was, however, murdered by the 
populace in a violent demonstration of their rejection of any connection with Rome 
and their wish for closer ties with the Muslims. By the time the last king of Cilician 
Armenia, Leo V, ascended the throne in 1373, the Cilicians had all but yielded to the 
temporal domination of Islam.
The end of Armenian political sovereignty in Cilicia did not mean the end of the 
Armenian population there. The Armenians once more demonstrated an enviable 
ability to survive against all the odds, many individuals remaining as peasants and 
migrant workers in the Cilician plain until this centuiy;
A few stuck firm to their mountain fastnesses, maintaining a turbulent and 
defiant independence until the catastrophes during and after the First World War. 
Even today, one or two Armenian villages remain, which could be said to be the 
legacy of Cilician Armenia, notably Kessab, in northern Syria. In view of the 
chasm of disaster between the medieval period and the present day, it is 
astonishing that anything at all has endured (Walker, 1990, p.34).
In describing the endurance of the Cilician Armenians in the face of strife and the 
wrath of neighbouring powers, the author of the above has echoed much of what has
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been said about Armenians throughout the ages: that they have survived thus far as a 
people is the result of their belief in themselves and, most importantly, their faith in 
God.
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3.0 Armenia Under the Tsars
'^ 1+^
For the last two centuries the fortunes of most of Armenian people and of Armenia
A
itself have been intimately connected with the fate of the Russian Empire and its 
Soviet successor. Russian policy towards the Armenians tended to fluctuate between 
declarations of protection for fellow Christians to persecution of a newly-conscious 
national minority. The shifts in Russian perceptions of the Armenians were 
dependent on both the changes in Russia’s interests in the Caucasus and the 
developments taking place among the Armenians themselves. In general, Russian 
stereotypical images of the Armenians fell into three major groups: the image of the 
Armenian as Christian, as commercial, and as conspiratorial. The Christian image 
linked the Armenians’ suffering under the Muslim yoke to their Orthodox protectors 
in the north; the image of the men of commerce also served, for the most part, to tie 
the Armenians to the expanding economic world of tsarist Russia. However, the 
image of the conspiratorial revolutionary reflected a new reality, one of opposition 
and rebellion, which deeply alienated the Russians from their Armenian subjects.
The perception of a national minority by the Russian autocratic state was a political 
fact of extreme importance, for that minority could determine whether that group 
would benefit or suffer from the enormous power of its rulers. If, as in the mid­
nineteenth century, Armenians were considered to be useful or virtuous, they would 
be rewarded with state support and new liberties. If, however, as in the last decades 
of the empire, they were perceived as enemies of order, their privileges and even their 
property were threatened.
Contact between the Armenians and the Russians dates back to the tenth centuiy at 
the court of the Byzantine Emperor Basil II. When Kiev joined the Christian world at 
the end of the tenth century. Prince Vladimir married Anna, the sister of Basil II. 
Both were members of the so-called Macedonian dynasty which was of Armenian
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origin. In succeeding centuries Armenian merchants traded in Russia through their 
base in the Crimea, and in the later Middle Ages Armenians established themselves as 
traders and craftsmen in Moscow and Astrakhan. Thus, long before Russians ruled 
over part of Armenia, their sporadic contacts with the Armenians established clearly 
two principal sources of Armenian identification-.commerce and Christianity. These 
two features of the Armenians were, of course, related in a significant way. As 
Christians in the Muslim world, Armenians were strategically located to engage in 
trade with Christians outside the Turkish and Persian empires. Because they were 
stateless, cosmopolitan people of trade, this class of Armenians was frequently 
compared with the Jews. The ambivalence implied in such an image lingers with the 
Armenians to the present day.
In the mid-seventeenth century relations between the Russian Empire and the 
Armenians improved as Russo-Persian trade picked up and as the Meliks (petty 
princes) of the Caucasus joined forces with the Catholicos of Echmiadzin, Hakob 
Jughaetsi, to seek allies for the struggle against their foes, the Persians.
Encouraged by the decline of Safavid power, the Armenian leaders sent 
deputations to the Georgian king, to the Pope, the Holy Roman Emperor, the king 
of Poland and finally to the Muscovite court to solicit aid in an anti-Persian 
campaign. The Armenian representatives, Israel Ori and Minas Vardapet came 
as suppliant fellow Christians, the victims of infidel oppressors asking to be 
assisted in their liberation, and it is significant that their efforts were directed to a 
variety of Christian courts (Suny, 1993, p.33).
In fact, the historian, P.T. Harutiunian has claimed that a ‘Russian orientation’ was 
already developing among some Armenian merchants in the latter half of the 
seventeenth centuiy. As early as 1667, the Armenian trading company of Julia had 
signed a commercial agreement with the Muscovite government. Because these 
Persian-Armenian merchants were neither independent nor free traders but agents of 
the Persian Shah and the silk producers, Russian policy under Peter the Great was
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aimed at protecting, patronising and ‘winning over’ these silk traders in order to use 
them to develop commerce and silk production for the benefit of Russia. Such 
patronage led, in time, to a shift in allegiance of some Armenian merchants to the 
Russians. Once again, the Armenians, as Christians and merchants, became 
congenial allies for Russia.
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3.1 Armenia During the Reign of Peter the Great (1696-1725)
Peter’s interest in Caucasus was based upon his desire for the economic development 
of his empire. In 1715 Peter the Great had appointed Artemius Volinsky as envoy to 
the Shah of Persia. Volinsky was charged principally with obtaining more 
information about Persian foreign policy. He was also given the task of persuading 
the Armenian merchants of the time to divert their trade with Europe, from the land 
route, which went through the Ottoman Empire (that is, along the Vale of Alashkert 
to Erzerum, and thence to the port of Trebizond), to the waterways of Russia, which 
would transport their goods all the way to St Petersburg. It seemed that the Russian 
monarch was more interested in gaining Persian trade than in seizing territory.
According to Professor Ronald Suny, however, the Russians were eager to conduct a 
vigorous campaign against the Persians with the aim of acquiring territory;
Having concluded a peace with the Swedes in 1721, he (Peter) turned almost 
immediately to planning a campaign against the Persians along the Caspian. 
Aware that the Christian leaders of Georgia and Caucasian Armenia were 
anxious to join forces with the Russians, Peter set out from Astrakhan in July 
1722. A secular and pragmatic ruler, Peter perceived an opportunity for 
territorial expansion and economic rewards at the expense of a weakened Persia. 
But at the same time it would be a mistake to caricature the Tsar as a cynical 
manipulator of Armenian and Georgian hopes for relief. Rather the interests of 
the empire and those of the Caucasian Christians for the moment coincided, and 
as long as those interests were compatible Peter could act without further delay to 
aid his Christian allies (Suny, 1993, pp.33-34).
Other historians have, however, given more emphasis to Peter’s desire to aid his 
Christian neighbours (although this has been tempered by allusion to other ideas the 
monarch might have harboured):
His aims were at first purely commercial as he wished to divert through his own 
countiy the rich transit trade in silk and other commodities between Persia and 
the West through Aleppo and Smyrna. He was also anxious to obtain cotton from 
Turkistan for his newly-founded industries......
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An excellent trait in Peter’s character was his wish to champion the cause of the 
Christian minorities in Persia, of whose trials and tribulations he had doubtless 
heard much from Alexander Archilovich (a Georgian prince who lived near 
Moscow, the grandson of Vakhtang V of Kartli) and other Georgians, as well as 
from Armenians (Lockhart, 1958, p.29).
Whatever his motives, Peter the Great set out for Astrakhan in the May of 1722 intent 
on achieving his aims. He captured Derbend from the Persians three months later and 
without much difficulty. Soon afterwards, however, he turned back, leaving the 
native Christian armies of the region-principally the Armenians-disappointed that he 
had not come to liberate them from the Persian yoke. This seemed to be an 
uncharacteristic move on the part of the Russians if one considers much of the 
rhetoric which had occurred beforehand:
If the Turks say anything about this (the permission that Peter had granted to the 
Armenians to settle in the Caspian provinces) reply that we have not invited the 
Armenians, but that they on account of the unity of belief, had begged us to take 
them under our protection. For the sake of Christianity it is impossible for us to 
refuse this to the Armenians, who are Christians. As the Vizier himself has often 
said, it is impossible to refuse protection to those of the same faith who ask it 
(Schuyler, 1884, pp.603-4).
Peter’s campaign, however, proved to be a disaster. The Russians lost 10,000 men in 
the battle against the Persians. The Caucasian Christians were left without a 
protector, their alliance with Russia and their rebellion against Persia only having 
served to encourage the Turks to invade eastern Transcaucasia. In 1724 Peter 
abandoned his Christian supporters in Transcaucasia, preferring instead to sign a 
treaty with the Ottomans. This treaty partitioned the formerly Persian holdings in 
Caucasia and left most of Georgia and Armenia in Turkish hands. Great numbers of 
Christians thus felt compelled to flee to Russian areas. Clearly there were limits to 
Russian concerns for the Armenians, and Russian support seemed, for the most part, 
to be dependent upon the coincidence of the interests of the minority Christian and 
the Orthodox Empire.
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The ‘Russian orientation’ which Armenia had felt compelled to adopt since the tenth 
century was only one of several which it might have seized upon. In the complex and 
turbulent politics of the late Safavid Persian Empire, the various Christian princes of 
the borderlands manoeuvred among Persian factions, Turkish invaders, Georgian 
kings and hopes for Russian and European aid. Whilst some Meliks sided with the 
Russians, others preferred the Persians or the Turks. Joseph Emin, the traveller and 
author of a unique and daring plan to liberate Armenia, sought a solution through the 
intervention of Erekle II. Although in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries an 
image of an Armenia dependent upon Russian liberators would become a powerful 
factor in cementing loyalty to the empire, the ‘Russian orientation’ was neither a 
consistent attitude of Caucasian Armenians nor a widespread movement among the 
majority of Armenians.
However, the distinct image of the Armenians as oppressed Christians longing for 
Russian protection did emerge much more sharply in the eyes of the Russians in the 
eighteenth century. Emissaries to the court of St Petersburg and frequent 
communications reminding Russians of past pledges of assistance kept alive the 
image of the suppliant Christian Armenian. In a letter to the Russian monarch, the 
Karabakh Melik Avan-Yuzbashi affirmed boldly: ‘We will fight until that time when 
we will enter the service of the Tsar, and all will perish to the last one but we will not 
leave Christianity; we will fight for our faith’ (Arutiunian, 1954, p.238).
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3.2 Armenia During the Reign of Catherine the Great (1762-1796)
After Peter the Great’s Persian expedition, Russia found itself unable to hold on to its 
Caucasian spoils. Despite the fact that Baku was captured in 1723, in the years that 
followed, all captured districts were dutifully returned to Persia. Peter the Great died 
in 1725 and for almost half a century Russia took no further interest in the Caucasus. 
Persia, however, emerged as a great power under the leadership of Nadir Shah (1736- 
1749). The Russians found no objection to Nadir’s ascendancy of the Persian throne 
mainly because they regarded the new monarch as a barrier to any Turkish desire to 
‘approach the Caspian’ (Baddeley, 1908, p.31).
On becoming the sole ruler of Russia in 1762, Catherine the Great turned her 
attention to the Caucasus. She was determined to establish there a firm base for her 
empire. In order to further her plans Catherine knew that she had to pacify the 
Muslim tribes of the region. Her reign was characterised by the long Russian struggle 
with ‘the tribes’, a struggle which was to last for almost a hundred years and which 
culminated in the capture of Shamil in 1859. The tribes were in-revolt against Russia
partly because of a deep-seated hostility to being subject to a Christian power and 
Hnh A P -To ^\<L
partly because they^were^ encouraged to revolt by the Ottoman Turks. Russia
desperately sought to pacify them in an attempt to prevent Turkey from gaining a
foothold in the Caucasus and drawing a chain across Russia’s important outlet to
Persia.
Catherine’s activities against the tribes were judged hostile by Ottoman Turkey and 
war broke out between the two in 1768. Six years later, with the victory of the 
Russian forces, the two sides signed a treaty on the banks of the River Danube, at 
Kutchuk Kainardji. This treaty was of great importance in the history of the Near 
East as it set the tone of relations between Russia and Turkey up until 1914. It 
affirmed the Empress Catherine’s right to intervene in Ottoman affairs in the interests
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of Christian minorities and, with the capture by Russia of some of the coastline of the 
Black Sea (until then the Black Sea had been an Ottoman Turkish lake) her 
preoccupation with the problem of the straits was bom.
The Armenians, meanwhile, were making their presence felt. Amidst renewed 
interest in the Caucasus, Catherine’s jeweller, the Armenian Ivan Lazerev, built an 
Armenian Church in St Petersburg in 1779 and held a series of discussions with 
Bishop Hovsep Argutinskii (my great-great uncle) and Catherine’s chief minister. 
Prince Grigorii Potemkin. This concerned the possibility of Armenian liberation.
At about the same time, painted images of Armenia were provided for aristocratic 
Russians by M.M. Ivanov and Gavriil Sergeev, who depicted the mins of Armenian 
Churches and scenes of Erevan, Tiflis (in Georgia) and Echmiadzin. A romantic 
vision of the Caucasus was created; a wild and exotic land captured timelessly in the 
works of Radishchev, Derzhavin and Zhukovski and, later, Lermontov, Pushkin and 
Tolstoy. The Empress herself encouraged the Armenians, reviving the policies which 
had first been engineered during the reign of Peter the Great. In 1775 she granted the 
Armenians living in Russia ‘rights and advantages equal to the Russians’ (Suny, 1993, 
p.35). The Armenians were considered, unlike the neighbouring Muslims, to be 
reliable, and were thus permitted to settle in the newly-acquired lands along the Black 
Sea, in the Crimea and at Nor Nakhichevan. Catherine extended Russian protection 
to eastern Georgia (Kartli-Kakheti) in 1783 and recognised the existing privileges 
there of all social classes, including the powerful Armenian merchants.
Catherine attempted to forge stronger political links with the Christian Armenians and 
Georgians; such links, the Empress intended to be of great import as far as Russian 
expansion to the south was concerned. The benefits of such expansion had already 
been demonstrated in the annexation of Georgia.
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For the planned incorporation of the Caucasus, Catherine, her son Paul, and her
grandson Alexander I relied upon the active co-operation of Russophile segments of
the Armenian and Georgian elites. It was also important that the Russians had been
invited repeatedly to enter Transcaucasia by the local inhabitants. They viewed
CoNGiuG^- as
themselves as both liberators and oenquerors -liberator of Christian peoples no longer 
able to defend themselves, and conquerors who had brought gloiy to the empire by 
defending the Muslim powers. Such feelings were perhaps best captured by the 
Decembrist Lachinov, a participant in the sieges of Erevan and Kars, who recorded in 
his diary his emotions upon seeing the happiness of the Armenians at the arrival of 
the Russian troops: T am a Russian, and my heart beats from joy that I am a Russian; 
and with pride I notice the respect of peoples for Russia’s greatness’ (Suny, 1993, 
pp.35-36). Russian victories over the Persians and Turks were described in literature 
and depicted in art and poetry as events of great moment. Military heroes were 
deified.
Unusually, reference to the Christians of the area was rare. The Caucasian landscape 
was celebrated in grand poetic style but the Armenians and the Georgians seemed not 
to inhabit that landscape or at best appeared as rather passive recipients of the 
glorious freedom won for them by their Russian liberators. Alexander Pushkin, who 
had joined his friends in the campaign of 1829, was a witness to the capture of 
Erzerum. His account of events seems to retain a flavour of either indifference or 
condescension towards the Armenians although he notes particularly well the 
enthusiasm of the latter for the Russians: ‘The Armenians noisily crowded into the 
narrow streets, their little boys ran before our horses, making the sign of the cross and 
repeating: ‘Christians! Christians!” (Pushkin, 1974, p.557).
The new rulers from Russia referred to all the peoples of the Caucasus as ‘tuzemtsy’ 
(‘people of that land’) as if to emphasise the vast difference between the latter and the
Russians and ‘play down’ the distinctions that existed amongst the Caucasian 
nationalities themselves. Although at this time a sense of nationality or ethnicity was 
not clearly developed either among Russians or Armenians, Russian officials 
remained convinced that their way of life was superior. Their consistent goal was to 
bring the Caucasian political and social order into conformity with the bureaucratic 
absolutism and serf-owning political economy of Russia. Although these goals 
eventually brought about the destruction of local political autonomy and traditional 
social forms, they had little effect upon the cultural heritage and the religious and 
linguistic practices of the Caucasians. Perhaps this was due in part to the fact that the 
Russians made very little effort in the early and mid-nineteenth century to proselytise 
their brand of Christianity; they seemed to have little desire to ‘attack’ the social 
customs of the local peoples or even to insist upon the use of the Russian language.
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33  Armenia During the Reign of Alexander I (1801-1825)
The reign of Alexander I was characterised by a drive to expand Russian dominion in 
Transcaucasia. Such Russian ambition however, was not dominated by the desire to 
completely subjugate the Armenian people. The Emperor made it clear in his 
instructions to his commander-in-chief in Georgia, General Knorring, that he favoured 
preferential treatment of his Armenian subjects:
We ask you to take special care to win over the Armenian nation with every form 
of kindness. Because of the numerous people of this tribe in areas contiguous to 
Georgia, this is one of the most dependable means of increasing the power of 
these people and, together with that, the strengthening in general of the faith of 
Christians. To this end, we would be pleased if, by showing as much as possible 
your patronage of the Ararat Patriarch at the Echmiadzin Monastery, you 
maintained friendly relations with the head of the Church (Agaian, 1972, p.66).
The Armenians had much reason to welcome the Russians to Transcaucasia; the 
advantages brought by the tsarist troops were considerable. Thousands of Armenian 
refugees from Turkey and Persia settled in the newly-acquired Russian lands. Indeed, 
whole areas once occupied by Muslims were given over to Armenians. It seemed as 
though Russian officials much preferred having Christian farmers settled along their 
frontier with the Turks and Persians. In addition tsarist troops provided a defence 
against the frequent Persian incursions and the raids by Lezgin mountaineers.
The Treaties of Gulistan (1813) and Turkmenchai (1828) heralded periods of relative 
peace with Russia’s neighbours and the Russian military presence made possible a 
long period of security and tranquillity during which Armenia attempted to strengthen 
itself economically, politically and socially. Russian officials, meanwhile, put an end 
to the abusive treatment of Armenians by many members of the Georgian nobility. 
General Lazarev reported to St Petersburg on the violence used against the urban 
population and widespread exploitation:
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Often, one sees people who have no means of defending themselves, being 
completely looted. Goods from merchants, eatable products from industrialists- 
all are taken without payment by ‘Baraty’ (orders), given by all the princes, by all 
the princesses, and finally by all who have been given some position. No rank 
has any salary, and everyone must feed himself from his own place, and from this 
yet more is tolerated by the merchant and the city dweller, by the inhabitant, in a 
word, by everyone (Suny, 1993, p.37).
The urban artisan and merchant class of Tiflis (Tbilisi) and other east Georgian cities 
were the first classes of Armenian population with which the Russians had close and 
prolonged contact. The Russian looked upon the Armenian in Georgia as the 
principal controller of virtually all trade. Since the Georgian considered trade to be 
‘shameful’ it is no surprise that the Armenian gained a monopoly on all commercial 
transactions.
Armenians were already well established in the main towns of Georgia and by the late 
Middle Ages were effectively playing the role assigned to them by the monarchs of 
Kartli-the merchant, the artisan and the money-lender. Despite the ‘virtues’ displayed 
by these men of business, the Georgian elite regarded them with hostility and disdain. 
These feelings were violently expressed by Prince lese Baratashvili toward the end of 
the eighteenth century:
Godless Armenians merchants, huckstering and because of the sins of our
king entrenching themselves in the palace in defiance of the will of God
they are made lords, administrators, and ‘aznaumi’ (nobles) in Georgia This
is only done because of the impiety of kings, but look to the east, west, south and 
north: Where do Armenians possess nobility? They have been dispersed by God. 
Is it in Man’s power to reunite them? (Suny, 1993, p.38).
Georgian noble resentment of the Armenians stemmed from two main sources: the 
fundamental cultural differences between the emerging bourgeois civilisation of the 
urban Armenians and the traditional aristocratic values of the Georgian upper class; 
and the demographic, political and economic hegemony that the Armenians exercised
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over Tiflis and much of the country. Georgian society, peasant and noble, was almost 
entirely based on an agrarian economy and the age-old relations of lords and peasants 
in a rural environment. The nobility usually concerned itself with improvement in the 
agriculture that was the source of its income and preferred to live on the customary 
payment in labour, kind and money that was extracted from its bondsmen. Urban 
culture and economy was largely foreign to the Georgians, and what trade and craft 
industry there existed in the towns of their kingdoms was largely in the hands of 
immigrant Armenians. Thus, the social division of labour between city and country 
was, in Georgia, accentuated by the different nationalities.
The Russian nobility, like their Georgian counterparts, had little sympathy for the 
Armenian men of commerce. Instead, a deep affection for the Georgian noble was 
cultivated; this was based upon the shared values of military bravery, chivalry and a 
love of grace. Pushkin, on his arrival in Tiflis, noted that:
The Georgian people are warrior-like. They have shown their courage under our 
standards. Their mental abilities will benefit from great education. They are in 
general happy and gregarious by custom. On holidays the men drink and stroll 
through the streets. Black-eyed boys sing, jump, and somersault; the women 
dance the lezginka (Pushkin, 1974, p.557).
In the few references in his poetiy to Armenians, Pushkin was quick to use the 
Armenian as a metaphor for trickery, deception and cowardice. In his poem ‘Tazit’ 
for example, an angiy Chechen father berates his son for not displaying the virtues of 
a Chechen warrior and avenging his brother’s death: ‘Podi ty proch’-ty mne ne syn. 
Ty ne chechenets-ty starukha. Ty trus, ty rab, ty armianin!’ (‘Get away from me-you 
are no son of mine. You are not a Chechen-you are an old woman. You are a 
coward, you are a slave, you are an Armenian!’) (Suny, 1993, p.38).
The contrasting images of the Armenian as a defenceless Christian and a ‘sly’
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businessman provoked differing responses from policy makers in the first half of the 
nineteenth century. As the self-appointed protectors of the Armenian Christians, 
successive Russian monarchs promoted the fortunes of the Armenian Church, but 
their relations with the Armenian people of commerce were less enthusiastic. Indeed, 
in the early nineteenth century Russian economic policy toward Transcaucasia veered 
from support for development to declarations that the region should be treated as a 
‘colony’ and exploited as a source of natural resources for Russian industry. The 
Armenian merchants whose commercial activity came to dominate the Caucasian 
economic landscape were perceived as a threat to their Russian counterparts, arid the 
state took an active role in promoting Russian competition and discriminating against 
local Armenian capital. These efforts were, by and large, fruitless, and by the middle 
of the century the government had elevated the most prominent of Armenian 
merchants, the ‘Mokalakesi’ of Tiflis, to the rank of ‘Pochetnye Grazhdane’ 
(‘honoured citizens’) of the Russian Empire.
Although the services of Armenian entrepreneurs were seen by Russian officials as 
being of great value in the propagation of a prosperous and economically developed 
Transcaucasia, disdain remained part of the Russian attitude toward the Armenian 
commercial class. The Armenian, like the Jew, was regarded with suspicion; he was 
able to manipulate prices to his advantage and displayed the characteristics of 
wilyness and cleverness in doing so. The Russian believed the Armenian merchant to 
be more than capable of deception when buying and selling and held the view that the 
motivating factor peraieating all his thoughts and deeds was one of self-interest.
Suspicion and mistrust of the commercial Armenian were widespread in the early 
nineteenth century. Calculation of profit and economic efficiency rather than more 
customary and traditional forms of exchange made the Annenian an alien element in 
the economic world of Transcaucasia. Although he was, of course, the harbinger of a
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new social order based upon market relations and economic considerations, to 
Georgian peasants, nobles and bureaucrats it seemed as though the loyalties of the 
Armenian were neither to the existing way of life nor to the country in which he 
found himself
Despite the disdain and distrust shown toward the commercial Armenian at this time, 
a more healthy respect for Christian Armenia and its Church was being cultivated. 
The Armenians were encouraged by Russian declarations of support for their Church 
and, as they had done since the time of Peter the Great, looked upon the Russians as 
their liberators:
The conquest of Transcaucasia by the expanding Russian colossus was an 
important step toward Armenian independence. To most Armenians of Turkey 
and Persia, Romanov Russia symbolised an advanced civilisation and society, a 
champion of Christendom against Islam, and the hope for emancipation 
(Hovannisian, 1967, p.7).
With the Russian defeat of the Turks and the Persians, the Armenians felt a step 
closer to political independence, a step closer to the Armenian dream of forming an 
autonomous Russian Armenian province under the Tsar’s suzerainty.
3.4 The Reign of Alexander ÏÏ (1855-1881)
The first half of the reign of Alexander II was a period of toleration, increasing 
freedom, and positive reform. Between the defeat in the Crimean War (1856) and the 
reemergence of Russia as a great European power in the Russo-Turkish War of 1877- 
1878, the Armenians identified their hopes for economic progress and physical 
security with the Russian state. Within Russian Caucasia the Armenian bourgeoisie 
and its literary intelligentsia praised the positive role Russians played in Armenian 
affairs. In numerous conservative newspapers the Russian state was venerated along 
with the reforms of the 1860s. The Russophile liberal tendency was more evident in 
the latter half of the nineteenth century when publications such as Grigor Artsruni’s 
‘Mshak’ (‘Cultivator’) (1872-1920) appeared in Tiflis and dominated that city’s 
Armenian intellectual life. It seemed as though:
Caucasia was Russified without Russification, and at the forefront of this natural
Russianizing were, once again, the Armenians (Amfiteatrov, 1906, p.47).
The post-Emancipation period (post-1861) meant considerable growth for the 
Armenians of Tiflis, Baku, and other Caucasian cities. The market economy and 
capitalist industry continued to expand in Transcaucasia and Armenian businessmen 
thrived. Although the state continued to favour the nobility in Transcaucasia, the 
growing economic power of the Armenian bourgeoisie was soon reflected in their 
control of Tiflis municipal politics. Such an increase in economic and political 
visibility resulted in the Armenians attracting new forms of hostility from those 
among whom they lived.
By the last third of the nineteenth century, stereotypical attitudes about the inherent 
and racial character of the Armenian people began to emerge. In the early 1870s, a 
Russian observer, S. Maksimov, echoed many other travellers to the Caucasus when 
he stated:
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Trade in the Caucasus is entirely in the hands of clever and calculating 
Armenians. Armenians are higher than Georgians in intelligence and in love for 
work, and for that reason there is nothing surprising in the fact that Georgian 
properties are rapidly falling into Armenian hands. Georgians are dependent on 
them just as the Poles are on the Jews and similarly feel toward them the same 
contempt and hatred (if not more than the Poles feel toward the Jews). The 
commercial Armenians reveal much cleverness, wilyness, are always ready with 
flattery; their thirst for profit leads them to cheating and swindling (Suny, 1993, 
p.41).
The existence of this national stereotype did not, however, indicate a lack of the 
necessary business acumen and entrepreneurial spirit on the part of the Georgian 
people. Moreover, there were also Armenian peasants in Transcaucasia and Anatolia 
who were not noted for their ‘cleverness, wilyness, or flattery’, but who displayed 
attitudes and patterns of life very similar to their Georgian counterparts. What really 
separated these two peoples were the positions they held in Caucasian society and the 
roles they played in economic and political life. The dominant elites of each nation 
were very different. Armenian society had, at its core, the merchant classes. The 
Georgians, however, had as their model a traditional landed nobility (the Armenians 
having long ago lost their nobility, the ‘Nakhararutiun’ of former kingdoms). What 
the many travellers to the Caucasus saw when they observed Transcaucasian society 
possibly led them to generalise from their experiences with the elites of Armenian 
and Georgian society and apply their conclusions to the whole of these peoples. The 
racial or ethnic stereotypes which have found their way to us are most probably more 
the product of the visibility and behaviour of the dominant classes in Caucasian 
society than a true reflection of the nature of nationalities.
Throughout the 1870s (the latter half of the reign of Tsar Alexander II) Russian state 
interests and Armenian aspirations still converged. The growing tide of discontent 
felt by the subjugated peoples of the Ottoman Empire translated itself into organised 
resistance and the Armenians of Tiflis found themselves in unison with the Russian 
Pan-Slavs as they both fiercely championed the cause of Christian liberation in the
Russian press and court circles. Yet again, Russia appeared as the saviour of the 
Armenians. This was particularly so during the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-1878, 
and immediately after.
The administration of the Ottoman Empire was, it seemed, incapable of giving its 
subject peoples an effective voice and when they rose in revolt it was swift to respond 
in the way of outright massacre. Such manifestations of Turkish policy only served to 
unite most Russians and others under the aegis of Pan-Slavism and created a wave of 
feeling in Russia which was to lead to war. This was despite the fact that the Tsar 
and his Foreign Minister were not supporters of the new ideology.
Pan-Slavism was a popular ideology, its followers desirous of the unification of the 
Slav peoples under the umbrella of Russian protection and the eventual control of 
Constantinople and the Straits. Although this ethic proved rather distasteful to both 
the Armenians and Georgians, it did constitute an opportunity for the Asiatic non-Slav 
peoples to cast off the alien yokes of Austria and, most importantly, Turkey. It also 
had the effect of focusing much attention on Turkey’s prolonged unjust and cruel 
treatment of all its subject peoples, including the Armenians.
In the summer of 1875 the Christian peasantry of Bosnia and Herzegovina rose in 
revolt against their Muslim landlords. The crisis intensified with the uprising in 
Bulgaria in April 1876, which was cruelly put down by Ottoman irregulars, 
despatched on orders from Constantinople. Immense anti-Turkish agitation followed 
the publication of the facts of Turkish atrocities against the Bulgarian rebels. Such 
was the power of the popular agitation whipped up by the rebels in protest against the 
Ottoman government’s repression of the Bulgarian uprising that a conference was 
called to discuss the ills of the Ottoman Empire. The conference was eventually 
convened in the December of 1876 in Constantinople. Its agenda was almost entirely
concerned with the administration of European Turkey; Armenia had not yet come 
under the scrutiny of the powers.
The conference broke up in disarray in late January 1877 after the Ottomans 
announced their new constitution, a liberal and democratic instrument. The very 
reforms which the powers had been seeking to impose upon the Turks had been 
created by the latter in their own, rather timely, constitution. This was a huge blow to 
the great powers who considered the new constitution to have been ‘wheeled in at a 
critical moment, like a gigantic piece of stage scenery’ (Walker, 1990, p. 108).
However, the deception was not to last for long; within months the Ottomans had 
reverted to the local tyranny, extortion, and oppression which was their hallmark. 
The number of wrecked homes, burnt fields and homeless refugees increased.
It seemed as though the method the powers chose, of trying to impose schemes of 
reform, was the worst possible, since it achieved very little. In fact, if anything, it left 
the subjugated peoples more resented and hated by both central and provincial 
Ottoman rulers. Only one power was prepared to abandon such fruitless diplomacy in 
favour of action; Russia.
On 24 April 1877, Alexander, the ‘Tsar-Liberator’, declared war on the Ottoman 
Empire. All the Slav peoples now looked to Russia for deliverance from the Turkish 
oppressor and the Russian monarch did not intend to disappoint them:
Our faithful and beloved subjects know the lively interest which we have always
devoted to the destinies of the oppressed Christian population of Turkey....... We
made it pre-eminently our object to attain the amelioration of the condition of the 
Christians in the east by means of peaceful negotiations and concerted action
with the great European powers, our allies and friends The Porte has
remained immovable in its refusal of every effectual guarantee for the security of 
its Christian subjects, and it rejected the demands of the conference of
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Constantinople Having exhausted our peaceful efforts, we are obliged by the
haughty obstinacy of the Porte to proceed to more determined action. The 
sentiment of equity and that of our own dignity render it imperative. Turkey, by
its refusal, places us under the necessity of having recourse to arms We
expressed our intention of acting independently should we deem it necessary, and 
should the honour of Russia require it. Today, in invoking the blessing of God 
upon our valiant armies, we give them the order to cross the frontier of Turkey 
(Hertslet, 1891, pp.2418-29).
The war was disastrous for Turkey. In Europe, Russian forces reached the outskirts 
of Constantinople, and in Asia they reached Erzerum. After the fall of Plevna 
(Bulgaria) on the 11 December 1877, Russian troops advanced on the Ottoman 
capital; it was only an armistice, agreed on the 27 January 1878 and signed on the 
31st which halted them at Adrianople (Edime). On the same day the bases of a new 
accord were etched out and signed by the parties. Bulgaria was to be autonomous, 
Montenegro, Romania and Serbia independent, and Bosnia and Herzegovina were to 
receive autonomous administrations. There was, however, no mention made of 
Armenia since the latter had not formally made any requests. The situation was soon 
rectified through the intervention and effective mediation of Count Ignatyev, the 
Russian ambassador to Constantinople and a fervent Pan-Slavist. As a result, a clause 
was fashioned for inclusion in the forthcoming peace treaty. This read;
For the purpose of preventing oppressions and atrocities that have taken place in 
Turkey’s European and Asiatic provinces, the Sultan guarantees, in agreement 
with the Tsar, to grant administrative local self-government to the provinces 
inhabited by the Armenians (Sarkissian, 1938, p.64).
Ottoman Turkey was reluctant to allow local self-government for the Armenians but 
after much negotiation between various parties it finally agreed to reform in those 
provinces inhabited by the Armenians. This was to be the basis for Article 16 of the 
Treaty of San Stefano signed on the 3 March 1878. The treaty also resulted in many 
Russian territorial gains in Asia, much to the chagrin of Disraeli and his British 
cabinet.
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British opposition to Russian territorial gains in Armenia was twofold;
The acquisition of the strongholds of Armenia will place the population of that 
province under the immediate influence of the Power which holds them; while 
the extensive European trade which now passes from Trebizond to Persia will, in 
consequence of the cessions in Kurdistan, be liable to be arrested at the pleasure 
of the Russian government by the prohibitory barriers of their commercial system 
(Hertslet, 1891, p.2704).
To calm British fears and the reservations of others, a congress was arranged for 
attendance by the main parties to the Treaty of San Stefano. This was to be held in 
Berlin, with Prince Bismarck presiding as ‘honest broker’. It was decided that Russia 
would keep Kars (captured by Russian troops commanded by Count Mikhail 
Tarielovich Loris-Melikov, my great-great grandfather), Ardahan and Batum, but that 
Turkey would keep Alashkert, and Bayazid would revert to Turkey (so that Britain 
could keep its commercial route open).
Armenian leaders were not pleased with these developments. They had been hoping 
for some sort of local self-government within the Ottoman Empire and their 
displeasure led them to send a delegation headed by ex-patriarch Khrimian to 
European capitals to plead the Armenian cause. Their plans ‘fell upon deaf ears’ 
particularly in England where Armenian leaders were given no more than assurances 
designed merely to placate for the time being; ‘British policy had more important 
things to deal with than humanitarian matters’ (Walker, 1990, p. 112). The Armenian 
presence at the Congress of Berlin was largely ineffective and in great part ignored. 
The Armenian leaders witnessed the ‘carving up’ of their nation at the hands of the 
great powers and the destruction of their hopes for the security of their people. The 
ensuing Cyprus Convention addressed the aspirations of the Armenians for secure 
government in Turkish Armenia. Britain undertook to defend Ottoman Turkey and in 
return obtained Cyprus and, most importantly for the Armenians, a pledge from the
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Ottoman Sultan to ‘introduce reforms’. This Turkish promise was, however, greeted 
with some scepticism since former Ottoman promises to do the same had ended, quite 
often, in failure. The relevant article of the Treaty of Berlin (July 1878) and the 
Cyprus Convention did nothing to enhance security for Turkish Armenians. If 
anything, administration in the area continued to deteriorate and Armenian self- 
defence groups and revolutionary societies came to prominence. The unheard 
Armenian delegation expressed its displeasure at the text of Article 61 of the treaty:
The Armenians have just realised that they have been deceived, that their rights 
have not been recognised^ because they have been pacific; that the maintenance 
of their ancient Church and nationality have advanced them nothing.
The Armenian delegation is going to return to the east, taking this lesson with it. 
It declares nevertheless that the Armenian people will never cease from crying 
out until Europe gives its legitimate demands satisfaction (Baghdjian, 1969,
p.88).
Powerless to seize the moment, the Armenians had once again let slip from their 
grasp the cherished dream of liberty. No alternative proffered itself save that of 
patiently awaiting the next opportunity.
San Stefano was the zenith of Armenian-Russian collaboration. It would only be a 
few years before tsarist policy would begin to disregard the aspirations of the minority 
nationalities within Russia’s borders. Such a change in allegiance was already 
becoming apparent in the remaining years of the reign of Alexander II. The 
increasingly violent revolutionary movement in Russia had compelled the Tsar to 
send for the hero of the Russo-Turkish War, Count Mikhail Tarielovich Loris- 
Melikov (1825-1888), to head the Russian government with the purpose of bringing 
order to an empire in chaos. Seen by many Russians as a liberal, this ‘dictator of the 
heart’ encountered stiff opposition from both conservative and nationalist circles. 
When Alexander II was assassinated in the March of 1881, Loris-Melikov was subject 
to heavy criticism from the conservatives who rallied round the heir, convincing him
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that the Armenian was a ‘frenzied Asiatic’ and a dangerous reformer. The Procurator 
of the Holy Synod, Konstantin Pobedonostsev, wrote to his former pupil, now 
Alexander III, and told him:
Do not keep Count Loris-Melikov. I do not believe him. He is a sly person and 
can still play a double game. If you give yourself over into his hands, he will lead 
you and Russia to destruction. He was able to work out liberal projects and to
carry on a game of internal intrigue He is not a Russian patriot. Be careful,
for the sake of God, your Highness, that he does not capture your will; and do not 
lose time (Heilbronner, 1961, pp.384-97).
Pobedonostsev played upon the heir’s mistrust of liberals and foreigners, placing 
much emphasis on Loris-Melikov’s supposed Armenian character, his ‘slyness’, his 
not being a ‘true Russian’. This was a theme which would characterise the reign of 
Alexander III and one which would be a springboard for further anti-Armenian 
feeling generated by Russian conservative writers. The Armenian people were now to 
be referred to as ‘inorodtsy’ (‘aliens’), a term which had, until then, been used to refer 
to Jews, nomads, Gypsies and a few Siberian tribes. A great psychological divide 
between Pobedonostsev’s ‘true Russians’ and the ‘alien’ Armenians had now opened 
up.
Alexander Ill’s policy of conservative retrenchment and a renewed interest in the 
Armenian Question on a Europe-wide basis led to an acceleration in the revolutionary 
struggles both in Turkey and Russia. As a result, Russians came to view the 
Armenians as a ‘recalcitrant, ungrateful, difficult-to-govem, and even disloyal people’ 
(Suny, 1993, p.43). The tide was beginning to turn.
The reign of Alexander II had seen little need for confrontation between the Russian 
regime and the Armenian people. Russian policy had remained flexible in the 
Caucasus and the Armenians had looked, as so often before, to the Russians as
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providers and protectors. Change, however, was now afoot.
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3.5 Alexander III (1881-1894)
The Russophile liberalism that had been displayed by the Armenian intelligentsia 
during the reign of Alexander II now gave way to a type of revolutionary nationalism 
tinged with socialism. Despite the fact that the main thrust of this new movement 
was directed against the Ottoman Empire, the Russian authorities became concerned 
about its implications for the tsarist autocracy. Images of Armenian separatism and 
disloyalty replaced those of the Armenian as a loyal Christian and enterprising 
businessman. The differences that existed between Armenian Christianity and 
Russian Orthodoxy became more accentuated. The Armenian Church itself soon 
became the target of Russification and the Armenians as a whole came to be seen as a 
conspiratorial and rebellious people.
Open articulation of nationalist sentiment in the Armenian press, in schools, and in 
the Church was seen by the officials of Alexander III as a threat to autocratic Russia 
and to the unity of the multinational empire. To the rulers of nineteenth century 
Europe, nationalistic expression of this type was based upon a subversive doctrine 
which introduced a new principle as the basis for legitimacy of government: Tt 
substituted for the old legitimacy, based on monarchy by divine right, a new 
legitimacy based on the nation’ (Seton-Watson, 1967, p.268).
Russian nationalism now became the major factor compelling the ruling Russian 
authorities under Alexander III, to attempt to Russify through law and force the non- 
Russian peoples. Such Russification efforts began in 1885, first in the Baltic region 
and in Poland, and then in Transcaucasia. The Governor of the Caucasus, Prince 
A.M. Dondukov-Korsakov, ordered all Armenian parish schools to be closed and their 
replacement by Russian schools. The Caucasian authorities were hoping to eradicate 
the Armenian ‘patriotism’ and ‘populism’ which they believed was spreading among 
Armenian students. Over five hundred schools, attended by 20,000 students and
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employing 900 teachers, were shut down. Such anti-Armenian feeling only served to 
encourage the birth of resistance in the guise of secret schools, and in the wake of the 
school crisis there emerged a more radicalised Armenian intelligentsia. By 1886 the 
schools had been reopened, but their staff had been purged and stricter state 
surveillance over teachers had been established. The callous treatment of the Church- 
run educational system dealt a fatal blow to any element of Russophilia that was 
present in Armenian society, forced the Church further into opposition with tsarist 
authority, and finally led, within a few years, to the formation of the Armenian 
revolutionary organisations: the Hunchak and Dashnak parties.
Armenian reaction to the government’s Russification policies convinced state 
officials that elements within Russia’s minority groups were both dangerous and 
subversive. A government minister declared, after a visit to Transcaucasia in 1886, 
that ‘the Armenians and Georgians are seeking to free themselves from Russian 
culture and nourish the mad dream of the re-establishment of their national 
independence. Only firm power can succeed in containing and crushing this mad 
dream’ (Byrnes, 1968, p. 196).
The estrangement between Russia and the Armenians meant that the traditional 
Russian role of protector of Christian minorities was eroded. Such a development 
was to have a profound effect upon Armenian hopes for reform in Anatolia, hopes 
which later came to rest upon Britain. The situation for Ottoman Armenians in the 
1880s had become intolerable, and they were unable, even if they appeared to have 
had the fighting spirit ‘knocked out of them’ by centuries of subservience, to endure 
further Turkish brutality. Driven slowly towards defiance, defence of the body 
became as precious as religious faith. Spurred on by Ottoman oppression, some 
Annenians began to reject the theocratic system of the Ottoman Empire, and to 
rethink their position in the world. New ideas reached the Armenian populace from
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three different directions and were instrumental in undermining the Ottoman system. 
First, Radical, Populist political notions which had been current in Transcaucasia in 
the mid-1800s, found their way across the border to the Turkish Armenians. 
Secondly, Anierican Protestant missionaries had established a network of 
congregations and schools throughout Anatolia and Turkish Armenia. This network 
enabled the Armenians in Turkey to rapidly assimilate European intellectual ideas. 
The third channel for new ideas was through Constantinople and resulted in many 
well-established Armenian bankers sending their sons to Europe for their education.
The Armenians of Turkey placed their hopes for liberation from the Turkish yoke in 
the great powers. It seemed, to the Armenians, that the foreign powers and 
neighbouring countries favoured the Armenian cause and that they would intervene 
and rescue the Armenian people and their revolutionary leaders from Turkish misrule. 
The Armenians placed enormous faith in both the Cyprus Convention and Article 61 
of the Berlin Treaty and believed that under the terms of these two instruments, the 
powers, especially Britain, were bound to intervene in their affairs when Ottoman rule 
manifested its harshest side.
The failure of both Russia and Britain, however, to impose reforms on the Turks in 
the 1880s convinced young Armenians that they had to take up the national struggle 
for themselves. The revolutionary exploits of both the Hunchak and Dashnak parties 
became topics for discussion in the Russian and European press where the brutal 
reaction of the Turks was also charted. Demonstrations such as those at Kum Kapu 
(July 1890) and at Bab Ali (September 1895) were designed to attract the attention of 
diplomats and the readership of the popular press. The real significance of the Kum 
Kapu episode was:
 the Hunchaks’ challenge to their own traditional clerical leaders, whom they
considered, qua leaders, as slothful and collaborationist, and their attempt to
wrest the leadership of the community from them. Implicitly it was a challenge 
to the government; and it was a veiled threat to the six powers, that they would 
not be allowed to forget article 61 of the Berlin Treaty and keep the Annenian 
question entombed indefinitely, and that if necessary, blood would be shed in 
order to resurrect it (Walker, 1990, p. 133).
The purpose of the demonstration at Bab Ali was to present the Ottoman Sultan with 
a document which the Hunchaks termed their ‘Protest-Demand’. This document 
listed five individual protests, the first of which attacked Turkish persecution of the 
Ottoman Armenians:
 against the systematic persecution to which our people has been subjected,
especially during the last few years, a persecution which the Sublime Porte has 
made a principle of government with the one object of causing Armenians to 
disappear from their own country (Walker, 1990, p. 153).
The activities of the revolutionaries, particularly those of the Hunchaks who had 
openly proclaimed their opposition to the Russian autocracy, only served to 
compound the Russian image of the Armenians as an unruly and rebellious people. 
Any support which the Russian state had shown for the Armenians, now began to 
dissipate rapidly. This was particularly so in the wake of the insurrection and 
massacre at Zeitun and the occupation by the Dashnaks of the Ottoman Bank in 1895. 
The Dashnaks had occupied the bank in order to focus the attention of the great 
powers upon the plight of the Armenians, and to compel political changes to be made 
for their kinsfolk in the east. When the British pressed the Sultan for reform in 
Eastern Anatolia following the Sassoun Massacres, Russia and its ally France 
attempted to limit their effect as much as possible. British attempts to obtain Russian 
help to force concessions upon the Turks also met with rejection; Russia now viewed 
the Armenians not as fellow Christians but as villains, conspirators who seemed not 
only intent upon the destruction of the Ottoman Empire but also the Romanov 
dynasty. It seemed as though: ‘The only Armenia in which the Russian government 
might be interested was an Annenia without Armenians (Suny, 1993, p.46).
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The complete reversal of the Russian tradition of protecting the Armenians was 
achieved in the wake of the Hamidian Massacres of 1895-1896. When a group of 
Armenians in Europe turned to the British with a petition for aid, the authorities in St 
Petersburg were so outraged that they informed the Catholicos that Armenian schools 
in Russia would be closed as fitting punishment for the audacious petition. In the 
January of 1896 the Armenian Church schools were once again closed, and officials 
made plans to seize Church properties to finance a new state school system for the 
Armenians. In 1898 the benevolent societies and libraries were closed down and 
censors were ordered to prohibit publication of the words: ‘Armenian people’ or 
‘Armenian nation’. One censor, himself an Armenian, agreed that only the words 
‘Armenian society’ should be used to describe his nationality; after all, he asked: 
‘What kind of people are we anyway?’ (Suny, 1993, p.47).
Although the incontestable leaders of Caucasian urban life, the Armenians still came 
to be regarded as a pariah nation by those around them. This anti-Armenian feeling 
was most stridently vocalised by the Russian nationalist Vasilii Velichko (1860- 
1904). Velichko manipulated Georgian hostility towards the Armenians by his use of 
anti-Armenian rhetoric in Russian journals such as ‘Russkii vestnik’ (‘Russian 
Herald’). In one article Velichko asserted that the selfishness and ingratitude shown 
by the Armenians had turned the Azerbaijanis against them as well, as evidenced by 
the Azeri saying: ‘Light fire to your ten fingers like candles to show the way to an 
Armenian and he will not say thank you’ (Russkii vestnik. 1902, pp.617-18). 
Velichko was a staunch supporter of the autocracy and accused the Armenians of 
seeking a constitution for themselves with the sole aim of creating havoc for Russia. 
He was also determined, it seemed, to convince the Georgians that their natural allies 
were indeed the Russians and that the only solution to the national problem in the 
Caucasus lay in the strengthening of Russian language, ideas and spiritual influence 
in the region. The Armenian was depicted, thenceforth, as an alien element in society
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and the tenets of race, religion and revolution were cleverly manipulated by the 
Russians to achieve this.
With the Russophile affections of the Armenian people greatly diminished, the reign 
of Nicholas II (1894-1917) brought with it open rebellion against both the Turkish 
Empire and the Russian autocracy. In 1903 the seizure of properties belonging to the 
Armenian Church was an act which unified the great majority of the Armenian people 
of Transcaucasia behind the radical leadership of the Dashnaktsutiun Party. The 
newly-appointed Viceroy of the Caucasus, Count I.I. Vorontsov-Dashkov with his 
skilful combination of liberal concessions and armed repression restored some degree 
of stability to the Caucasus. Armenian properties were restored to the Church, and 
active state policy against the Armenians decelerated. The last years of the reign of 
Nicholas II were witness to a somewhat fragile restoration of the Armenian-Russian 
entente.
Not all Russians supported Vorontsov-Dashkov’s concessions to the Armenian 
populace. Some accused the Viceroy of propagating policies that were clearly anti- 
Russian in character:
The population of Caucasia, more precisely Transcaucasia, consists of different 
non-Russian elements, and they are all anti-state in their attitude, all filled with 
revolutionary separatism, and all living and breathing hatred toward Russia. Can 
the Russian state power depend on them? It is clear that it cannot (Liprandi, 
1911,pp.9-10).
On the other hand, Russian writers, poets and critics attempted to show the 
Armenians to be a cultured and friendly people with a literature worthy of European 
recognition. In 1916, for example, Maxim Gorky published a collection of Armenian 
literature in Russian, and at about the same time the Russian poet Valerii Briusov 
brought out his anthology of Armenian poetry. The most important attempt to reverse
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the negative image of Armenians in government circles was made by the Viceroy of 
the Caucasus. In his report to the Tsar in 1913, Vorontsov-Dashkov rejected the 
argument that the Armenians were treacherous and rebellious:
Six years ago I reported to you. Sire, with complete candour that within the 
borders of the empire we ourselves created the (Armenian) problems by
carelessly ignoring the religious and national views of the Armenians This
population is almost exclusively rural, occupied diligently with agriculture; what 
is more, this kind of work is so congenial to the spirit of these people that the 
inhabitants of all Armenian cities remain primarily farmers. Only about one-fifth 
of Armenians live outside their homeland, primarily occupied in commercial- 
industrial enterprises and creating among the nationalists with whom they live 
that false impression about Armenians in general that exists among us, just as we 
have views about Greeks as a nationality based on Greek merchants (Vorontsov- 
Dashkov, 1913, p.6).
Vorontsov-Dashkov criticised the Russian government for its incrimination of the 
whole Armenian nation by means of the trial of 500 Dashnaks in 1912. However, the 
apparent attempt to use the semi-independent judiciary to promote the seemingly 
racist views of the government backfired and at least 450 defendants were acquitted.
Towards the end of the reign of Nicholas II the Armenians remained in a precarious 
position for they were still viewed by the Russians and other neighbours as 
conspiratorial merchants and mercenary exploiters. However, the Armenians did find 
support in both liberal and radical circles. In the last years before the outbreak of the 
First World War the Russian Foreign Ministry took up the ‘Armenian Question’ once 
more and, along with the major European powers, approved a programme of reform 
in Turkish Armenia. Sadly, with the onset of war the Armenians once again became 
the pawns in a Russo-Turkish game. Armenia was now ‘carved up’ and given in 
secret to Russia in the Sykes-Picot agreement of May 1916. However, before this 
accord had been definitively formulated, the Turks embarked upon their own ‘Final 
Solution’ to the Armenian Question. The Genocide of 1915 emptied Anatolia of
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Armenians and brought a step nearer the fulfilment of the Turkish nationalist and 
Russian imperialist dream: an Armenia without Armenians.
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4.0 Armenia in the 20th Century
4.1 The Genocide of 1915
The Young Turk Revolution of 1908 marked a turning point in the affairs of the 
Armenian people. Ottoman Armenians and other minorities welcomed the revolution 
that brought the Young Turk to power; they hoped that the restoration of the liberal 
constitution would somehow provide a political mechanism for peaceful development 
within the framework of a representative parliamentary system. However, a new 
Turkish nationalist ideology was already taking shape. The new Turkish government 
aimed to alter completely the ethnic and political balance in eastern Anatolia and by 
doing so permit the eventual creation of a new ethnically Turkic Empire. The 
ideology has been described thus:
First, the Ottoman Turks had to consolidate their grip over their empire and 
Turkicize its minorities. In the second, ‘Pan-Turkic’, phase, the closest relatives 
of the Ottoman Turks-the Azerbaijanis of Russia and Persia (the southeastern 
group of Turkic peoples)-were to be taken into the Turkic state. The third step 
would be the uniting of all the Turanian peoples of Asia around the Turkish core 
(Lang & Walker, 1987, p.7).
A biographer of one of the chief Pan-Turkists, Zia Gôkalp, commented: ‘Gokalp, 
Halide Edib and their associates dreamt of a union of all the Turks under a single 
ruler who would renew the days of Attila, Jengiz Khan or Timur-leng’ (Lang & 
Walker, 1987, p.7). By eliminating the Armenians, in the four-way power struggle in 
the region, the Young Turks could also end Western and Russian interference in 
Ottoman affairs, achieve the goal of Turkish nationalists to create an undisputed 
homeland for the Turkish people, and strive toward the Pan-Turanian utopia of a 
Turkic Empire stretching from Istanbul to Central Asia.
The implications of Pan-Turkism for the Armenians were grave. They were among 
the least willing of the minorities within the empire to be Turkicised, preferring
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instead to cling to their ancient Church as a symbol of their defiance. Moreover, their 
fellow Armenians in the Russian Caucasus stood in the way of the ‘second stage’ of 
Pan-Turkism-the expansion to Baku, the oil city on the Caspian.
The Armenians were resented by the Muslim population because of what the latter 
perceived to be their inferior status in the industrial and commercial world. 
Armenians were visible in the Ottoman business world and as close colleagues of 
European investors and entrepreneurs. Muslims, who dominated the empire 
politically, were subordinated economically and socially to non-Muslims in the work 
world. Armenians and Greeks, and to a lesser extent Jews, made up a large and 
influential number of the owners and operators of industrial and commercial 
enterprises. In addition, Armenians and Greeks also held important positions as 
managers and salaried employees in Western-financed companies, in mining and 
especially on the railroads. The social and cultural tension between the Muslim and 
Armenian, coupled with the new Turkic ideology, became the catalyst for the 
Genocide of the Armenian people in 1915.
The state had for decades perceived the Armenians to be alien to the Turkish Empire; 
they were considered to be dangerous revolutionaries and separatists who threatened 
the integrity of the state. Furthermore, they were seen as responsible for the troubles 
of the empire, allies of the anti-Turkish powers, and the source of politically radical 
ideas, including trade unionism and socialism:
For the Turks, the Armenian movement was the deadliest of all threats. From the 
conquered lands of the Serbs, Bulgars, Albanians, and Greeks, they could, 
however reluctantly, withdraw, abandoning distant provinces and bringing the 
Imperial frontier nearer home. But the Armenians, stretching across Turkey-in- 
Asia from the Caucasian frontier to the Mediterranean coast, lay in the very heart 
of the Turkish homeland-and to renounce these lands would have meant not the 
truncation, but the dissolution of the Turkish state (Lewis, 1961, p.356).
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With anti-Armenian feeling firmly established within governmental and other circles, 
the First World War broke out. Most Turkish Armenians behaved as loyal Ottoman 
citizens. In fact about 250,000 were conscripted into the Ottoman armies. However, 
some Armenians did flee from Turkey into Russia where they joined the volunteer 
regiments which the tsarist authorities were encouraging. In Cilicia, Armenian 
leaders instigated a revolt against the Ottoman government, but this came to nothing.
Turkish Armenians in the Ottoman Army were herded into labour battalions and 
starved, beaten or shot. On 24 April 1915, 254 Armenian intellectuals in Istanbul 
were arrested and deported to the provinces of Ayash and Chankiri, where nearly all 
of them were murdered by the authorities. The Armenian community was now 
leaderless and the Turkish authorities took full advantage of the situation. In every 
town and village of Turkish Armenia and Asia Minor, the entire Armenian population 
was ordered out:
The men were usually led away and shot down just outside their villages. A far 
worse fate awaited the women and children: they were forced to walk southwards 
in huge convoys to the burning deserts of northern Syria. Few survived the 
privations of these terrible death marches; for months afterwards, the roads and 
tracks of Anatolia were littered with corpses and skeletons picked clean by the 
vultures. There were variations on this pattern. In Trebizond, the local 
Armenians were embarked in boats, and thrown overboard when well out into the 
Black Sea. A number were despatched by being hurled down the Kemakh Gorge, 
near Erzinjan (Lang & Walker, 1987, p.7).
Survivors of the long journey south were herded into open-air concentration camps 
where they were starved and killed by sadistic guards. A small number were able to 
escape thanks to the secret protection of friendly Arabs in the surrounding villages of 
northern Syria. The only other refugee routes were to Russian Transcaucasia or the 
Balkans:
But whatever happened, how was it conceivable to enslave a people who, by
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looking at their native mountains, learnt to stand upright staunchly, who, by 
looking at the stem contours of their architectural monuments, absorbed their 
beauty and, by looking at their cuneiforms and manuscripts, remembered their 
origins? (Emin, 1981, p.23).
There were Muslim leaders who vehemently denounced the horrors perpetrated 
against the Armenians by the Young Turk Government, but such protests, sadly, bore 
little fruit. Before 1914, about 2 million Armenians lived in Turkey. Since the First 
World War this figure has hardly exceeded 100,000. Thus the number of Armenian 
dead may be estimated to be about 1,500,000. Another half-million became refugees, 
the descendants of whom are now scattered to the four comers of the earth.
Despite the extreme hardship which the Armenian found himself subject to, he 
somehow managed, says Gevorg Emin, to survive:
The blazing fires of the holocaust tempered our suffering people to the point of 
being undefeatable and indestmctible. The enormous physical and spiritual 
pressure made them as hard as diamonds. Our people contracted, coiling like a
spring which accumulated enormous energy for uncoiling The Genocide
had killed, if one might put it so, the flesh of our people, but gave strength to 
their spirit. One eye-witness of the massacre said later that the Turkish assassins
succeeded in killing the substance, but suffered a failure in essence Yes,
only 700,000 Armenians were left alive on the small plot of land known as 
present-day Armenia. But they were a people who in the crucible of suffering 
had acquired the secrets of resurrection.
After all, our people had to endure atrocities throughout their history. In 
captivity they retained their dignity, in defeat they won a victory, and when dying
they went on living Here is the mythical phoenix, rising out of its ashes after
being consumed by fire. And whoever does not believe in the legend of the
resurrection, should visit Armenia! Dying more often than living, we not
only survived, but also created, stmggled and lived in hope. The spark of fire 
was alive even when we seemed to have been buried under ashes. Yes, only
700,000 Armenians were left after the Genocide in Eastem Armenia, but their 
spirit had been steeled and they knew how to defy the enemy as courageously as 
Haik, how to love as tenderly as Ara, how to accept a martyr’s death as bravely as 
Vardan, how to create spiritual light as wisely as Mashtots, how to build 
Zvartnots and howto murmur the line o f ‘Narek’ (Emin, 1981, pp.33-34).
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4.2 Independent Armenia: 1918-1920
The Armenians believed that the Bolshevik Revolution of October 1917 would enable 
them to realise their Western-inspired political hopes. Though most Armenian 
political leaders opposed the creation of Soviet power, they were more receptive to 
Lenin’s ideas concerning nationalities. The Bolshevik programme seemed to 
formally guarantee the full civil and social rights of all peoples, and in his writings 
Lenin specifically called for ‘self-determination of nations including separation’ from 
Russia if they should so desire. For the Armenians this meant that they would be 
permitted to decide for themselves whether or not they wanted association with 
Russia or independence. Should they have chosen to remain within a Russian state, 
however, they would have had to accept the Bolshevik principle of a centralised state 
with a certain degree of territorial autonomy, but could not have chosen national 
cultural autonomy or a federal relationship with the Centre.
In an effort to reassure the minorities and other governments that the new Soviet 
government was not as imperialist as former Russian governments had been, Lenin 
was prepared to allow the creation of an independent Armenia by the Armenians, but 
not with the help of Russian troops. Such a policy was, essentially, unrealistic; a 
withdrawal of Russian troops would have prompted a Turkish military return to 
Armenia and any decision about the future of Turkish Armenia would have been 
impossible.
From early 1918 to early 1921 Russia was tom apart by a ferocious civil war, attacked 
by hostile powers, and fractured by nationalist and separatist movements. Soviet 
Russia would not, until 1920, be a major player in Caucasian affairs. Turkey was 
now the main threat to Transcaucasian governments; Pan-Turkic ambitions were now 
revived as Russia stmggled to overcome the turmoil within its borders. The Turkish 
offensive began in Febmaiy 1918 and the whole of Turkish Armenia soon rested
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within the grip of General Karabekir. No outside power was willing to come to the 
aid of the Armenians and, in the face of continued onslaught, the level of fear and 
hostility towards Caucasian Muslims in Erevan grew.
The chances for the survival of an independent Armenian state in 1918 seemed fairly 
remote. Although repulsed from the Erevan province, the Turks still posed a serious 
threat as they continued their advance through Azerbaijan toward Baku. The 
Armenian leadership in Tiflis (Tbilisi) would have preferred to keep some kind of 
political relationship with Russia and the other peoples of Transcaucasia. But 
hostilities between these peoples and the calculation by the Georgians and the 
Azerbaijanis that they could improve their situation by abandoning the Armenians and 
allying with the Germans and Turks left the Armenians completely isolated. The 
decisions of other nations forced the Dashnak Party to adopt the role of leader of a 
new state, a state that came into existence in an extremely inhospitable environment.
Two conditions were required for an independent Armenia to become a viable 
sovereign state: unity among the Armenians in support of the state and material and 
diplomatic support from at least one of the great powers. Russia was unable to aid 
and Armenia’s fortune thus rested with the Entente. In the short term, however, 
Armenia was compelled to deal with Turkey. On 4 June, a peace treaty was signed 
with the Turks and the Tiflis Armenians began the task of forming a government for a 
country that did not yet exist in any tangible way. It was only on 19 July that the 
government of the new Armenian Republic arrived in its designated capital, Erevan. 
The government, however, had not only to contend with the nearby Turkish Army; it 
was also faced with tens of thousands of starving and homeless refugees and people 
suffering from cholera and typhus. The first few months of the republic’s existence 
were a holding operation, as the Armenians watched the First World War come to a 
close. A new political scene emerged as the defeat of the Central Powers and the
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subsequent withdrawal of the Turks from Transcaucasia created an entirely new 
political universe for the Armenians. Armenia’s chances for survival seemed to have 
been enhanced.
The period of Armenian independence lasted for only two years, from the end of the 
First World War to the coming of the Red Army in the last month of 1920. The 
failure to establish an independent state might be attributed to the poor leadership of 
the Dashnaks themselves, to the failure of the Entente to provide necessary aid, or to 
the imperialist designs of the Soviet and Turkish states.
Armenia’s failure to remain independent may have lain in the fact that the attempt to 
establish independence took place in a power vacuum. This tenuous state of 
independence lasted only as long as the large states that had divided Armenia in the 
last century and a half were too weak to establish hegemony over this small country. 
As soon as either or both of these powers, Russia and Turkey, regained strength, one 
was likely to reestablish its authority over Armenia. If the two powers were, however, 
evenly matched or in alliance, Armenia was likely to be divided between them. This 
scenario was not a new one. For thousands of years Armenia’s geographical position 
had made it susceptible to the whims of the surrounding powers. It had become 
almost a law of Armenian histoiy that Armenia could enjoy autonomy or 
independence only when the great empires on its borders were weak, distracted by 
international affairs, or so evenly balanced with one another that an autonomous 
Armenian buffer state between them was acceptable. Frequently, however, Armenia 
was simply divided between the great imperial states of the region.
Shortly after taking office, the first Prime Minister of the Armenian Republic, 
Hovhannes Kachaznuni, found the country in a condition that could only be described 
as catastrophic. Armenia needed immediate assistance, namely material supplies and
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a pledge of support for its security. Famine was widespread in Erevan, and the 
underfed population was more susceptible to disease. By the middle of 1919, 
approximately 200,000 people, almost 20 percent of the republic’s population, had 
died:
The populace is feeding upon the bodies of dead cats and dogs. There have even 
been cases when a starving mother has eaten the kidney or liver from the corpse
of her own child The skeleton-like women and children rummage in the
refuse heaps for moldered shoes and, after cooking them for three days, eat them 
(Hovarmisan, 1971, p. 128).
With its food supply from Russia effectively cut off and the number of refugees 
increasing daily, the Armenian economy was unable to stabilise itself. The money 
issued by the government had become worthless. Moreover, the republic was faced 
with the hostile governments of Georgia and Azerbaijan as well as the nationalist 
movement headed by Mustafa Kemal in Anatolia.
The Armenians attended the Paris Peace Conference of January 1919 in the hope of 
gaining the Allied leaders’ approval for their plans concerning the establishment of an 
Armenian state stretching from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean. This Utopian 
image did not, however, meet with much approval from the Allied delegations.
Gradually, the various Allied powers refused to take on the principal responsibility for 
the Annenians. It was finally decided by those leaders gathered at the Paris Peace 
Conference that the United States should become the mandatory power protecting the 
Armenians. President Wilson was not, however, able to convince the Senate to adopt 
the mandate. Furthermore, although the Allied powers granted de facto recognition to 
Armenia in January 1920, no military assistance was forthcoming. America sent 
food, money, and other supplies that were crucial to Armenia’s survival, but as the 
Russian Civil War came to a close, further aid was not forthcoming.
I l l
Without Western support Armenia survived as an independent state only so long as its 
two most powerful neighbours, Russia and Turkey, could not physically threaten its 
existence. The threat soon manifested itself. Armenia’s alliance with the Western 
Powers was viewed suspiciously by both the Soviet and Turkish Kemalist 
governments. Armenia was seen to be a supporter and agent of Western imperialism 
and its probable capitulation was seen by its enemies as a blow against that ideology.
The final act in the drama of independence was about to be played out. In the late 
spring of 1920, the Republic of Armenia sent a delegation to Moscow in the hope of 
gaining Soviet support for Armenian independence and claims to Turkish Armenia. 
Armenian aspirations were, however, scotched by the Soviet government which was 
intent on solidifying an alliance with the Turkish nationalists.
With the prospect of being crushed between the Soviet anvil and the Turkish hammer, 
the Armenians sent a delegation to Alexandropol to negotiate with the Turks in order 
to keep them out of Erevan. At the same time they continued negotiations with the 
representatives of Soviet Russia. In its last days the government of independent 
Armenia signed treaties with both the Soviets and the Kemalists. Anxious for the best 
possible deal for the Armenians, the republic’s representative in Alexandropol signed 
away Armenian claims to Turkish Armenia and denounced the Treaty of Sevres 
(August 10, 1920) which had given Armenia, in principle, a large part of northeastern 
Anatolia. On the same day (2 December, 1920), in Erevan, the government of 
General Dro signed an agreement with Silin, the representative of the Soviet Russian 
Republic, proclaiming the new state of Soviet Armenia.
The fragile light of independence, had, for the Armenians, been prematurely snuffed 
out. The surrounding powers had made sure of that. Soviet Russia had no interest in 
supporting Armenia as an independent state when it could put an end to its diplomatic
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isolation by aligning itself with Armenia’s traditional enemy, the Nationalist Turks, 
and therefore identifying the Soviet cause with the national liberation struggles of 
Muslim peoples. Armenia was expendable to the Soviets and always subordinate to 
Russia’s revolutionary goals. Faced with possible invasions on two frontiers, the 
Dashnak government of Armenia was compelled to capitulate. Fortunately, a small 
part of historic Armenia was preserved by the Dashnak-Soviet agreement and the 
Russo-Turkish Treaty of 1921. Kars and Ardahan were lost; Ararat and Turkish 
Armenia were ceded; but Erevan, Alexandropol, and Russian Armenia in its pre-1878 
boundaries remained in the new Soviet republic. Armenia’s future now lay in that 
small comer of its devastated homeland.
Although the Armenian dream had been shattered, the exercise was to shape the 
process of Armenian nation-building for the remainder of the century. The Dashnak 
Republic preserved a small portion of Armenia for Armenians and established an 
embryonic state stmcture in Erevan. The Russians, for their own political and 
ideological reasons, made possible the continued existence of an Armenian political 
entity, although it was not sovereign and independent. One fact remained, however. 
For the first time in modem histoiy the Armenians had constituted a nationality, in the 
sense of a conscious and mobilised ethnic group.
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4.3 The Establishment of Soviet Power
With the cession of power to the Soviets, Armenia was proclaimed an ‘independent 
Socialist republic’. All power was to be placed in the hands of a revolutionaiy 
committee (Revkom), made up of five Communists and two left-wing Dashnaks. 
Selection of the Dashnaks was dependent upon the approval of the Communists. The 
revolution that was to fundamentally shape the future of Armenia had begun.
The new Bolshevik regime began to wield its newly-acquired power. One of the first
measures to be taken involved the confiscation of foodstuffs and grains from the
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peasants and townspeople Wiom, the regime believed, had surpluses. The new 
government thus came to be associated with requisitions and confiscations. Soviet 
leaders did nothing, however, to expel the Turks from those parts of Armenia they 
continued to occupy.
The first Bolshevik attempt to impose Soviet rule in Armenia was a disaster as the 
latter had tried to implement their version of Communism without sufficient planning 
or preparation. Some degree of autonomy was offered to Transcaucasia by Lenin who 
feared too much emphasis on the importance of centralising power in the Soviet 
republics. The general nature of the relationship between Moscow and the Soviet 
republics was determined gradually, and through trial and error. Although no clear 
plan had been drawn up by the Centre, the rights and privileges of the individual 
republics wefe withered away, and many more prerogatives fell to the central 
leadership. Each Soviet republic signed a treaty of alliance with Soviet Russia 
defining their relationship. On 20 September 1921 Armenia signed such a treaty but 
limited its ties to financial cooperation.
By the end of 1922 the Soviet republics had all but surrendered their autonomous role 
in foreign affairs, which, thenceforth, became the prerogative of the central Russian
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authority. Because of the weakness of Soviet Armenia-the disastrous state of the 
economy, the lack of dependable support for the new government from the 
population, and the peculiar demographic situation in which more Armenians were 
living in Georgia and Azerbaijan than in Armenia itself-the Armenian Communists 
were among the most energetic supporters of a political and economic union of the 
three Transcaucasian republics.
On 12 March, 1922, the Federative Union of Soviet Socialist Republics of 
Transcaucasia was created by treaty. The ensuing four months saw an acceleration 
towards centralisation and on 13 December, 1922, this federation of republics was 
changed into a single federated republic (ZSFSR), a more unified, political and 
economic unit. The first stage in political unification took place between 1923 and 
1924 as the various Soviet republics formed the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 
(USSR), centralising foreign policy, defence, foreign trade, communications, and 
most domestic economic policy at the all-union level. Thus, by early 1924, Armenia 
was a republic within the Transcaucasian Republic, which in turn was a member of 
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.
In 1922, the RSFSR adopted a series of law codes-criminal, civil, agrarian, labour and 
judicial-and in the following years the Armenian SSR, together with the other Soviet 
republics, adopted the same codes, sometimes with minor revisions. In January 1922, 
the first Congress of Soviets of Armenia adopted a constitution modelled on that of 
the RSFSR. The stress was on standardisation and uniformity in the interest of 
binding the periphery closer to the centre. In November 1923 the Dashnaks in Erevan 
formally abolished their party within Armenia-and the Communist Party achieved a 
complete monopoly of political power.
Thus, by 1924 close ties had been developed between the centre and the periphery to
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such an extent that only a very limited area of competence remained to the Armenian 
Republic; it couldn’t be considered in any sense a sovereign state, though officially in 
Soviet law it was so designated. The most important political and economic 
decisions affecting Armenians were now made outside of Erevan, in Tbilisi and in 
Moscow, although it must be said that a whole host of cultural and local issues were 
left to the Armenian community.
In the first decade of Soviet power the government of Armenia embarked upon a 
programme of economic restoration and cultural revival. Its policies were aimed at 
the expansion of the agricultural base of peasant life, the construction of new canals 
and industries and the establishment of schools and cultural institutions; these were 
the first tentative steps toward the modernisation of Armenia through state initiative. 
The Soviet leadership also engaged in a programme of revitalising the national 
culture of the Armenians and stimulating the use of their national language.
Whereas modernisation had led, elsewhere, to the weakening of national culture and 
had given rise to assimilationist tendencies, in the Armenian Republic, state policy 
was aimed at encouraging the simultaneous processes of modernisation and 
renationalisation.
The Soviet government expected the Armenians to change their traditional ways into 
those that were ‘modern’, yet remain Armenian; indeed, through education and state 
promotion of culture, they were, ironically, to become even more Armenian.
Economically, the Soviet government had the task of reestablishing a viable agrarian 
economy in Armenia before it could seriously consider its transformation into that 
which was industrial. The Communist Party found itself in a paradoxical situation as 
it was dedicated to building a Socialist society based on industry in a country which
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had an overwhelmingly peasant population. For Marx and Marxists, Socialism 
presumed the prior existence of a highly developed industrial economy and a 
politically conscious working class ready to take power.
But the reality of the 1920s in Russia and Armenia was that of an agricultural rather 
than an industrial country in which workers and peasants did not rule themselves but 
were ruled by a small group of party members who held power in the name of a 
nearly non-existent working class.
Lenin’s New Economic Policy (NEP) established a mixed economy in which the state 
controlled the ‘commanding heights’ of industry and trade, while the peasants and 
much of the rest of the nation worked in a largely private, semi-capitalist market 
economy. The NEP was seen by Lenin as a form of ‘state capitalism’, a necessary 
first step for a backward nation to build the basis for Socialism.
By 1926, agricultural production had reached 71.5% of its prewar level. The peasants 
didn’t own their own land but were free to use it after paying a tax to the state. The 
state, in turn, purchased the peasants’ produce at fixed prices, and the peasants were 
permitted to sell surpluses on the open market. Some peasants did well enough to 
hire extra hands to work on their lands, others who could not succeed in agriculture 
drifted into the towns looking for jobs in the new industries.
Industrial production in Armenia also recovered to just under three-quarters of the 
prewar level by 1926. The cities expanded steadily, siphoning the surplus population 
from the villages. However, over 80% of Armenians were still living in the 
countryside. It is clear that along with agrarian restoration and capital construction, 
Soviet modernisation in Armenia involved urbanisation. The government assigned 
the architect Alexander Tumanian to draw up a master plan for the reconstruction and
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transformation of Erevan from a provincial centre into a national capital.
Soviet modernisation also involved the shift of values from the traditional and 
religious to the secular and Socialist. The Soviet government actively tried to wrench 
Armenians away from their loyalty to the national Church and replace that faith with 
a commitment to building a Socialist Armenia. The Church was forbidden to engage 
in religious propaganda, while anti-religious propaganda was actively encouraged by 
the state. Churches were closed, priests persecuted, and the Catholicos Kevork V 
(1911-1930) retaliated by refusing until 1927 to recognise the atheist Soviet regime.
The new Soviet government attacked traditional Armenian attitudes. The Armenian 
male attitude towards their women came under such attack as the Communists urged 
the liberation of women from housework and family life and brought them into the
labour force. A special ‘Women’s Section was to struggle for women’s equality, but
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it met with resistance from the patriarchal leaders of Armenian villages.
Language and literacy took on an added importance as they became the tools with 
which the new Soviet political leadership could integrate the Armenian into the new 
political order. In Armenia, the language of instruction in schools was Armenian, but 
the content was Soviet: children were taught the dominant values of the ruling elite. 
In Armenia, they were taught to defend the October Revolution and to hate its 
enemies, including the former leaders of Armenian national life; the Dashnaktsutiun. 
They were taught to be suspicious of the Capitalist West and to support the 
revolutionary struggles throughout the world. Children were also encouraged to 
develop a collective spirit and reject personal egotism. At the same time, they were 
inculcated with the values of the Communist Party as well as a fresh appreciation of 
the histoiy and literature of the Armenians.
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Already in the 1920s, a conflict was growing between the effects of Communist 
modernisation and Armenian renationalisation. Soviet modernisation was an attack 
on many traditional Armenian mores and institutions; on the patriarchal family and 
the subordinate role of women, on the authority of religion and the national Church, 
and on village life and its former authorities. But at the same time, Soviet policy was 
also directed toward preserving and nourishing many aspects of Armenian national 
life, at renationalising Armenia.
State policy was aimed also, at redressing the imbalance between more developed 
central Russia and the less developed borderlands. This was achieved by means of 
economic aid in the form of capital which was given to the nationalities. The 
Communists also intended to eliminate civil, legal, and social distinctions between 
minorities and to achieve what they termed, ‘national equality’. Colonial aspects of 
imperial Russian rule were to be consciously avoided and a policy of encouraging 
members of local nationalities to run their own areas was actively promoted. This 
new policy known as ‘Korenizatsiia’ (‘Rooting’) or ‘Nativisation’, was first outlined 
in a resolution of the Tenth Party Congress in March 1921. The Party was to develop 
administrative and economic organs that would operate in the local languages and 
with people from the local nationality. Schools, theatres and newspapers, all utilising 
national languages, were also to be established.
Territorially, Armenians were guaranteed a physical space of their own to which 
those who had been scattered around the globe, could return. Frontiers were settled in 
treaties with foreign states and other Soviet republics. With the establishment of a 
close tie with Soviet Russia, the threat from Turkey was effectively eliminated. In the 
minds of many Armenians the ultimate justification for the dominance of Russia over 
Armenia continued, even after the Revolution, to be the conclusion that without 
Russian protection, Armenia simply couldn’t exist.
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Demographically, Armenia now became the haven of Armenians displaced by wars 
and political changes in the rest of the world. Armenians from other parts of the 
Soviet Union migrated to Armenia, either for nationalist reasons or to better their 
prospects in life. Tiflis and Baku Armenians displaced by the nativisation of Georgia 
and Azerbaijan, went to Armenia to find opportunities no longer available in their 
former homelands. Like the Jews, the Armenians had been a cosmopolitan people 
without a territorial base; they had flourished as middle-class members of a mixed 
urban population. But as the policy of ‘Korenizatsiia’ developed local cadres of local 
nationalities, the Armenians were pushed out of political and economic positions in 
other republics and as a result, migrated to Armenia.
Culturally, the Soviet policy of nativisation meant the spread of the use of the 
Armenian language into all aspects of Armenian life. Armenian became the official 
language of the Soviet republic and was to be used in all government institutions, in 
the courts, and in the schools. At first it was difficult to implement this policy, for 
many Communists were Russified Armenians who didn’t know Armenian well, but in 
time Russian was largely replaced in official circles by Armenian.
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At the same time, various institutions were established in Armenia an opera, a film
A
Studio, national radio, an Academy of Sciences, museums and a State University. For 
the first time since the Middle Ages, Annenian became a language of science. A new 
literary language based upon the Eastem Armenian dialect was developed along with 
a new orthography. The 1920s also heralded a period of cultural renaissance for 
Armenia’s artists and scientists. Along with the revitalisation of high culture, the 
government campaigned for the spread of education and liquidation of illiteracy. As 
part of this ‘Cultural Revolution’, hundreds of groups were set up between 1928 and 
1929 to teach reading. By 1931 Erevan could claim to be a city that had eliminated 
illiteracy. A new audience had now been created for the publications and periodicals
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that poured out of the state publishing houses. As the 1920s came to a close, Lenin’s 
NEP faded as Stalin and his associates adopted an ambitious Five Year Plan for 
development. Under this new initiative, peasant agriculture was to be collectivised, 
all private industry eliminated, and the entire country mobilised in order to convert 
the Soviet Union from an agrarian to an industrial economy. Another revolution was 
being planned, this time a ‘revolution from above’, which was designed to complete 
the modernisation of the country.
The political, economic, and cultural changes that took place in Armenia during the 
first decade of Soviet power represented the restoration of a devastated nationality 
and the foundation of a new nation. The new Soviet government, with little active 
support from the population, nevertheless managed to achieve a degree of 
acquiescence in its rule, as it brought peace and security to a ravaged land and began 
the tentative revival of economic and cultural life.
The successes of the Soviets in turning a land of refugees into a stable, growing 
society increased the popularity of the regime. Particularly welcome was the policy 
of nativisation in Armenia, a policy which elevated the Armenian language to that of 
an official state language, encouraged the spread of education from the towns into the 
villages, created science in Armenian, and subsidised an Armenian cultural 
establishment. The limits on the expression of nationalism tightened at the end of the 
twenties, but the renationalisation of the country continued into the thirties. By the 
end of the 1920s it seemed as though the Armenians had stepped back from the brink 
of extinction. It was now clear that they would survive, even thrive, in this new 
nation being built upon the ruins of their ancient homeland. As was once noted by the 
Norwegian explorer, Fridthof Nansen:
The notes of the Armenian folk-songs echo long in the soul. I could not help 
thinking of what my friend Kurgenian said after hearing one of the melodies sung
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that evening; ‘Wouldn’t you say that a people whose soul goes out in songs and 
music like that can never die?’ (Nansen, 1928, p.225).
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4.4 Stalin and the Armenians
The first decade of Soviet rule in Armenia had established an Armenian political 
framework within which the economy could be restored and society embark upon a 
gradual but steady modernisation. The Armenians were still faced, however, with the 
task of feeding, housing and organising a starving population, 50% of which were 
homeless refugees. They began the construction of capital projects which they hoped 
would serve as a basis for further economic developments; the building of HEP 
plants, canals and irrigation projects and the rebuilding of the city of Erevan. A 
government of Armenians created the political, cultural, educational, and scientific 
infrastructure of a new nation, and the Armenian language was elevated to the level of 
an official state language.
The first and most intense phase of the so-called Stalin Revolution occurred with the 
implementation of the first Five Year Plan (1928-1932). The policy of supporting 
independent peasant agriculture which had seemed to work so well in the 1920s to 
restore the countryside, was terminated, and a drive for the formation of collective 
farms began in earnest.
By February 1930 the Party announced that 63% of all peasant households in Armenia 
had been collectivised. The assault on the villages by the Party and the army in the 
years between 1929 and 1930, was a return to the crude and violent methods of the 
earliest days of Soviet power in Armenia, and gave rise to fierce resistance. 
Armenian villagers joined with the Muslim peasants to fight against the collectivisers. 
Facing widespread rebellion against its agrarian policy, the government now reversed 
itself temporarily and allowed the peasants to decide themselves if they wanted to 
join the collectives. In Armenia, as elsewhere, the decision was overwhelmingly 
against collectivisation. However, a second campaign of forced collectivisation 
began in the fall of 1930, resulting in many parts of Armenia falling into the hands of
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anti-collectivisation rebels. Collectivisation was finally imposed on the Armenians 
with the help of Russian troops. By the end of 1933 nearly two-fifths of the peasantry 
had been collectivised. By 1936 the figure had reached four-fifths and on the eve of 
World War Two all but 17% of Armenia’s peasants lived and worked on the 
collective farms (Suny, 1993, p. 152).
The campaign for collectivisation was the single most important offensive launched 
against traditional Armenian society by the Soviet government; they ordered the 
destruction of the old village governance system and made it easier to rule the 
countryside through the collective units. There were economic benefits of course, but 
the political advantages to the Soviet state far outweighed them. As a result of 
collectivisation the peasantry disappeared as an independent force in the economy or 
a political threat to the community in the cities.
In addition to the independent peasantry a second class was destroyed in Armenia by 
the Stalin Revolution-the commercial bourgeoisie. By 1935 private trade had been 
completely eliminated and only state cooperative institutions engaged in trade 
remained. Private industries were also abolished and the entire economy was put 
under the guidance of a state programme. The market system had been eliminated, 
though in this land of chronic shortages a ‘sort of free market’ remained.
A new class was now taking shape-the industrial working class. Whereas industry 
had accounted for a mere 21.7% of economic production in 1928, in early 1935 it 
measured 62.1%. The percentage of industrial and white collar workers in Armenia 
grew steadily until it reached 23.3% of the population in 1935 and 31.2% in 1939. 
Unemployment was eliminated and many poor peasants rose rapidly through work 
and education to become skilled workers, engineers and even to enter the political 
hierarchy. A new Soviet-trained intelligentsia was emerging to compete with the pre-
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Revolutionary intellectuals and specialists. The forced modernisation of the Stalinist 
period brought fundamental changes to Armenian society. More urban, more 
industrial, Armenians also became more literate, more mobile, and Armenian women 
were considerably freer than they had been.
During the first phase of the Stalinist ‘Cultural’ Revolution of 1928-1931, the Leninist 
policy of ‘Korenizatsiia’ (‘Nativisation’) was not only continued, but intensified. 
Greater emphasis than ever was placed upon the teaching and use of native languages. 
Russians and other non-natives were encouraged to learn the local languages. 
Official enthusiasm for nativisation began to wane perceptibly, however, between 
1933 and 1934. In 1934 Stalin told the Seventeenth Party Congress that local 
nationalism was a great danger to Socialist unity. The Russian language was 
recognised as the ‘international language’ of the Soviet peoples, the most 
‘progressive’ language in the USSR, and the ‘language of the Socialist Revolution’. 
After 1933 minorities were encouraged more forcefully to learn Russian and in 1938 
the learning of the Russian language was made compulsory for all Soviet students.
These policy changes reduced the local nationalities to a somewhat secondary level 
and gave the Russians a kind of ‘superior status’. Increasingly, expressions of 
Russian nationalism could be heard in music and opera, and seen in the theatres and 
movie houses. Nationalism was condemned, but Soviet patriotism was praised. This 
resurgence of official pro-Russian Soviet nationalism culminated in Stalin’s famous 
toast at the end of World War Two (24 May, 1945) when he drank to the health of the 
Russian people, referring to them as ‘the leading nation of all the nations belonging to 
the Soviet Union’ (Suny, 1993, p. 154). In the late thirties and to an even greater 
extent, during World War Two, state policy on the national question underwent a 
sudden shift towards ‘Russification’.
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Strict limits were placed on the expression of artists and writers as the Stalin 
Revolution marked the end of the relative intellectual freedom that Soviet writers and 
artists had enjoyed in the first decade of Soviet power. In each branch of the arts 
creative experimentation and modernism were attacked, and artists were urged to 
return to classicism. Writing was to be realistic in style; architecture was to employ 
classical and national motifs. Not only were the artists forbidden to deal with certain 
topics, not only was the content of their work prescribed, but even the form, the style 
in which they worked, was strictly limited. This meant that art was to be national in 
form. Socialist in content; though the language and motifs of artists in Armenia 
should have Armenian qualities, the content should conform to the general themes 
dictated by the Party in the struggle to build Socialism. Positive heroes were to be 
drawn as models for emulation. Any negative aspects of Soviet life were to be played 
down or eliminated altogether. Those who were unable to conform to the new artistic 
order fell under immediate suspicion and many were arrested or perished in prison.
The ‘Great Purges’ of 1936-1938 hit various segments of Armenian society, but none 
more than the membership of the Armenian Communist Party. The purges not only 
hit the top party leaders but those in the lower œhelons. Thousands perished in the 
last years of the 1930s until the bloodletting was finally called off by Moscow. 
Russians were then brought in to fill places formerly held by the Armenians. In 1939, 
for example, the Russian Alexei Korotkov became the head of Armenia’s secret 
police. Most positions continued to be held by Armenians, but now they were 
younger men and women, trained in Soviet institutions and loyal to the Stalin-Beria 
leadership. The old Armenian ruling party had been eliminated by the eve of World 
War Two and replaced by a new elite that owed everything to their patrons, Stalin and 
Beria. As a result of the purges, any vestiges of Armenian autonomy disappeared.
Stalinism was a calculated assault on all semi-independent centres of potential power
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and influence. Economic autonomy, the remnants of intellectual freedom, and the 
remaining prerogatives of national minorities were swiftly eliminated as the Stalinist 
police-party-state expanded to envelop all of society and bring it under its direct 
control. The effect of the Stalin Revolution was to break the back of peasant 
resistance to the rapid and forced industrialisation of the country. Collectivisation 
permitted the exploitation of the peasantry; they built cities, created a new working 
class made up of displaced persons from the countryside, and transformed the USSR 
from a backward and vulnerable agrarian country into an industrial giant that would 
successfully resist the invasion of Nazi Germany.
Stalin and his agents wantonly condemned Armenian intellectuals and leaders to 
ruined lives. From 1920 to 1940 Armenia lost two generations of its intellectual and 
political elite, first the pre-Revolutionary elite that was identified with the anti- 
Bolshevik forces that had ruled Armenia during the brief period of independence, and 
then the revolutionary elite, who had led Armenia up until the mid-1930s. It would 
take a long time for the Armenians to recover from these losses.
The Second World War marked a distinct period in the history of Soviet nationality 
policy. Every resource of the country had to be mobilised to repel the invasion of 
Nazi Germany, and one of these resources was the revival of nationalism; both 
Russian and that of the minority. In Armenia the persecution of the Church ceased as 
the clergy was invited to join with the state in the struggle against Fascism. Church 
leaders took the initiative in raising funds for the Armenian military forces that the 
government now reconstituted. Editorials praised the Armenian people, who:
Not only have preserved their national existence and have created their 
wonderful culture, but together with all leading peoples, headed by the great 
Russian people, are conducting a most righteous struggle against the most 
reactionary force in the world-bloody German imperialism (Suny, 1993, p.59).
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Armenia, along with other national republics, was given its own Ministries of 
Defence and Foreign Affairs in 1944, thus restoring the image if not the reality of full 
state sovereignty. In the late 1940s Stalin reinstituted the policy of tighter control 
over his own society that had characterised the late 1930s. A new campaign was 
launched against nationalism bringing the all too brief flowering of wartime cultural 
life to an end. The last years of the Stalin era were harsh and dark in cultural policy, 
though they were also years of restoration and rebuilding after the war years. Any 
slight expression of Armenian pride was condemned as nationalism and while some 
material progress was being made, a deep national frustration was building on the part 
of people who were forbidden to express feelings and views contrary to official 
policy.
Very strict limits were placed on freedom of expression. In Armenia and other 
national republics tension was building between the demands of Soviet-style 
modernisation and the nationalist aspirations to which the renationalisation of the 
republics had given rise. Armenians in Armenia were more conscious of their 
language, history and culture than ever before, yet outlets for real expression of their 
national pride and interests simply did not exist in the Stalinist political world.
Economically, Armenia grew into a more industrial and urban society, but politically, 
the last vestiges of self-rule and self-definition had been eliminated. Any expression 
of national pride or unique Armenian achievement was strictly prohibited. Passive 
acceptance of Russian direction was now required. Seething below the surface, the 
national passions and tensions produced by the forces of modem life came up against 
the repressive apparatus of the Stalinist state.
When Stalin died in March 1953, those passions and tensions bubbled slowly to the 
surface and a new expression of nationalism was heard in Armenia. The quarter-
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century of Stalinism that had propelled Armenia forward in material terms but had 
held it back politically and spiritually was ending. Armenians had to learn once again 
how to express openly their own national interest, their despair at the past they had 
endured, and the lasting hope of what the future could be.
The economic and social paralysis into which Stalinism had led the country 
persuaded the new Soviet leader, Krushchev, and his allies to break gradually with the 
more repressive aspects of the past. An intellectual ‘thaw’ that opened up discussion 
of political and artistic matters was quickly perceptible. The great figures of the 
Armenian past who had been condemned as ‘nationalists’ were now to be 
rehabilitated. Writers such as Raffi and Patkanian, who, only a few years before, 
could not be published, were now considered giants of national culture. Writers who 
had survived the repression of the Stalin years now appeared in Erevan; Gurgen 
Mahari, Vagharsak Norents and Varam Alazan.
‘Déstalinisation’ reached its high point in the years between 1956 and 1962. It 
entailed much more than shifts in leadership or greater cultural freedom. It also 
meant a reduction in the control of the periphery by the centre. More competence in 
local affairs was granted to local officials, so that it was no longer necessary to clear 
eveiy economic decision in advance with Moscow. Industrial enterprises in Armenia 
were placed under the local Ministry of Industry, and local agriculture under the local 
Ministry of Agriculture. Decentralisation of decision-making made a welcome 
change from Stalinist practice which had inhibited any initiative from local officials, 
many of whom feared taking any responsibility upon themselves, because of the 
obvious risks. While limits on local autonomy were maintained by the Khrushchev 
leadership, the local Armenian party and state apparatus increased its power 
significantly and, to a degree, its independence from Moscow. The period of 
‘indirect’ rule had begun, and over the next two decades the Armenian elite, like the
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national dites in many other republics, used this opportunity to solidify its position 
within the republic, to increase its popular support by making concessions to local 
nationalism, and to make itself ever more invulnerable to interference from central 
government.
Many publicised cases of corruption, bribery, misuse of state funds and materials, and 
other instances of the ‘wheeling and dealing’ commonly referred to as ‘the second 
economy’ helped forge the reputation of the country as somewhat less ‘Soviet’ than 
Russia proper. It was well known that to live in Armenia it was necessary to have 
connections in high places, or what is termed in Armenia ‘Kh-ts-b’ and to be prepared 
to use ‘papakh’ (bribery). There was a deepening awareness in Armenia that 
corruption was rampant within the political elite. A growing cynicism about official 
rhetoric that promised an egalitarian and just society in the near ftiture, eroded 
whatever support the Communists had secured in earlier years.
The republic maintained a respectable rate of industrial and agricultural development. 
Indeed, Armenian development proceeded at a somewhat faster rate after 1950 than 
that within the USSR as a whole. Whereas in the Soviet Union as a whole, per capita 
income increased 149% between 1960 and 1978, in Armenia it rose 162%. Per capita 
industrial production in Armenia did not keep pace with the Soviet average however. 
Whereas it increased 688% throughout the entire USSR between 1950 and 1978, 
Armenia managed an increase of only 538%. Still, this was a comparatively high rate 
of growth and contributed to the increasingly industrial character of Soviet Armenia.
Fifty percent of Armenian labour worked in agricultural forestry in the last years of 
Stalinist rule, but that figure rapidly dropped to 35% in 1960 and to 20% in 1975. As 
for industry, Armenian workers made up only 24% of the labour force in 1950. This 
had, however, grown to 32% by 1960 and 38% by 1975. By 1975 the number of
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Armenian workers employed in services had reached 42% of the labour force, the 
same as the other Transcaucasian republics and above the all-union level (Suny, 1993, 
p. 183).
Of some note is the fact that over 80% of Armenians had been peasants in the early 
1920s and that by the 1980s peasants made up only 20% of the population. Thus, we 
have a clear picture of the movement in Armenia from an agrarian society to that 
based upon service industry. In 1979 the great majority of Armenians (66%) lived in 
cities and towns whilst only a third (34%) lived in the countryside (Suny, 1993, 
p. 184).
Sixty years of Soviet-style modernisation transformed Armenia into an urban and 
industrialised country. Nearly three-quarters of the Armenian population (71.3%) 
had, in 1980, a secondary or higher education, with over 900,000 of them speaking 
Russian as a second language. Women in Armenia, who made up only 15% of the 
non-agricultural work force in 1928, now constituted 46% of the workers and 
employees in the republic. Well over two-thirds of the doctors and more than half of 
the teachers in Armenia were women. The patriarchal attitudes of traditional 
Armenian men were constantly being challenged, though they were far from being 
overcome. Few women reached the highest political posts in the republic, and the 
‘Cultural Revolution’ did not permeate the household, where men still dominated.
The expectations of many analysts, that modernisation would lead to an erosion of 
ethnic cohesiveness and national consciousness, that the years of cultural and 
economic offensives against traditional society would accelerate the process of 
assimilation, have not been borne out by the evidence. Part of the explanation for the 
tenacity of national awareness, indeed for the recent explosion of overt nationalism, 
requires a consideration of the process of renationalisation that accompanied the
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process of modernisation in the Soviet context. The policy of ‘Korenizatsiia’ 
(‘Nativisation’) of the 1920s and the 1930s, the renewal of nationalism at various 
points in Soviet history (most notably during the Second World War), and the 
underlying socio-ethnic developments led to a reconsolidation of the Armenian 
nation, to a ‘re-Armenianisation’ of the territory of Soviet Armenia.
Within Armenia in 1979, 89.7% of the population was Armenian. ^This figure 
represented the highest concentration of Armenians anywhere in the world, and the 
highest level that Armenianisation had reached in the region around Erevan. The 
trend toward Armenianisation continued as the Armenian population increased at a 
rate which was twice as great as that of any other nationality within the republic. 
Among the Armenians in Armenia there was a fierce loyalty to the Armenian 
language; 99.4% of Armenians in the republic considered Armenian to be their native 
language (Suny, 1993, p. 184). So strong was the pull of the Armenian language 
within the republic that even ethnic minorities were motivated to learn it. Of the
60,000 Kurds in Armenia, 28,000 used Armenian as their second language while only 
2,800 used Russian. Among the 160,000 Azeris in Armenia, slightly more spoke 
Armenian (16,164) as their second language than spoke Russian (15,879) (Suny, 
1993, p.184)
This is not to suggest, by any means, that there were no real threats to national 
consolidation. Armenia had, amongst the Soviet nationalities, the lowest percentage 
of its native sons and daughters living within its borders. The total number of 
Armenians in the USSR in 1979 was, 4,151,000. Only 2,725,000 or 65.5% of them 
lived in Soviet Armenia (Suny, 1993, p. 185). The number of Armenians in the 
Russian Republic, however, was on the increase, as educated young people sought to 
broaden their career horizons in the central cities of the Soviet Union. Armenians 
outside Armenia tended to neglect their language and intermarry with members of
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other nationalities. The dispersal of Armenians meant that a significant number lost 
their Armenian identity within a few generations. On the positive side, it should be 
noted that twenty years earlier, in the census of 1959, the Armenians in Soviet 
Armenia represented only 55.7% of all Armenians in the USSR. In 1979 the 
Armenians in the republic made up two-thirds of all Soviet Armenians. In-migration 
and a fairly strong birthrate (Armenia had a higher birthrate than the Slavic and 
Western Soviet nationalities, higher than Georgia’s, though not as high as that of the 
Muslim peoples) meant that there was reason to remain confident that Armenia would 
continue to consolidate demographically in the coming decades. The Soviet census in 
1989 revealed that of the 3,304,776 inhabitants of the Armenian Republic, 93.3% 
were Armenian (Suny, 1993, p. 185).
By the 1960s, instead of promoting assimilation, Soviet development had led to the 
consolidation of nations. Instead of Russification, there was greater awareness of 
national cultures and devotion to national languages. Instead of brutal repression of 
nationalism, in the post-Stalin period there were not only concessions made to 
nationalism, but often subtle encouragement of it.
There were two types of nationalism in the Soviet Union; Orthodox, or official 
nationalism and Unorthodox or dissident nationalism. The former was characteristic 
of the post-Stalinist decades in which the national elites of the Union republics 
fostered a base of support within the populus by making concessions to the ethnic 
sensitivities of the ethnic majority.  ^Within limits the government permitted the 
expression of national pride, patriotic sentiment, even a certain amount of 
glorification of the past. Once, however, nationalist expression transcended the 
official limits, once it took the form of public protests or political organisation, it 
became dissident or Unorthodox nationalism. The line between these two types of 
nationalism was not hard and fast and it steadily shifted back and forth, from the
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1960s through to the 1980s.
In Armenia there was a complex interplay of official and dissident nationalism, a 
sparring relationship between the government and the demands of the most vocal and 
activist nationalists in the population. Concessions were always possible because of 
the peculiar nature of Armenian nationalism. In comparison with Georgian, Estonian, 
or Ukrainian nationalism, the Armenian equivalent was not nearly as vociferous in its 
Russophobia. Instead, Armenians directed their hostility toward their traditional 
enemy, the Turk. Thus, Armenian nationalism seemed to be less threatening to the 
Soviet state especially in view of the fact that it was the Soviet army that stood 
between Armenia and the ever-present political threat from Turkey. Indeed, 
Armenian nationalists repeatedly appealed to the Soviet leadership for redress of the 
wrongs they believed that the Armenians had suffered at the hands of the Turks. 
Therefore, Armenian nationalism, until 1988, co-existed with all that was Russian, 
although it must be said that such an alliance was not always an easy one. Despite the 
differences the Armenians still remained a Toyal millet’ within the Soviet Socialist 
world.
The revival of nationalist expression in Armenia and other Soviet republics could not 
be contained within official bounds, and in the 1970s in particular there were frequent 
displays of semi-legal and extra-legal dissident nationalism. The National Unity 
Party, a small group of young Armenians, demanded the return of Nakhichevan, 
Artsakh (Karabagh) and Western Armenia to the Armenians as well as the formation 
of a united independent Armenian state.
The two principal issues that agitated Armenians in the Soviet Union in the 1970s and 
1980s were the questions of the Armenian language and the concern over Karabagh. 
Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaijan were the only three Union republics that had the
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language of their titular nationality recognised in their constitutions as the official 
state language. When, in the spring of 1978, new constitutions were being approved 
for the Transcaucasian republics, an attempt was made to eliminate the clause that 
affirmed that the language of the majority people was the official language. 
Demonstrations followed in Erevan and as a result, the provision for an official 
language was preserved in the new constitution. Any attempt to erode the position of 
the Armenian language was carefully watched by Armenian intellectuals. The 
struggle between those who wanted to expand the role of Russian in the national 
republics and those who wished to preserve Armenian language dominance continued 
up until the 1980s.
The rise of nationalism in Armenia cannot be explained simply as a response to a 
repressive Russification policy by the Soviet state. The emergence of nationalism 
was the understandable response to the complex, and at times contradictory processes 
of modernisation and renationalisation. Soviet modernisation, whatever its 
considerable benefits to the Armenians, was initially imposed upon the people of the 
smallest Union republic. The revolution came from above and from outside, uprooted 
the peasantry, eliminated the traditional political and religious authorities, punished 
all opponents, and forged a new society-more industrial, more urban, better educated 
and more mobile. More possibilities existed in life for Armenians than ever before, 
yet with these new choices also came the new dangers of assimilation and 
Russification, particularly if one left the republic.
Closely linked with Soviet modernisation was the process of national consolidation, 
the creation of a new Armenian nation in Transcaucasia. After seventy years of 
Soviet power, more Armenians spoke, read, wrote, argued and invented in Armenian 
than ever before. From the ‘starving Armenians’ of half a century before, from the 
immigrants from around the world, a new nation had been formed, and with that
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nation had come a new national consciousness and a sense of national interest.
Social and economic modernisation and renationalisation produced a vital, educated 
people whose expectations about how they wished to live and be governed in the 
future increasingly clashed with the restrictions imposed by the Soviet regime. 
Nationalism was the expression by the Armenians of their fears and hopes for the 
future, a future in which they imagined that they might be swallowed up by the larger 
nations and lose what was uniquely theirs. Armenian hopes rested upon the desire to 
preserve the best of their past and culture and also regain what had been lost.
For all the complaints about economic stagnation and political restrictions, the 
Armenians had managed as so often before, to develop a degree of autonomy and 
self-expression that distinguished them from their imperial rulers. The nation had 
moved from agrarianism and diaspora to industrialisation and reunification. While 
full political control eluded it, this was not an insurmountable obstacle to cultural and 
material development. One was reminded of the golden age of classical Armenian 
literature and culture, the fifth century, when Armenia was divided between two great 
empires; Byzantium and Sassanian Persia. It was fragmented into more than a dozen 
little principalities, yet it was precisely at that time that the Armenians managed to 
create a new written language and a distinctly national Christian Church. Thus was 
the groundwork for a durable national tradition laid.
Armenia’s fate in the twentieth century seemed inexorably linked to that of the Soviet 
Empire. But as that empire itself began to crumble, Armenians were among the first 
to accelerate its fall and to construct a new national democracy.
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5.0 Armenian Institutions
5.1 The Armenian Church
‘Now what of that Church of yours, worldly man?’(Tertullian in Marsden, 1994, 
p.111). No institution has had a greater impact on shaping the national culture of 
Armenians than the Armenian Apostolic Church:
The Christian faith and the Armenian language have, ever since such evolution, 
been the cornerstones upon which Armenian national identity has been founded. 
Indeed, experience has borne witness to the fact that whenever Armenians have 
abandoned their Church, assimilation in the larger and more powerful 
communities around them has not been slow to follow (Malikoff-Missen, 1992, 
p.3).
The Armenian Church has, for centuries, occupied an important and special place in 
the hearts and minds of Armenians either as a religion or, as a means of transmitting 
and preserving culture. It has also become a symbol of nationalist feeling (see figs 14 
&15).
In 301 AD the Armenian king Tiridates III responded positively to the mission of St 
Gregory the Illuminator and embraced Christianity, as did the nation. Thus the 
Armenians have the distinction of having become the first nation to turn to and adopt 
Christianity. Despite enormous pressure to convert to Zoroastrianism, Islam and 
more recently to Marxism, the Armenian people have retained their Christian faith. 
Since the loss of political independence the Armenian Apostolic Church served for 
centuries as the institutional focal point for Armenian nationhood. The Armenian 
Church had been independent of the Greco-Roman Church since the sixth century AD 
when, following the example of the Coptic and Syrian Orthodox Churches, it refused 
to accept the definition of the Council of Chalcedon (451 AD) of the relationship 
between the divine and human natures of Christ. Rejecting what it regarded as an 
unacceptable doctrinal innovation, the Armenian Church adhered to the pre-
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Fig 14: Poem: ‘The Armenian Church’ (Source: Armenian Vicarage Newsletter,
October 1995)
THE ARMENIAN CHURCH
Vahan Tekeyan
The Armenian church is the birthplace of m y spirit, 
shadowed and illuminated like a cavern; 
but vast and vaulted, its entrance welcomes guests 
to the wide sanctuary where the altar floats 
in silence in the distance like a mighty ship.
Even with m y eyes closed I  can see it, 
its Christ's face bright as a child's.
When I  breathe in, I  breathe its holy incense 
smoking on its altar, its sturdy walls quaking 
with old and stormy prayers.
The Armenian church is the unyielding fortress 
of our fathers faith. They raised it 
stone by stone put of the earth.
They lowered it dewfall by dew from the heavens.
And they were buried in hushed stillness there.
The Armenian church is the tapestry curtain 
behind which God Himself descends 
into the chalice. And before which m y nation 
bows its head for communion with the wine 
and life-giving bread o f our past.
Against storms, our church is haven and harbor. 
Against the cold night, it is fire and flame.
It is the shaded forest in the heat o f day 
where lilies flower watered by sharagans.
The Armenian church knows the secret road to heaven 
hidden under every stone. For the Armenian spirit 
and body it is the shining armor, its crosses swords; 
its bells reverberated with the victory we know is ours.
Translated by Diana Der Hovanessian
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Fig 15: ‘The Glory of Holy Translators’ (Source: Annenian Vicarage Newsletter,
October 1996)
flpp quipi]uiphg[ili inliop|iliuipuip qliiTuiuinu U.lihq|ib, 
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bpqn4 fu jq g p n ip h u ili Ah^ifunfp qU uinntui^  opRlihugnif: 'K ,
3 Î
1
139
Chalcedonian doctrine of the Greco-Roman Church.
During the long years of Armenia’s subjection to foreign empires, the national 
Apostolic Church was the one factor which kept the national spirit alive:
This unity, based on a common language, civilisation and religious faith, and 
backed by uncommon personal tenacity and courage, has, throughout history 
survived persecutions which were intended to result in the nation’s total 
extermination. The Armenians of today are still there, at the heart of a new 
struggle to establish a new post-Soviet nation (Lang, 1970, p.59).
By the late nineteenth century, the Church had come to be recognised as a vehicle for 
nationalism and self-defence within the empire. It was through the Church that the 
Armenian leaders sought to educate their people, and imperial functionaries 
(especially those who were Turkish) were not slow to discover that education was 
dangerous.
Besides the adherents of the Armenian Apostolic Church, there were a number of 
Armenian Uniate Catholics, some dating from the time of the Crusades and others 
from later Dominican missionary activity. In the eighteenth century their patriarchate 
moved from Aleppo, where there had been disturbances between them and the 
adherents of the Armenian Apostolic Church, to Bzommar on Mount Lebanon, which 
is situated on the land belonging to the powerful Maronite Khazen family. Armenian 
Protestants dated from the period of American missionary activity (1830s onwards) 
and by the middle of the century were an officially recognised community within the 
Ottoman Empire.
At the time of the persecution of the 1890s, adherents of the national Church were 
singled out for especially harsh treatment. This was partly because the Church, as the 
guardian of the people, was inevitably being forced into a more political role as
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persecution increased and partly because the Ottoman government understood that it 
would encounter no diplomatic response if it attacked Gregorian Armenians. It 
seemed, however, that if Armenian Catholics were attacked, the French (or Austro- 
Hungarian) Ambassador would protest, and if Protestants were attacked, the British or 
Americans would make their voices heard. During the Young Turk Genocide of 1915 
however, such distinctions were ignored, and Armenians regardless of adherence 
were killed.
The problems of the Church after the establishment of Communist rule in Armenia 
were immense, and for long periods the Catholicosate of Echmiadzin was left vacant. 
The Cilician Catholicosate (which in theory had similar powers, while recognising 
that the title of Echmiadzin Catholicos was ‘Catholicos of all Armenians’) moved 
after the First World War to Antilias, north of Beirut, where it continues to exist 
today. After its reconstitution in 1929 the Cilician Catholicosate comprised the 
bishoprics of Aleppo, Damascus, Beirut and Cyprus. In 1956, it adopted a new 
constitution which permits it to appoint bishops in regions hitherto under the 
jurisdiction of Echmiadzin. It now has responsibility for the additional dioceses in 
Iran, Greece, Kuwait, and parts of the USA and Canada.
A split in the Armenian Church began in 1933 and was fonnalised in 1956. The point 
at issue was the authority of the Catholicos in Echmiadzin (Soviet Armenia); was he 
an authentic, independent Church leader, or a puppet manipulated by the Communist 
regime? The Dashnak Party threw its powerful organisation behind opposition to the 
claims of the Echmiadzin Catholicosate and in 1956 the effective division of the 
Church came about, with the election of a pro-Dashnak Catholicos in Antilias.
It should also be noted that the liberal capitalistic Ramgavar Party supported the 
candidate who would have kept the Church united, not on the grounds of sympathy
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with Communism but because in its opinion the unity of Armenians was a more 
important matter than a hypothetical increase of Soviet influence.
Since 1956 various attempts have been made to heal the split in the Church, a split 
which has also resulted in a fissure within the community. What has, if anything, 
brought the two sides together, and gone some way towards creating an atmosphere 
for reconciliation within the Church, were the activities of April 1975 and 1985 (the 
60th and 70th anniversaries of the Genocide), for which a united committee of all 
main functions was created. This committee had proved to be of enduring value 
throughout most of the Lebanese civil war, protecting the community from attacks 
(whether incidental or deliberate) from either side, and ensuring Armenian neutrality.
The international standing of the Armenian Apostolic Church was enhanced by the 
official visit of the then Archbishop of Canterbury Dr. Donald Coggan, to Echmiadzin 
early in October 1977. Armenian prelates from all over the world gathered there to 
welcome the first primate of the Anglican Church ever to visit Armenia. British press 
reports expressed amazement at the large crowds, including many young people who 
assembled for the occasion, and commented that the expression of religious 
enthusiasm was freer here than in other Soviet republics which the British delegation 
had visited.
It is probable that the Armenians may have ended up being assimilated by one of the 
great powers which surrounded and ultimately sought to dominate them, had it not 
been for the unifying force of the Christian faith. Indeed, it was the Church, in the 
shape of St Mesrop-Mashtots, which gave Armenia its alphabet early in the fifth 
century AD, and opened the door to education and evangelical work in the native 
tongue.
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The Armenian Church has, therefore, played a major part in ensuring the survival of a 
nation, a nation which, by all accounts, should hardly have survived. As noted by a 
former Chancellor of the See (Armenian Apostolic Church):
But through all our history, all the massacres and occupations, the Church did its
best to keep both the faith and national feelings Perhaps 80 percent of the
people bring their children to be baptised. In recent years we have had many 
young people coming to our churches. Not educated believers-but they see the 
art, history and tradition (McDowell, 1977, p.228).
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5.2 The Armenian Alphabet and Language
The main obstacle to the spreading of Christian knowledge in Armenia was, of 
course, the fact that the language had as yet no alphabet of its own. The difficult but 
vital task of inventing an alphabet for the Armenian language was ultimately achieved 
by Mesrop-Mashtots, whom the Armenian Church reveres amongst its Saints.
Little is known about Mesrop’s early life. His main biographer is Koriun, one of 
Mesrop’s first and ablest disciples. Mesrop Mashtots was bom in the year 361 AD, in 
the province of Taron and graduated from one of the schools established by 
Catholicos Nerses the Great. As a man of exceptional ability who had mastered 
Greek, Syriac, Persian and other languages, he was soon appointed to be a Royal 
Secretary at the city of Vagharshapat or Echmiadzin, then the capital of Armenia. 
After a few years of government service, Mesrop resigned his post and entered the 
Church.
Mesrop was some forty years of age when he first began his preaching in different 
parts of Armenia. It was during these tours that he conceived the idea of inventing 
Armenian characters and translating the Bible, thus marking the birth of the national 
literature. The invention of a national alphabet, he considered, would not only help to 
propagate the Christian faith, but would also establish a strong tie to bind together 
those Armenians living in eastern and western Annenia and elsewhere; since the 
Persians and Byzantines had partitioned Armenia between themselves in 387 AD, this 
was obviously an urgent task.
Mesrop’s project met with the approval of the Catholicos Sahak, the saintly head of 
the Church, and himself, an emdite scholar. The king of Eastern Armenia, 
Vramshapuh, also expressed keen interest, and told Mesrop that he had once seen in 
Mesopotamia a set of characters which had been devised for Armenia by a certain
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Bishop Daniel the Syrian. These were promptly sent for, but proved to be unsuitable 
for rendering the complicated phonetic system of Armenian. No doubt Daniel’s 
system was based upon Syriac, which is written from right to left, and has basically 
the same twenty-two characters as Hebrew. The Syriac alphabet failed to provide a 
complete system for writing the vowels. Since the Armenian alphabet as invented by 
Mesrop and his disciples, was found to need thirty-six characters, it is hardly 
surprising that Syriac failed to provide an adequate basis for writing Armenian.
Mesrop and his pupils now set to work devising a fresh system for Armenian. They 
decided to write the characters from left to right, as in Greek (see fig. 16). They 
retained a number of Greek letters, and altered others to fit in with the aesthetic 
pattern which they had adopted. As far as possible, Mesrop retained the order of the 
Greek alphabet, while interpolating a number of new and hitherto non-existent signs, 
which had to be devised to render those sounds which occur in Armenian and 
Georgian, but not in Greek. The work was completed in Samosata, probably in 404 
or 406 AD.
After receiving an extensive education in Armenia and after travelling in many 
countries and studying the old and new languages of his time, he created an 
alphabet, which, incredible though it may seem, has not changed in the course of 
sixteen centuries and thanks to which I, an unworthy descendant of Mesrop 
Mashtotz, am writing these lines.
The entire Armenian people came out to meet Mesrop Mashtotz when he 
returned to Vagharshapat (the Armenian capital) with the new alphabet, the 
thirty-six courageous warriors of the ‘book regiment’, which has since defended 
our identity for 1600 years. None of these warriors perished in the numerous 
harsh and bloody battles but, instead, their ranks were supplemented by three 
other valiant soldiers, or the letters ‘ Yev’, ‘O’, ‘Fe’ which ‘came over to our side’ 
and joined our alphabet at a later date (Emin, 1981, p. 154).
Later on, Mesrop and his group of disciples devised alphabets for the Georgians and 
for the Albanians of the Caucasus. The Armenian and Georgian alphabets have 
continued in use up to the present day, with the original sets of characters, though
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Fig 16: I he Armenian Alphabet (Source: Armenian V icarage N ew sletter, O ctober 
I9 9 5 ) | i
u z u u UP irbu
K  F  « M ' I r a i ;  d  O '  
(M^ LtoTTiMQO,
z^lMTbCIM'nA
( H ) ' L 5 P 0 l ' f t > ' P -  
0 <3 )
Alia R3PnhPbTQ 
TfnbKj-TnPhna b
^  n p  •> u j j  L u jp n t_ p h 'b p >  
t ^ n p i f n g  t f  p \ t  ^  ; * , t o y  ' A t p i u * U n k u t \ i
^ ^ i .V u k p l^ 'U  ^ u p t u p i t j % \ j t  p p  ju iu tn L .1 ^  “b p — 
^ u i'h n ij^  t i p  ' h o p  lu t^ p n u u jh ^  4 ^ ,  Z r t  1 r ( " ^ j P [ ^  
u j j ' h p u j ' ü  ^Lui_ i±j u L n tu L n n i^ L u h -  4" i  ^ iu  J
^ u j  j P u j  j p u i h ^  ^  ^ l u  p u t ' i j n u p b u i ' l i  
ij^L p  ^  LU l^ iu b  UJ p tr tL u  JU J J t n n i . p  ^ u h  t f  p   ^ u j  p — 
u iL u  j u j  j t n n i _ p  j i l\ i n p  uj^tu ^ u ^ tu 'h n u t u i y  ^  
t f p t .  L u j u o p  L u r iL u \i^  i ^ n t ^ n p n i ^ p ^ L . %  t f p  
^ r ^ L ' ^ ' - y  i u n u i \ i g  p i u p b p u i ^ n u d  d p  u i n u A i t u — 
^ /7 t_  LL^l^inp n l A i b i i t u L  ^ i p u u i t t ^ j i  u l^ ^ t j ^ p ^ b  
j t  u  t u b ^  l^ iu  l^ tu  tn  t u p b t u ^ ^ C  '
H u m p  b  l u b L . t u b p n t j^  ^ t u j t u u m t u b  n t_ — 
b b p t u t .  û tu tt^ n t_ l^  t ^ p i u l ^ t u b  p n ^ n t -  d p ^  n p  
p u t r t t u  u ^ tu  ^ tu  p  p i t  p t t  p n  p  t u p d ^ p b b p p  
l u p t n t u p b p p .  l ^ t u t p d n t _ b ÿ t u L. ^f-p—
p t u î ^ t u b  ^ b tj^ n i. d p  n p  & n p  ^  b u  n p  l ^ p b t u p  
tu  p t n t u  j t u  j u t b  t u d p  [ t b ^  n p  j n j b  i^ b t^ n i_ b  
l^ tu p n r j^  ^ n  p t u ^ t u t n p b ^ :
H j f p  p t j ^ n t j i b  £ n p n t . p p b b  #»t_ ^ I^ n iL — 
b n t ^ P ^ t _ b p  n j t b  d p  b r^ tu h ^  b b  ^ t u  j  
^ t u d i u p .  . • : A“^y ^ 1 ‘bH. * d b n p  ^ t u t ^ t u t n u t —
p f > d  t t b t u p t u h r  4" I t u b  p i t p t j J p U p p  l^ p
u ^ t u t n n t - ^  tj_ b  n. t u j u o p  t u  ^  t u o b t u  p d  p b  ^ n t^
t u j r ^ t t ^ ^ u j t  u t n b r p r t u t ^ n p i ï n t ^ p b t u b  d p  j f * — 
y t u  t f t t u  L  n  :
 ^ awnhii'b iTbsat
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T H E  A R M E N IA N  A L P H A B E T  
IS A M A S TE R -P IE C E
As everyone knows, the system of 
the Armenian a lphabet is a m aster­
piece. Each phonem e is represented  
by a different sign, and the system  
was so well designed that it gave the 
Armenian nation a definitive represen­
tation of the sounds of the language, 
representation that has been m ain­
tained up to day without change, with 
no need for improvement, because it 
was perfect at the beginning.
The Armenians have had a flex­
ible literary language, which m atch­
ed all the virtues of the G reek  vo ca­
bulary. Thus a literary language has  
been formed which is rich and is able  
to express all that the G reek  language  
was capable of.
The richness and the flexibility of 
this language have been an inspiration  
for the Armenian nation... The  A rm en ­
ian nation has remained faithful to It, 
and now takes pleasure in ce lebrating,  
also to day, the memory of such an 
invention. A. M E IL L E T
nowadays, these are written in modem, cursive script. The fact that they still exist, is 
a great tribute to a remarkable pioneer.
**In the early part of the nineteenth century writers and nationalists in Armenia made an attempt to reach 
the populace with nationalist material and publications. As a result of this a national revival occurred 
from which a new literary language was bom. This was a language which was much closer to that which 
was spoken and today, it appears in two forms. Eastern Armenian is now the official language of the 
Armenian Republic and is based on the dialect of the Ararat valley and the city of Erevan. Western 
Armenian has its foundation in the dialect of Istanbul and is also spoken in other parts of what was the 
former Soviet Union. It also dominates in the Armenian colonies in the Middle East, Asia Minor, Europe 
and America. The difference between these two written forms of modem Armenian is slight and does not 
seem to create a barrier to mutual intelligibility (The New Encyclopaedia Britannica. Vol. 22, 1993,
The original Armenian alphabet was written in large capital letters or uncials, of a 
monumental character and size. Between the tenth and eleventh centuries, we find a 
type of curved uncial, called ‘boloragits yerkatagir’, or ‘iron capitals’. The ‘middle’ 
‘yerkatagir’ of the eleventh and twelfth centuries has more straight lines, and there is 
also a small ‘yerkatagir’ script. Sometimes a combination of more than one style of 
‘yerkatagir’ occurs, referred to as ‘mixed letters’. From the thirteenth century 
onwards, the predominant script is the small ‘bolorgir’ writing, which closely 
resembles most Armenian printing of the present day. In the eighteenth century, a 
form of cursive writing was developed, under the name of ‘notrgir’.
Mesrop’s example was followed by many brilliant disciples, who set out to create a 
new Christian literature, systematically covering all the main fields of knowledge and 
including theology, philosophy, history, geography and astronomy. Those classic 
writers of the fifth century are often known as the ‘interpreters’, because they brought 
knowledge to the people and imbued them with a spirit which was acknowledged by 
the prominent Armenian poet, Gevorg Emin;
Mesrop Mashtotz created the Armenian alphabet in 396 AD, and only 55 years 
later, in 451, the Armenian letters waged their first battle for freedom against the
14:
foreign invaders....
While the gunsmiths forged swords and spears, the historians and scholars wrote 
manuscripts on parchment. The latter were evidently dreaded more by the 
enemy. Otherwise, it’s impossible to explain the hatred with which every 
aggressor and conqueror destroyed the sources of our culture, murdering the 
scribes and wrecking the manuscripts. Tt’s better to be blind in the eyes than 
blind in the mind’; ‘Death not acknowledged is death, death acknowledged is 
immortality’. These were two of the proverbs which in the 5th century inspired 
our soldiers, writers and historians fighting for freedom.
One need hardly say that these words were more effective than the bows and 
arrows and swords and spears with which Armenian soldiers were then armed 
(Emin, 1981, p. 156).
Tormented for centuries by wars and disasters, the Armenian people would thus have 
hardly survived until now had they not owned, along with the sword, a most powerful 
weapon-a written language. Whenever they were unable to triumph with the sword, 
they triumphed with their letters, destroying their enemies, and passing down their 
hopes, faith and dreams to future generations. The love which binds the Armenian 
people to their native language and spiritual culture, is quite amazing. They sensed 
instinctively that language and literature were their most powerful weapon in the 
eternal struggle for existence:
Second only to their love of Ararat, of Massis, is the Armenian passion for their 
language. ‘These are people’, wrote Mandelstam, ‘who jangle the keys of their 
language even when they are not using them to unlock any treasures (Marsden, 
1994, p. 171).
Indeed, ever since the Armenian alphabet was created, year after year, century after 
century, all the invading tyrants did everything they could to make the Armenians 
forget their mother tongue and to integrate and assimilate them. However, this small, 
helpless and lonely people waged a stiff struggle against them with the ‘small 
regiment’ of the thirty-six letters of their alphabet. They finally won the age-long, 
unequal battle and are now proudly writing new chapters in their history with the 
same letters. At times this ‘love for their mother tongue’ seems an inexplicable
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metaphysical phenomenon, a feeling or an instinct which has the power to work 
miracles:
Otherwise, the tortured Armenian mothers could hardly have found the strength, 
as they died in the death camps of Ter-Zor, to trace the Armenian alphabet in the 
sand so that children should remember them for the rest of their life (Emin, 1981, 
p. 150).
Indeed, Emin concludes that:
For one thousand six hundred years the letters of the Armenian alphabet have 
defended the national identity of our people, like a regiment of thirty-six 
courageous warriors..... (Emin, 1981, p. 127).
and that:
This thought ran as red thread-nay, as a stream of red blood-through the entire 
history of our people; Whatever happens, love your native tongue, your books, 
your culture, whether you have to write Armenian letters with a stick on the sand 
of the Ter-Zor desert or with a Parker fountain pen in a New York 
flat (Emin, 1981, p. 170).
Today, the Armenian language is spoken by several million people, a majority of 
whom live in the Republic of Armenia. Most of the remainder are scattered 
throughout the Middle East and Southeast Europe. More than 100,000 speakers of 
Armenian live in the United States.
Historically, Armenian is an Indo-European language, although its position within the 
Indo-European family has long been debated. Most scholars agree that Armenian is 
the descendant of a language closely akin to Phrygian, an Indo-European speech 
known from ancient inscriptions found in Anatolia. The affinities between Armenian 
and Phrygian seem to bear out the statement of Herodotus (Collier’s Encvclopaedia. 
Vol. II, 1990, p.665) that the Armens (or Armenians) were Phrygian colonists, and the
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**It is unclear whether Albanian is descended, like Armenian from Thraco-Phrygian. Some sources 
claim that Albanian has à close affinity with Armenian and many striking similarities ( C s ^  
Rncvclonaedia. Vol. II, 1990, p.665), whilst others claim that Albanian has no obvious close afluuty to 
any other Indo-European language. It is stated that Albanian is the sole modem survivor of its own 
subgroup m p  Nrw Rncvclonaedia Britannica. Vol. 22, 1993, p.683). Such sources go on to propound 
that in very early times the Balto-Slavic group was its nearest of kin. Of the ancient languages, hot 
Dacian (or Daco-Mycian) and Illyrian have been tentatively considered its nearest relative.
It has also been claimed, however, that Albanian is the last, although much altered remnant of Illyria^ 
with traces of the now extinct Thracian, and that both Illyrian and Thraco-Phrysian have vanished apm 
from genetic traces still found in Albanian and Armenian (Stevenson, 1983, Pp.43 & 178) The 
Thracian language says Victor Stevenson was ‘spoken from the Black Sea to modem Albania
(Stevenson, 1983, p. 19).
Armenian is considered to be one of the eastern group of Indo-European languages, 
with close ties to Balto-Slavic and Iranian, and to a lesser extent. Indie. In view of 
Armenia’s geographical position it is not surprising to find that it also bears 
similarities to the western Indo-European languages, especially Greek. It appears that 
the Greeks and the Armenians passed through a prehistoric period of linguistic unity.
The Armenian lexicon also has a number of agricultural terms common to the western 
group but not found in the east; ‘Sal’ (Latin), ‘al’ (Armenian), ‘Salt’ (English).
A mutation of Indo-European consonants is an Armenian characteristic: ‘dens’
(Latin), ‘o-don’ (Greek), ‘a-tamn’ (Armenian), ‘tooth’; ‘genus’ (Latin), ‘genos’
(Greek), ‘cin’ (Armenian), ‘birth’. An accent shift to the Indo-European penult 
caused the loss of original final syllables, and Armenian now stresses the resultant last 
syllable: ancestral Indo-European ‘ebheret’ became ‘eberet’, producing Armenian 
‘eber’.
Armenian preserves a small amount of inherited Indo-European vocabulary; due to 
centuries-long Persian domination, so many Iranian words entered Armenian that 
early nineteenth century linguists thought it a Persian dialect. Christianity brought 
with it Greek and Syriac^  words, and there is also a Turkish element to the lexicon 
reflecting prolonged Ottoman rule; even the Crusaders contributed a few French 
words. Armenian grammar preserves a number of noun classes, six cases, two 
numbers, four conjugations and nine tenses. As in English, gender distinction is lost.
150
Classical Armenian has continued as the language of the Armenian Church and was 
employed until the nineteenth century as the vehicle of secular literature. Modem 
Armenian is divided into two mutually intelligible dialects, an eastern branch 
employed mostly in the Republic of Armenia, and a western branch spoken in Asia 
Minor, Europe, and the United States. The principal difference is the western 
unvoicing of the stops ‘d’, ‘b% and ‘g’ to ‘f , ‘p’ and ‘k’.
Today, most of the the earliest Armenian sacred scripts and literature are housed 
safely in the ‘Madenataran’, Armenia’s national museum. These historical scripts 
and documents are highly treasured by the Armenian people and have been for 
centuries. After all, they recount the story of Armenia’s turbulent and very often 
glorious past, attest to the country’s existence from the earliest times and inspire 
future generations:
Is this the heart of Annenia? Perhaps it is. If it is the Armenian language that 
pumps through the distant limbs of the diaspora then, yes, the Madenataran must 
be the heart. Or is Ararat the heart? Untouchable Ararat, Ararat stolen by the 
Turks. Ararat where the demon yazatas chained up Artamazd who will one day 
break free and save Armenia.....
Or is it Edjmiatsin? ‘Light of the Lord descended to earth’, seat of the Catholicos 
of All Armenians, the holiest site of Armenia, where every visiting Armenian 
comes to light a candle, where the chrism is blessed for the baptism of every 
Armenian child. Here is where the fractured notion of Annenianness is united 
with its emblem: Armenian Christianity. Never during the Soviet years did the 
Catholicos and his vartabeds fail to celebrate the Eucharist here, nor in the 
sixteen hundred years before that (Marsden, 1994, p. 172).
Perhaps the heart of all Armenia lies here, within the walls of the Madenataran. 
Perhaps the heartbeat of Armenia originates solely at the holy centre of 
Echmiadzin. Whatever the reasons for Armenia’s survival it is certain that its 
language and literature have been an inspiration for many generations of Annenians.
151
5.3 The Armenian Diaspora
From the earliest times the Armenian people have been subject to massacres and 
deportations which have resulted in new communities being established all over the 
world. As early as 582 AD thousands of Armenians were deported by the Byzantine 
emperor Maurice to Philippopolis (Plovdiv) in Bulgaria; subsequently, they 
established the Paulician heresy in Thrace which in turn inspired the Bogomil 
movement of the eleventh and twelfth centuries. The influence of this movement was 
felt as far away as the West (with the Cathars and Waldensians). In Plovdiv and the 
surrounding region these Armenians found an older Armenian community which had 
been living there since the fifth century.
During the eleventh and twelfth centuries Armenian churches and monasteries were 
very active. A large colony survived at Timovo in Bulgaria. A new influx of 
Armenians arrived in Bulgaria after the conquest of the town of Kamenets Podolski in 
the Ukraine by the Ottomans in 1672. Significant Armenian communities in Bulgaria 
survived until the twentieth century in Plovdiv, Ruse (on the Danube), Sofia, and the 
ports of Varna and Bourgas on the Black Sea. The oldest Armenian diaspora is 
probably the one in Bulgaria.
The endless conflict between Byzantium and Armenia did not prevent the exodus to 
Byzantium of numerous Armenians who gave it a series of illustrious generals and 
emperors: Narses, the general who conquered Italy under Justinian; John Curcuas, 
who defeated the Arabs in the seventh century. In the eighth and ninth centuries 
Byzantium had four emperors of Armenian origin, including the founder of the so- 
called Macedonian dynasty.
The first large-scale migration of the Armenian people since the creation of the 
kingdom of Armenia occurred following the collapse of the Bagratid Dynasty. At the
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end of the eleventh centuiy (1080 AD), a Bagratid prince established a colony in 
Cilicia, which in the twelfth centuiy became a new Armenian state and retained its 
independence until 1375.
Part of the Armenian population-the people from Vaspouragan (an Armenian 
province in the area of Lake Van)-migrated in the eleventh century to Cilicia, a 
coastal area of southeastern Anatolia, while some of the people of Ani migrated to the 
Crimea. Some colonists went off to settle in Hungary and Poland as well as 
Moldavia, and western Anatolia. In Ruthenia and Galicia their settlement was 
favoured by Prince Lev of Galicia, who founded Lvov (Lemberg) in 1270; for 
centuries the town became the great Armenian ‘Mecca’ of the Ukraine and Poland 
(see fig. 17).
The kingdom of Cilicia played an important role during the Crusades and in the 
history of the Frankish states of the east. Its last king, Leo V de Lusignan, died in 
Paris in 1393 and lies with the kings of France in the Basilica of Saint-Denis. While a 
first wave of Armenian migration had dispersed to the Crimea, Ukraine, and Poland 
following the fall of the kingdom of Armenia in the eleventh century, a second wave 
joined them after the fall of the kingdom of Cilicia in the fourteenth century. The 
Church of St. Nicholas of Kamenets Podolsk dates from 1318. From the Ukraine 
Annenians went off to settle in Romania, Poland, and Lithuania.
In Romania the Annenian Church of Botoshani dates from 1350, and that of 
Bucharest from 1581. The Armenian colonies retained their individuality there until 
the twentieth century. There is evidence of their presence in Moldavia, at both 
Suleava and Jassy, from the fourteenth to the nineteenth century and beyond.
At the beginning of the fifteenth century Armenians fought alongside Witold, Grand
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Duke of Lithuania, against the Teutonic knights and took part in the Battle of 
Tannenberg. From Casimir the Great (1333-1370) to John III Sobieski (1674-1696), 
the kings of Poland regularly renewed the commercial and other privileges granted to 
the Armenian community.
Lvov, meanwhile, remained the great Armenian centre of Central Europe. It was only 
in the eighteenth century that the role of the city’s Armenians began to decline. But 
the colony survived until the beginning of the twentieth century.
In the Middle Ages, from the tenth to the beginning of the fifteenth centuiy, there is 
evidence of the continuous presence of Armenian communities of traders and 
craftsmen (especially masons and architects) in Western Europe: Venice, Marseilles, 
Paris, Bruges-from the thirteenth to fifteenth centuries-and London.
In the seventeenth century several thousand Armenians were deported to Persia by 
Shah Abbas I (for historical dispersions see fig. 18). Settled at Isfahan, and at New 
Djulfa, they prospered and are still living there today, although a movement of 
Armenian emigration has been underway for several decades and has accelerated 
since the Khomeini revolution. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries this 
colony played a major role in trade relations between the Far East, the East, and the 
West. From New Djulfa, through the port of Bandar Abbas at the entry to the Persian 
Gulf, long-distance trade was organised by sea to India, Indonesia, and the 
Philippines, and by land to Tibet and China northward along the Silk Route.
The seventeenth and eighteenth centuries were the golden age of the dispersion of the 
Armenian trading colonies (see fig. 19). At that time, the Armenian network stretched 
from London to the Philippines. The Armenians played a major role in trade between 
Iran (silk in particular) and Venice, Leghorn, Marseilles, Amsterdam, Antwerp,
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London, and Manchester. The routes they took crossed either Syria and Anatolia to 
the Mediterranean ports (Constantinople, etc) or Russia to Archangel and the White 
Sea. In Asia, Armenian merchants found Armenian communities settled in Iraq, at 
Basra, and in India at Surat, Calcutta, and Madras. ‘What would Madras be without 
the Annenians?’ wrote Fernand Braudel (Braudel, 1982, p. 134). From Iran to China, 
by way of India and even Tibet, Armenian communities served as staging posts.
This network, which covered the Eurasian landmass, attained a considerable degree 
of financial power. It was dismantled by the English, and with it the diasporas of 
Asia on which it was built gradually declined as well; from the eighteenth centuiy 
especially, the British no longer wished to deal with ‘middlemen’ and took world 
trade ‘directly in hand’, by virtue of their colonial presence. The Indian Empire 
installed Europe in Asia for some two centuries.
The Armenians were particularly active in Burma fiom the seventeenth centuiy. They 
managed to secure a monopoly on rubies there, and by the end of the seventeenth 
century they had established their own small fleet. Until the mid-eighteenth century 
the Armenians conducted a busy trade between Syiram (near Rangoon) and Madras. 
They played an important role at the court of King Alangpaya (Alompra), who unified 
the countiy between 1752 and 1760; their influence remained important there until 
the mid-nineteenth centuiy. Most of them were then living at Anapura, on the River 
Irrawaddy between Mandalay and Ava. Their trading relations took them as far as the 
Moluccas and the China sea. The advent of British control served only to eliminate 
the Armenians commercially in the nineteenth century. Although no longer 
occupying a dominant position in the nineteenth century, the Armenian trading 
diaspora in Southeast Asia continued to be very active from Madras to Jakarta. The 
Armenian community of Alexandria, dating from the thirteenth to the fourteenth 
centuries, almost completely disappeared after the advent of Nasser. In Egypt under
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Mohammad Ali, just before the British takeover in 1882, the Armenians played a 
notable role in the form of two statesmen: Boghos Bey, who, as adviser to and 
collaborator with the Khedive (Ottoman suzerain), contributed to the creation of 
modem Egypt, and Nubar Pasha, First Minister to Ibrahim Pasha.
In the mid-nineteenth centuiy, at a time when Egyptian power extended along the Red 
Sea as far as Northern Eritrea, the Armenians of Alexandria and Cairo were in touch 
with Armenian colonies in Ethiopia, at Gondar and Addis Ababa.
By the beginning of the twentieth centuiy, there were Armenian communities in Paris, 
London, Vienna, Venice, Marseilles, Antwerp, and Lvov, in Romania and Bulgaria, at 
Djulfa (near Isfahan in Persia), Alexandria, Madras, Calcutta, Singapore, and Jakarta. 
Outside the Ottoman Empire, the Russian Empire and Persia, the largest number of 
Armenians was in the United States-fifty to eighty thousand-principally in Boston, 
New York, Philadelphia, and California. Most of them arrived in the United States 
following the massacres of 1895-1896 which took place under the Ottoman Sultan 
Abdul-Hamid II. A small number went to Canada, especially Toronto and Montreal. 
In the Russian Empire, they were mostly at Baku and Tbilisi; in the Ottoman Empire 
at Constantinople, Smyrna, and Trebizond.
Until the appearance in the Ottoman Empire of modem nationalism, (an idea spread 
by Europe, and bom of French Socialist or Russian Populist ideas) the Armenians 
enjoyed conditions deemed acceptable to the spirit of the age. Like the Greeks or the 
Jews, the Armenians enjoyed the rights of ‘millet’, that is, communal self-government 
granted to non-Muslims. Although the Armenian peasantry lived in often very harsh 
conditions, a bourgeoisie of notables, merchants, bankers, and craftsmen had 
occupied enviable positions since the seventeenth centuiy.
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During the First World War the Ottoman Empire, which harboured Pan-Turk 
ambitions, allied itself with the Central Powers (Germany and Austria-Hungary). In a 
climate clouded by reversals in the Caucasus, where they were in conflict with the 
Russians, the Young Turks, fearing that the Armenians, like the nationalists in the 
Balkans, would seek independence under the leadership of their own political 
organisations, decided to deport the Armenian population from the Russo-Turkish 
border.
In reality, it was the entire Armenian population of Anatolia as far as the Syrian 
border that was deported in 1915-1916. Between 1.5 and 2 million Armenians had 
been living throughout the Ottoman Empire before the Genocide took place. After 
the liquidation of the elite and notables of Constantinople and the summary execution 
of Armenian soldiers enrolled in the Ottoman army, general deportation led to large- 
scale massacres. This genocide led to the death of forty to fifty percent of the 
Armenian population (Chaliand & Rageau, 1995, p.85). The Genocide of 1915 
eradicated the Armenians from Asia Minor, especially the six ‘vilayets’ (‘provinces’) 
where most of them had been concentrated. Following the Treaty of Lausanne in 
1923, only a few tens of thousands of Armenians remained in Turkey, mostly in 
Istanbul.
The flight of the Armenians took three directions: the Armenians of the vilayet of Van 
mostly sought refuge in the Caucasus and Iran, as did some of the Armenians from 
northeastern Anatolia who had managed to escape deportation.
The bulk of the Armenian population of Anatolia was deported to the deserts of Syria 
and Mesopotamia. The survivors settled, sometimes provisionally, in Aleppo, 
Damascus, and Beirut, at the time of the French mandate. Some reached France or 
the United States.
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The passports of Armenians leaving Constantinople in the 1920s were stamped with 
the words: ‘No return possible’ (Chaliand & Rageau, 1995, p. 86). The eviction of the 
Armenians from Turkey was almost total. Some of these political refugees did 
manage to obtain what was termed a ‘Nansen passport’; this was first issued in 1924 
and named after the Norwegian explorer and humanitarian, the League of Nations’ 
first High Commissioner for Refugees.
In the industrialised countries, conditions were difficult for the new refugees at first, 
particularly since they arrived with no capital and no command of the language of the 
countiy. Marseilles, the suburbs of Paris, the poor districts of New York or Buenos 
Aires were home to most of the first generation of survivors of the great massacres. 
In California, at Fresno, the Armenians became farm labourers, while some of the 
immigrants worked in factories.
In the Russian Empire, the last quarter of the nineteenth centuiy saw the appearance 
of an Armenian bourgeoisie of merchants and industrialists, mainly at Baku but also 
in Tbilisi, Batum, the Caucasus, and, further north, in Odessa, Rostov-on-Don, 
Moscow, and St Petersburg.
After the Revolution, an independent Republic of Armenia was established, which 
lasted from 1918-1920 (see section 4.2). In the meantime it had taken in some
300,000 refugees from Anatolia-out of a total population of 750,000. At the end of 
the First World War, the situation was thus dramatic for most Armenians. Many were 
living in camps hastily thrown up on wasteland on the outskirts of Aleppo, Damascus, 
Beirut, Athens, Plovdiv, Sofia in Bulgaria, and in Cyprus.
The Annenian diaspora-some 1.8 million outside the former Soviet Union-is 
especially large today in North America. There are some 600,000 in the United
161
States, almost half of them in California. In Canada there are almost 50,000. In the 
West as in the Middle East, communities of Armenian origin are strongly represented 
in the professions and the middle classes (see fig.20).
France, with which Armenians have traditionally had close historical and cultural 
links, is home to 250,000 Armenians, perhaps more, concentrated mainly in Paris, 
Lyons, and Marseilles. Argentina, with approximately 50,000 and Australia with
25,000 Armenians are also major diasporan centres.
Although numbers in the Middle East have been steadily declining with the rise of 
religious and national identity crises in the last two decades, there are still many 
Armenians there.
More and more of the Armenian diaspora in Iran (100,000 approx.), Syria (80,000 
approx.), and above all Lebanon (100,000) are migrating to Western countries. The 
diaspora’s centre of gravity, long established in the Near East, seems to have shifted 
to North America and France.
The Armenian diaspora in the former Soviet Union (outside the Republic of Armenia) 
numbers some 1.5 million: 350,000 in Georgia, 800,000 in Russia, 100,000 in 
Azerbaijan (Upper Karabakh), 100,000 in Central Asia, and 40,000 in the Ukraine 
(Chaliand & Rageau, 1995, p. 89). The political parties, although a hundred years old, 
have survived in the diaspora with a mixture of obstinacy in transmitting a national 
heritage and a conservatism almost untouched by the great changes brought about by 
modernity. The Dashnaks (Social Democrats) and the Ramgavars (Liberals) both still 
have their followings and activists (see section 5.4).
Securing international recognition of the Genocide mobilised the energies of the
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diaspora in various forais. A very small minority resorted to publicity terrorism 
between 1975 and 1983 (Justice Commandos for the Armenian Genocide, and the 
Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia) but, most engaged in legal 
activities such as publishing books and documents. The Permanent Peoples’ Tribunal 
(Paris, 1984), after a long procedural struggle, gained recognition from the UN. 
Human Rights Subcommittee, for the Genocide (Geneva, 1986). In 1987 recognition 
was also granted for the Genocide by the European Council. The fight for official 
recognition by the democracies continues in the United States, where Turkey defends 
its viewpoint largely through the threat of reprisals against American interests. 
Official international recognition of the Genocide of the Armenians has not yet 
occurred and Turkey continues vehemently to deny the crime.
As regards the clashes between Azeris and Annenians over the Karabakh issue, it is 
reasonable to estimate that some 250,000 Armenians left Azerbaijan (and notably 
Baku) between 1988 and 1990. For their part, about 200,000 Azerbaijanis have left 
Armenia, freely or otherwise (Chaliand & Rageau, 1995, p.91). The terrible 
earthquake of December 1988 and the exceptional international solidarity which was 
expressed at that time brought Armenia back to the centre of the concerns of a 
diaspora which had found in it a common cause and, for some, prospects for action 
beyond simply keeping faith with a past. The political prospects and the democratic 
openings that have arisen from Gorbachev’s ‘Glasnosf, by helping to put an end to 
the hegemony of the Armenian Communist Party, have radically altered the 
relationship between the diaspora and Armenia. The new democratically elected 
leadership-those who belonged to the Karabakh Committee for the self-determination 
of the Armenian population-decided to demand all the attributes of sovereignty 
Gorbachev had laid out. Ex-Soviet Armenia has thus taken on a more than symbolic 
reality for the diaspora.
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5.4 Armenian Political Parties
In the mid-1880s the Armenian people moved slowly towards a rejection of the 
theocratic system of the Ottoman Empire and reconsidered their position in the world;
The situation for the Armenians was intolerable, and no people, even if they 
appear to have had fighting spirit knocked out of them by centuries of 
subservience, can endure such a situation forever. The Armenians were in effect 
cornered by their own government. So they slowly moved towards defiance. In 
doing so, entire ideologies and self-images were called into question. In a people 
whose hope had hitherto been their religious faith alone, defence of the body 
became as assiduously cultivated as salvation of the soul (Walker, 1990, p. 125).
Ideas came to the Armenians from three directions. These ideas chipped away at an 
Ottoman system which the Armenians viewed as tyrannical and oppressive. First of 
all, Radical, Populist political notions which had been current in Russian 
Transcaucasia in recent decades, found their way across the border to the Armenian 
population in Van, Erzerum and other Armenian centres. In the second place, since 
the 1820s American Protestant missionaries has established a network of 
congregations and schools throughout Anatolia and Turkish Armenia. The 
missionaries’ decision to ‘reform’ the Christianity of the Armenians led to the 
development of a new system of thought amongst the Armenians as, those who were 
young, rapidly assimilated European intellectual currents. The third channel for new 
ideas was through Constantinople; from there also came strands of European thought.
Ottoman Armenians now took the opportunity to organise themselves politically. 
There had been rudimentary attempts in the late nineteenth centuiy at such political 
organisation; these had taken the form of secret societies and local groups. In 1881, 
however, a new, and much more ambitious organisation was established in Erzerum; 
the ‘Protectors of the Fatherland’. It was dedicated to the defence of the Armenian 
population against the Kurds and Turks; but it was almost certainly a type of 
revolutionary organisation, since the words ‘Liberty or Death’ were found inscribed
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on an official document when members of the organisation were arrested by the 
Ottoman police in November 1882. The trial of those captured was viewed as a 
political confrontation by the Armenians and inspired the revolutionary song:
A voice rang out from the Armenian mountains of Erzerum,
Thrilled were the hearts of Armenians by the sounds of the weapons;
For centuries the Armenian villager had seen neither sword nor weapon-He left
his field and, instead of spade, took sword and rifle (Walker, 1990, p. 126).
Twelve years later this song would be sung on the streets of Constantinople, as the 
Armenians staged a demonstration against Ottoman tyranny. The first recognisable 
Armenian political party with a platform, a central body, and an official publication, 
was the Armenakan Party. This was founded in Van in the autumn of 1885. The 
guiding spirit behind its foundation was one Mekertich Portukalian, who believed that 
Armenians abroad should help those in their native land, both financially and by 
telling the world about their oppressed condition. As if in response to this ethic an 
Armenian Patriotic Society of Europe was founded in London. This society was to 
play an important part in the dissemination of news and the arousal of Liberal opinion 
in Britain nine years later, when details of the Sasun Massacre began to leak out.
Despite the absence of their ‘leading light’, the Armenians of Van worked out their 
political principles. Far from their leader who had been exiled in southern France, 
Portukalian’s followers met in secrecy and hammered out their ideological platform. 
Their central aim, they decided, was to ‘win for the Armenians the right to rule over 
themselves, through revolution’ (Walker, 1990, p. 127). The Armenakan concept of 
revolution was distinctly low-key, especially in comparison with that of succeeding 
organisations; terror, agitation and militant demonstrations were viewed with 
disfavour. The people were to be trained with arms, as guerrilla fighters, but 
essentially for defensive purposes, against the terrorism of the Ottoman Empire.
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Hope for liberation from the Ottomans was placed in the great powers. Armenakans 
were to ‘prepare the people for a general movement, especially when the external 
circumstances-the disposition of the foreign powers and neighbouring races-seem to 
favour the Armenian cause’ (Nalbandian, 1963, pp.97-98).
It is arguable that this belief-that the great powers would intervene in the Ottoman 
Empire, and rescue the Armenian people and their revolutionary leaders from the 
clutches of Turkish misrule-was the greatest single error of the Armenian 
revolutionary parties throughout the period 1885-1908. Realistically, it was futile to 
hope that the solid, bourgeois powers of Europe would intervene in favour of a 
revolutionary uprising. But the Armenians placed enormous faith in the Cyprus 
Convention and Article 61 of the Berlin Treaty. They believed that under the terms of 
these two instruments the powers, especially Britain, were bound to intervene in their 
affairs when Ottoman rule manifested its true nature. The Armenakans soon had cells 
outside Van, in other towns in the province, as well as in Trebizond and 
Constantinople. Beyond the Ottoman Empire the party developed in a small way in 
Russian Transcaucasia, in Persia and in the United States.
A document entitled ‘My Last Decision’ was a testimony left behind after an incident 
just inside the Turkish border involving three Armenakans. The document, found on 
one of the captives, was remarkable for showing the mind of a man moving from 
passive acceptance to active challenge, and the painful readjustment necessary for a 
man belonging to a community which had eschewed violence for centuries. The 
following is part of his testimony:
I have come to the end of the last of those years in which I have begun to live. 
When I drifted into the current of life, I resembled a man whose eyes had been 
bandaged, who had been isolated from real life, and kept in an imaginary world 
for many years; at length this man is allowed to enter upon real life, the poor man 
opens his eyes which have been blindfolded for several years, he finds himself in
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a world totally different from the life which he has hitherto led; every obstacle 
that he meets causes him to stumble, he goes on foot, often he falls, but he takes 
courage and gets up again; he changes his path for another direction, hoping that 
this new way will lead him to a better road, although he is convinced that he will 
only discover a world more or less resembling that in which he has hitherto 
lived........
But he has not been taught how to set to work. He pauses a moment, looks 
around him; in every direction he sees misery, persecution, and baseness, and 
human corruption. Thinking of his childhood, he passes his hand across his 
forehead, and the fearful vision of the past presents itself before his eyes; he 
beholds the torture which his relatives have endured, he beholds his fellow- 
countrymen abandoned and despairing through the persecution of the cruel 
Turks.
Finally he calls to mind that he has sworn in his childhood to assist his 
compatriots when he grew up, and not to allow himself to be so mercilessly 
treated (Walker, 1990, p. 128).
However, it must be said that resistance to robbery often ended in sterile brutality. 
Instead of those legitimate methods of liberation and self-defence which had been 
advocated by Portukalian, these later members of the Armenakan Party used violence 
against their Kurdish neighbours. This only succeeded in creating a huge barrier 
between the Armenians and Kurds and delayed any political developments which may 
have been forthcoming between the two peoples. When the Ottoman ruler Abdul- 
Hamid armed the Kurds into Hamidiye battalions in 1891 he obtained the same result 
as those Armenians who indulged in vengeance; the division of the two peoples from 
one another.
The first Socialist and Revolutionaiy Party was founded in Geneva in 1887. Its 
doctrine was essentially Marxist and its members, all of whom were Russian 
Armenians, modified the ideas of Portukalian and the Armenakans so as to imbue 
them with Caucasian revolutionary thought. Their attention, together with that of 
other Russian-Annenian groups, was focused upon Turkish Annenia, the homeland. 
The aims of this party, which, as yet, had no name, were drafted in 1886 (Nalbandian, 
1963, pp. 108-12). These aims involved the achievement of Socialism and the
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freedom of Turkish Armenia. A new, unified. Socialist state was to be carved out of 
the existing imperial regimes; and this could only be brought about by revolution. 
The party would be a national one, in that it worked for the alleviation of the plight of 
the Armenian people, who were oppressed in eastern Turkey as a national group-that 
is, they suffered merely for being Armenians, not for being workers or peasants. It 
would not, however, be a nationalist party. The leaders saw the new. Socialist 
Armenia as a beacon for the world Socialist Revolution. The draft of the party’s 
principles contained a model of the Armenian state envisaged, and described how the 
revolution would occur; more extreme than the Armenakans, the party did not eschew 
agitation and terror. The instruments of the revolution were to be workers and 
peasants, whose activities were to be directed by a central committee.
In 1887 the party was actually formed, and the first issue of the party organ, 
‘Hunchak’ produced. Not until 1890 did the party adopt a name-the ‘Hunchakian 
Revolutionary Party’, or Hunchaks for short.
The Hunchaks soon had agents in Ottoman Turkey, Europe and America, and in the 
Russian Caucasus. It was an international movement. Soon there emerged other 
organisations which stuck more closely to the only practical centre for Armenian 
revolutionaries, the Caucasus, which, although ruled by the bureaucratic functionaries 
of the Tsar, was nevertheless a place where Armenians could meet, collect funds and 
organise without too much secrecy.
The first Caucasian-born organisation of any real significance was the Young 
Armenia Society, founded in 1889 by Kristapor Mikayelian. It only lasted for a year, 
before developing into a greater and more comprehensive organisation. The Young 
Armenia’s policies were crude and consisted largely of making forays into Ottoman 
territory in order to ‘punish’ the Kurds for their oppression and violence towards
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Armenians. An important word in the Society’s vocabulary was ‘vrezh’-revenge. 
The idea that the Kurds too were victims of the Ottoman system was not apparent. 
Moreover, the Society believed in foreign intervention; as Russia had intervened after 
the Bulgarian atrocities, so, it held, would one or more powers come to their aid. In 
this, its leaders failed to note the change in the political climate in the late 1880s.
The oppression to which the Ottoman Armenians were subject meant that the use of 
revolutionary terrorism was an entirely natural consequence. The Ottoman system of 
law was a denial of law itself. Nevertheless, Armenians were no longer suffering 
passively. They were raiding Ottoman territory, and, more significantly, in political 
terms, the Hunchaks defied the government both in Constantinople and Erzerum, the 
capital of Turkish Armenia. Social relationships throughout the empire were shifting 
as a result:
The old friendly feeling between the Turks and Armenians, who had always been 
regarded with more favour than the other Christian nationalities, and who seemed 
to understand each other better, had given place to distrust and fear (Washburn, 
1911,p.219).
In the Caucasus, also in 1890, a new word entered the vocabulary of the Armenian 
revolutionary societies-Dashnaktsutiun, or ‘Federation’. The ‘Federation of 
Armenian Revolutionaries’ (‘Hai Heghapokhakarmeri Dashnaktsutiun’) emerged 
from the need for an umbrella organisation for all the groups. Initially they all 
belonged to it. The main objective of this federation was to win freedom for Armenia
by a ‘people’s war’. Details, however, were not properly worked out, perhaps 
because there were too many people pulling in different directions. Indeed, by the 
summer of 1891 the Hunchaks had split from Dashnaktsutiun, less because of 
ideological differences than personal ones. The following year the federation’s name 
was changed to ‘Hai Heghapokhakan Dashnaktsutiun’ (‘Armenian Revolutionary
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Federation’), the name it has today. Thereafter, the Hunchaks and the Dashnaks 
would almost always be rivals. Differences in policy in the formative years were 
often minimal but as time went on it became clear that the Hunchaks gave priority to 
Socialism, while the Dashnaks, in general, pursued a more nationalist path. There 
were also differences in the internal structure of the two on the issue of centralisation. 
Despite such divergence, both, nevertheless believed that in the prevailing conditions 
armed struggle was essential, and were prepared to use terror and intimidation-which 
were, indeed frequently applied by a succession of tsarist and Ottoman govemments- 
in order to achieve their aims.
When independence came to Armenia in May 1918, it was accepted reluctantly. The
Russian withdrawal from the Transcaucasus after the Russian Revolution led to a
power vacuum. At the end of the First World War Russian Armenia was tiny,
landlocked, and poor in resources. It lacked any significant infrastructure, it did not
include any of the major centres of Transcaucasia, and many Armenians, particularly
urban elites, lived outside its boundaries. Armenia was, furthermore, surrounded by
hostile armies. The Turks had just destroyed Western Armenia, along with its
political, cultural, and religious networks. The Russian side was flooded with almost 
300,000
refugees. Nevertheless, when neighbouring Georgians and Azeris abandoned 
a brief federation with Armenians after a few months, Armenia had no choice but to 
declare independence (see section 4.2).
The Dashnaks had established themselves as the legitimate political leaders of the 
Armenians, despite their beginnings as a small revolutionary movement. They had 
done this by mobilising Armenian protests for the return of Church lands expropriated 
by the Tsar in 1903 (and returned in 1905) and by championing the Armenian cause 
during the Anueno-Azeri conflict of 1905-1907. Thus, the party received 90% of the 
vote in the free elections that were held in 1919. While the Dashnaks were never able
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to reconcile their desire for progressive, democratic government with the authoritative 
measures the situation required, their administration has been credited with at least 
some improvement in rural self-administration, the legal system, and education, and 
with attempts at land and labour reform (Hovannisian, 1983, p.270).
The attempts of the Dashnaks to live up to their Socialist ideals were cut short. The 
Turks advanced into Armenia from the west, while the Russians returned to the 
Transcaucasus in the form of the Red Army. The Armenian government was forced 
to accept the lesser evil of Soviet control and handed over all authority to the Red 
Army in December 1920. A fast-developing alliance between the Bolsheviks and the 
Turks influenced the decision to deny Armenians two Soviet areas that they 
considered to be part of their historic homeland: Nakhichevan to the west and 
Nagorno-Karabakh to the east. These areas had a majority of Armenians (at least 
before the Genocide of 1915, in the case of Nakhichevan), but were eventually given 
partial autonomy as part of the Azerbaijan Republic, thus sowing the seeds for future 
conflict. The Armenian experiment with indigenous nationalism and Socialism had 
come to an end.
The political parties, although now over a hundred years old, have managed to survive 
in the diaspora. They have also succeeded in transmitting a national heritage and a 
conservatism both of which seem to have remained untouched by the great changes 
brought about by modernity. The Dashnaks and the Ramgavars (Liberals) both still 
have their followings and activists.
The Dashnak movement is particularly well represented in France, on both the 
political and cultural level. The French Dashnak organisation is called the 
‘Fédération Révolutionnaire Arménienne’ (FRA) and it runs several centres termed 
‘Maisons de la Culture Arménienne’, notably in Paris and Marseilles. The younger.
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more militant, French Armenians often join the Dashnak-sponsored ‘Nor Seround’ or 
‘New Generation group’. The moderate conservative ‘Ramgavar-Azatakan Party’ and 
the ‘Social-Democratic Hunchak Party’ are both strongly represented in France. 
There is also a small political organisation known as the ‘Démocrate-Arménien 
Group’, some of whose members also belong to the French Communist Party.
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6.0 The Gorbachev Period and the Question of Karabakh
The sudden eruption of nationalism in Armenia in the late 1980s, took the Soviet 
government by surprise. The Baltic republics, the Ukraine and ‘Muslim’ Central Asia 
had all been areas with a tradition of strong, frequently anti-Russian nationalism, but 
Annenia had always appeared to be politically docile. The unheralded development 
of a radical popular nationalist movement there can only be fully understood in 
relation to the central motivating issue; the question of Karabakh.
The Autonomous Oblast of Mountainous Karabakh is 4,400 square kilometres in area
and had in 1979 a population of 162,000 of which 123,000 (76%) were Armenian,
and 37,200 (23%) Azerbaijani (Mirzoyan, 1988, p.43). The region was conquered by
"TufiKic
the Seljuqs in the eleventh centuiy, and since then there has always been a TuAish 
element amongst the predominantly Armenian population. Although Karabakh went 
through occasional periods of partial independence, it was, for the most part, a 
constituent unit of some larger Islamic state until Iran ceded the territory to Russia in 
1813. It was later fought over by the independent republics of Armenia and 
Azerbaijan and finally in the Soviet period declared an Autonomous Oblast within the 
Republic of Azerbaijan.
There are a number of reasons which can be given for Karabakh being what a 
historian, writing in 1983, described as ‘the single most volatile issue among 
Armenians’ (Suny, 1983, p. 80). The first is that Armenian nationalists look upon the 
Azeris as culturally similar to the Turks of Turkey and see their possession of 
Karabakh as a symbol of the Turks’ successful evasion of punishment for the 
Genocide and occupation of Armenian lands (Libaridian, 1988, pp.76-77). Second, 
Karabakh’s incorporation into Azerbaijan was facilitated by British-occupying forces 
in Transcaucasia in 1918, and is thus a reminder of Armenia’s betrayal by the 
Western Allies (Arslanian, 1980, pp.92-104). Thirdly, Karabakh epitomises for the
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Armenians the unsatisfactory resolution of international and republican boundaries at 
the outset of the Soviet period. At the beginning of the aforementioned period the 
Soviet government of Azerbaijan sent a telegram to the incoming government of 
Armenia ceding Karabakh (Libaridian, 1988, p.34). However, this cession was never 
given effect, and in 1921 a plenary session of the Caucasian Bureau of the Central 
Committee of the Communist Party of Soviet Russia decided that:
Considering the necessity of national harmony between Muslims and the 
Armenians, the economic linkage between upper (‘plains’) and lower 
(‘mountainous’) Karabakh, and its permanent ties to Azerbaijan, Mountainous 
Karabakh should be left within the boundaries of the Azerbaijani Soviet Socialist 
Republic, while declaring it an autonomous Oblast (Libaridian, 1988, pp.36-37).
Karabakh was formerly incorporated into Azerbaijan in the July of 1923, This was a 
reversal of the 1920 decision which nationalist Armenians viewed as a serious 
betrayal. Finally, since medieval times the mountains of Karabakh have been a centre 
for the survival of Armenian folk traditions and culture. These, and the future of the 
Armenian settlement in Karabakh, were threatened by the alleged discriminatory 
policies and deliberate underdevelopment of the Oblast by Azerbaijan (Mirzoyan, 
1988, pp.43-56. Ter-Sarkisyants, 1988, pp. 14-23). Armenian nationalist aspirations 
focused on it as the only territory claimed by Armenia which had a majority 
Annenian population and which there was, therefore, any realistic short-term 
possibility of recovering (Libaridian, 1991, pp.69, 73-74).
The agitation for a reconsideration of the Karabakh question increased soon after the 
accession to power of Mikhail Gorbachev. The ethnic differences that emerged in the 
Caucasus in the late 1980s were almost ‘tribal’ in character, in that they sprang from 
the antipathies between ethnic groups with different religions, linguistic and historical 
backgrounds and expressed themselves in the form of communal clashes rather than 
pressures for formal independence. The first of such clashes took place in 1988
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between the republics of Armenia and Azerbaijan. Although, as earlier suggested, 
there had been pressure for some years for the transfer of Karabakh back to Armenia, 
nationalist tensions now took a particularly violent and intractable form.
It appears that the open conflict of early 1988 was precipitated by the rejection of the 
central party authorities of an appeal for Nagorno-Karabakh to be returned to 
Armenia. This appeal had been signed by no fewer than 75,000 Karabakh Armenians 
(Libaridian, 1988, pp. 88-89). Demonstrations began on the 11 February in 
Stepanakert, the regional capital, and led to the adoption of a resolution by the 
regional Soviet on 20 Februaiy which called for Nagorno-Karabakh to be transferred 
back to Armenia (Fuller & Devlin, 1989, pp. 161-174). Further demonstrations took 
place in the Armenian capital, Erevan, to support the call for Nagorno-Karabakh’s 
reincorporation into the republic. Up to a million Armenians by late February, were 
reported to be demonstrating daily in the city’s Opera Square (The Guardian. 1 June 
1988, p.6). The demonstrations came temporarily to an end after a personal appeal by 
Gorbachev on 26 February, but peace was short-lived. An anti-Armenian riot on 28- 
29 February in the oil town of Sumgait culminated in the death of 32 people and in 
the injury of 197 (Sovetskava Rossiva. 22 March 1988, p.4). The party First 
Secretaries of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Nagorno-Karabakh were all replaced in May 
1988; the Central Committee meanwhile, promised that steps would be taken to 
improve housing, schools and hospitals in the region, and to extend broadcasts in both 
Armenian and Azerbaijani (Pravda, 24 March 1988, p.5).
Despite Gorbachev’s assurances to two Armenian emissaries that a ‘just solution’ 
would be found, the Supreme Soviet Presidium warned on 23 March that ‘self- 
proclaimed groups’ (a reference to the Karabakh Committee, a group of Armenian 
activists whose activities were made illegal) could not be allowed to call for the 
redrawing of state and administrative boundaries, and it was also made clear that the
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transfer of Nagorno-Karabakh to Armenia would be a ‘clearly anti-Socialist solution’ 
(Pravda, 24 March 1988, p.5). On 15 June, after further demonstrations, the 
Armenian Supreme Soviet, voted unanimously for the disputed region to be 
transferred to their republic; the Azerbaijani Supreme Soviet, meeting two days later, 
was equally unanimous in holding this vote to be a violation of the Soviet 
Constitution (Izvestiva, 17 June 1988, p.2). The Supreme Soviet Presidium, at its 
meeting on 18 July, adopted a formal ruling which rejected any change in the 
constitutional status of Nagorno-Karabakh, but called for greater attention to be given 
to the concerns of ethnic Armenians living within the disputed region; a programme 
of cultural and economic aid was also approved (Voprosv Ekonomiki. 1989, no. 8, 
p.28). The situation temporarily stabilised, but in further unrest in November at least 
30 deaths were reported and tens of thousands were reported to have joined fellow 
nationals in the other republic (eventually, about 130,000 Azeris left Armenia and
200,000 Armenians made the journey in the reverse direction) (The Guardian, 7 
December 1988, p.24).
Continued tensions led, in January 1989 to the establishment of a special form of 
administration, in effect direct rule from Moscow, headed by Arkadii Vol’sky, who 
had been appointed the previous summer to represent the central government in the 
contested region (Pravda, 27 April 1989, p.6). The situation, remained, nonetheless, 
‘tense and complicated’ (Pravda, 10 May 1989, p.2). Demonstrations and disorders 
continued, and the decision of the Congress of People’s Deputies to elect an 
Azerbaijani as well as an Armenian to represent the region in the new Supreme Soviet 
aroused particular indignation. Further disorders were precipitated by an Armenian 
decision to abolish the special administration in November 1989 and return Nagorno- 
Karabakh to Azerbaijani rule (Pravda, 29 November 1989, p.l). In January 1990 the 
dispute extended into inter-communal violence across both republics, precipitated by 
an Armenian decision to extend the provisions of their republican budget and
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electoral law to the disputed enclave. Tens of thousands took to the streets in Baku 
alone, up to sixty people lost their lives in pogroms, and there were further fatalities 
when a state of emergency was declared by the USSR Presidium and troops were used 
to restore order on 19-20 January. At least 93 people lost their lives in the first days 
of fighting (Pravda, 26 September 1989, p.4). Ultimately, the events which had 
unfolded led Vol’sky to declare (when interviewed by the press) that the whole area 
was in danger of becoming the Soviet Union’s ‘home-grown Lebanon’ (Argumentv i 
Faktv, 1989, no.39, p.l).
The situation did indeed continue to degenerate and the prophecy expounded by 
Vol’sky was proved to have an element of truth within it. After Karabakh had fallen 
once more under the control of the Azeris, the policy adopted with regard to the 
predominantly Armenian populus in the region became one of force. A guerrilla war 
developed and by late 1991 over a thousand people had died, most of them civilians.
Despite their considerable military superiority, in terms of both numbers and 
weaponry, the Azeris could not maintain their grip on Karabakh. In the May of 1992, 
the Azeri stronghold of Shushi, from which a daily bombardment onto the capital of 
Stepanakert had reduced much of the city to rubble, was captured, and the single road 
that linked Armenia to Karabakh fell to the Karabakh forces (Issues in Focus, July 
1992, pp.36-37). To date, the question of Karabakh (Artsakh as the Armenians prefer 
to call it) remains as pertinent as ever. The wounds created by the conflict still 
remain and it seems that the two sides are no further along the road to achieving a just 
and peaceful settlement of the dispute. The region continues to be ripped apart by 
ancient and bitter hatred (see section 8.0).
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7.0 Armenia at the Crossroads; Building the Nation-State
7.1 Armenian Dependence on Foreign Forces
Careful examination of Armenian political history during the last 300 years shows, 
that with one or two exceptions, it has always been based on reliance on the ‘third 
force’. That which the Armenians call the ‘Liberation Movement’ was based on 
reliance on the third force. When developing liberation plans, the main role has been 
assigned to the third force; the West and Russia.
The middle of the seventeenth century proved to be the beginning of the ‘Russian 
orientation’ of Armenians-more specifically, the adoption of Russia as the third force 
in Armenian political life (Ishkhanian, 1991, p. 14). Western Europe and, generally 
speaking, the West remained of course, part of the Armenians’ visualisation of this 
third force. Russia, nevertheless, was the main power assigned that role. This role 
was so developed by the end of the nineteenth century that Grigor Ardsruni was 
compelled to write: ‘We Armenians, politically speaking, are Russians’ (Ishkhanian, 
1991, p. 14). Since the 1827-1828 Russo-Persian War and every time that Russia 
found itself in conflict with a Muslim power, the Armenian Volunteer Corps were 
always on hand to help the Russian advance. Such loyalty to Imperial Russia was 
perhaps shown by the Armenians in the hope that Russia would eventually restore 
Armenian statehood. Such devotion, more often than not, went unrewarded. Russia 
was not willing to restore the Armenian kingdom. It has not been particularly keen to 
do so for centuries.
The Armenian revolutionaiy parties also placed their hopes on the third force, Russia 
and Europe. Even their names had been copied from the Russians. ‘Hunchak’ was 
the Armenian for Herzen’s ‘Kolokol’; ‘Federation of Armenian Revolutionaries’ was 
the exact translation of Russia’s ‘Soyuz Ruskikh Revoliutsionerov’.f , The main 
function of these parties was to organise a movement by armed groups and to invite
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the attention of Europe to Armenia when massacres occurred. In other words, their 
entire strategy was based upon issuing an invitation to the third force to intervene. 
Anything which was guaranteed to invite the attention of the third force was 
attempted. Such actions included; the occupation of the Ottoman Bank and threats of 
destroying it with bombs as well as making bombs to assassinate the Sultan 
(Ishkhanian, 1991, p. 15). There were, of course, individuals who regarded anti- 
Turkish activities based on reliance on the third force destructive to Armenians and 
their cause. Father Ghevond Alishan, a historian, poet, and linguist (1820-1901) was 
against the use of the third force by Armenian revolutionaries, saying, ‘We should not 
provoke the Mongolian blood of Turks’ (Ishkhanian, 1991, p. 18). He was, however, 
dismissed, like those before him, as a Turkophile and not to be trusted. Support for 
the concept of the third force remained, on the whole, unfaltering amongst the 
political elites of Armenia;
When the third force or any of its components failed to behave as we projected 
and used the Annenian question to their interests, we would become angry, we 
would curse Europe and Russia but would still continue to place our hope on 
them. We could not see an alternative way to liberate Armenia (Ishkhanian, 
1991, p.l8).
Armenian reliance on the third force reached its zenith during the First World War 
and human loss and tragedy reached its zenith too. The Armenians came extremely 
close to being extenninated completely (see section 4.1).
Since 1915, and perhaps earlier, other concepts came to rival that of the third force. 
The latter approach which came to be known as the ‘Zavriev-Andronik’ line, 
advocated dependence on Russia and viewed Turkey as the eternal enemy. The rival 
approach, however, was based upon the principle of ruling put such dependence and 
developing constructive dialogue with neighbours. Such dialogue was to be based 
upon an accurate accounting of one’s own resources. This particular perspective has
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constantly been referred to as the ‘Aramian’ approach. The latter approach did not 
preclude external assistance if such was available (Ishkhanian, 1991, p.20). Aram 
Manukian, a leading member of the Dashnaktsutiun (and considered to be the founder 
of the Republic of Armenia in 1918) after whom the rival approach was named, was 
not even opposed to getting help from Bolshevik Russia if the situation merited such 
action. He did, however, make it clear that he would not rely completely on any 
external force. He always made plans considering the national strength, emphasising 
that ‘What you see is what you get’. One of his famous statements on the subject 
deserves quotation: ‘No one is interested enough in Armenians to send tangible 
assistance. On the contrary, there is a conspiratorial attitude. We are alone and we 
must rely on our own forces’ (Ishkhanian, 1991, p.21 ).
Among Armenians then and now, the Zavriev-Andranik line has always found most 
favour. In May 1918 for instance, Turkey demanded that the three nationalities in the 
Transcaucasus secede from Russia and declare themselves independent republics. 
The Armenians voted against such a move. Such action was taken because 
Armenians could not imagine an existence without the third force, or Russia; reliance 
on the third force had become ‘part and parcel’ of the Armenians’ instincts. Despite 
the vote against independence there was already an independent Armenian state in 
existence headed by Aram Manukian. The latter managed to organise brilliantly the 
defence of the new Armenian state already in existence. Such action was based solely 
upon Armenian forces. Manukian then determined to enter into negotiations with the 
Turks. The Annenians, ‘always being massacred and always on the run, were able to 
win finally’ (Ishkhanian, 1991, p.22). Thus, the greatest victory of the Armenians had 
been achieved without the third force. Manukian had managed to achieve what had 
always seemed to the Armenians to be impossible. As a result of this victory the 
Annenian National Council was forced to cut its umbilical cord with the third force 
(Russia) and, although outside the boundaries of Armenia, it declared in Tbilisi the
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independence of Armenia. The date was May 28 1918. Although the Armenian state 
had existed before that date, it was given full approval on that day. The date was of 
especial importance because from that time, Armenian leaders liberated themselves 
from their instinctive dependence on the third force and felt themselves alone in 
facing their neighbours, particularly Turkey.
It seemed that the policy of relying on the third force had lost its attraction. In 1918, 
the Dashnaktsutiun became a state party. It appeared that the redeeming value of 
ruling out the third force had come to be recognised by the party. However, the new 
mood quickly changed. Armenia expected support from the West on the subject of its 
borders which had been defined by the Treaty of Sevres in August 1920. This 
expectation continued despite the fact that the British had justified their position of 
support for the Ottoman Empire and the ‘abandonment’ of Armenians at the Congress 
of Berlin. Armenia continued to place its hopes on states in the West and was, it 
seemed, unwilling to realise that the Treaty of Sevres had, for Armenians, no more 
value than a piece of paper.
Eventually, the Turks allied with Bolshevik Russia; the two divided Armenia between 
themselves and the Republic of Armenia died. Where was the sacred third force 
now? The Western nations refused to ‘lift a finger’. At the Conference of Lausanne 
in 1923, states Ishkhanian; ‘The Armenian delegation was like a raped woman who 
had come to complain’ (Ishkhanian, 1991, p.25). There were no protectors now. This 
was yet another example of the consequence of the policy of relying on the third 
force.
The main reason for the ‘defeat’ inflicted upon the Armenians with regard to the early 
struggle for independence was that the politicians came to rely too heavily on the 
third force. If the elites had ruled out any kind of third force and had developed their
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plans on the basis of their own resources (and moved accordingly), the 
aforementioned abandonment and defeat may well have been avoided. More often 
than not the Armenians have lost out when they have put themselves totally in the 
‘care’ of foreign powers.
Reliance on the third force over many years has, therefore, had harsh consequences 
for the Armenian people. It has been suggested that it has culminated in what some 
might term, the ‘Russification’ of Armenia. Prior to the August coup of 1991 (which 
took place in the then Soviet Union), there had been a sustained and tangible 
movement towards full ‘Russification’. This had, of course, taken place over many 
years. It has also been pointed out by Ishkhanian that the Armenian tendency to rely 
on the third force has severely debilitated the internal strength of the latter. Such 
‘need’ for the protection of foreign powers has, he argues, turned the Armenians into 
‘sycophants, killed their spirit of resistance, and destroyed their will to survive’ 
(Ishkhanian, 1991, p.26). Ishkhanian then goes on to state that because the 
Armenians have made their existence conditional on the third force, they have 
rendered themselves unprepared for independence (Ishkhanian, 1991, p.27). There is 
also no substantial evidence to suggest that any third force which was relied upon had 
ever acted on a plea by the Armenians. Furthermore, there is no guarantee that any 
third force would consider acting on such a plea in the future. After all, ‘each power 
has its own interests and plans’ (Ishkhanian, 1991, p.27). According to Ishkhanian 
the Armenians themselves invented the view that the Russians saved them. Even the 
latter are surprised at such an assertion stating, ‘When have we saved you?’ 
(Ishkhanian, 1991, p.27). The aforementioned author also suggests that Europe will 
never be eager to help the Armenians militarily. He argues that it has never done so 
and it never will (if it has no interests of its own).
Of course there are those who would argue against the abandonment of reliance on
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the third force. For example, a leader of the Armenian Revolutionary Foundation 
(Dashnaksutiun) stated: ‘We cannot achieve anything without the help of some major 
power’ (Ishkhanian, 1991, p.27). The ‘Hay Tad’ (‘Armenian Cause’) group has also 
been an ‘offender’ in this respect. It too, seems to have shown scant regard for the 
preservation of the Armenian language, schools, education, and the use of Armenian 
by Armenians. In other words, the group seems to consider the question of Armenian 
cultural survival unimportant, preferring instead assimilation by some other power 
(i.e. Russia). ‘Hay Tad’ is, wittingly or unwittingly, working against the Armenian 
cause by expecting the West or Russia to help the Armenians get their lands back 
(mainly from the Turks). Whilst it is making such overtures to the Russians and the 
West, claim some, it is slighting Armenian language and culture. Armenia, they say, 
is being ‘sold short’ by those with similar views to those of ‘Hay Tad’ members. 
When there is no more Armenia left what will the territories which have been 
reclaimed unite to? The Armenian Democratic Party (Ramgavar Azatakan 
Kusaktsutiun) and the Social Democratic (Hunchakian) Party, both of which continue 
to function in the diaspora, are also both incapable of visualising any kind of Armenia 
without Russia. Indeed, for fifty to sixty years their whole policy has been based 
upon the mutuality of full devotion to the idea of Russian protection. It seems strange 
that such reliance should be placed upon the Russians considering the fact that for 
over 300 years Russia’s leaders have been telling the Armenians: ‘When you and the 
Muslims are in conflict don’t expect us to defend you’ (Ishkhanian, 1991, p.31).
Not to rely on Russia, not to make plans based upon its power does not at all entail 
becoming Russia’s enemy. It is quite possible for the Armenians to remain on 
friendly terms with the latter without relying on them completely, without being so 
fully ‘devoted’ to them. The Armenians are now in a position where it should be 
possible for them to rediscover their nationhood. For centuries they have managed to 
retain a sense of identity, a sense of their own Armenian character. However, it is
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now time for the Armenian people, for want of a better term, to completely ‘re- 
Armenianise’. The time has come when, having already attained sovereignty and 
independence physically, the Armenians must seek to establish themselves 
psychologically, mentally and morally. The task has, of course, been made easier by 
the very fact that the Armenian people have managed to preserve their language, 
culture and religion despite the countless wars that have been fought on Armenian 
territory and the partitions that have been wrought by competing powers. In order to 
attain such lofty goals the idea of total reliance on the third force must be eradicated 
from the Armenian psyche. Simultaneously, with such eradication, relations must be 
established with Armenia’s five neighbours (Azerbaijan, Turkey, Iran, Georgia and 
the Kurds). These neighbours, who number tens of millions, must now be faced 
alone. Only when this is accomplished will the Armenians be truly ready for 
statehood. When facing these nations alone they will immediately begin to seek ways 
of finding resolutions to their conflicts. Russia no longer holds the Caucasian nations 
in its vice-like grip and the Armenians must learn to survive alone. They have, 
indeed, survived thus far. Ruling out protection from Russia or the West does not, 
however, preclude seeking help from those nations which can be classed as allies. 
Allies will only be found, however, when Armenia has its own political and militaiy 
strength.
Ishkhanian, remaining true to the view held by many that Armenians are devoted to 
their Christian faith, says: ‘Let us rely not so much on a third force but on God and on 
the strength we can develop’. He goes on to suggest that if the Armenians forget their 
Christian faith the path to becoming a sovereign and independent nation will become 
barren:
Our nation has been kept and will be kept by God, if we rely on Him. He has 
never turned away from us; it is us who have done so and fallen onto bad days. 
We need a return to Christianity like we need air (Ishkhanian, 1991, p.36).
185
History has shown that the Armenians have not benefited too greatly from reliance on 
the third force. For over 300 years they have trodden this path and have only 
succeeded in becoming losers. A lesson must be learned from Aram Manukian.
The only correct path the Armenians can take, and the problem that has the highest 
priority, is the moral and intellectual sovereignty of the people, based on the law of 
ruling out the third force. No one will resolve the Armenian question. The 
Armenians are the only ones who can resolve it. They are, however, perfectly placed 
to do this, their religious faith, culture and language providing a solid foundation from 
which to begin the process.
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7.2 The Spectre of Pan-Turkism
It has been vehemently argued that there still exists a Pan-Turkic threat to the survival 
of the Armenian nation. Such a threat, says Balayan, is by far the gravest thing that 
the Armenians have to face (Balayan, 1991, p. 151). If Balayan’s assertions are 
correct then democracy and independence for Armenia may well have to become 
secondary considerations and reliance on the third force a necessity. It is sufficient, 
says Balayan, ‘To look into the folds of history’. In order to escape the fatal and 
barbaric Ottoman rule Armenia did eventually become part of a unified Russian state 
(Eastern Armenia was under Persian Safawid rule when it was made part of Russia 
following the Russo-Persian War of 1827-28). Balayan also suggests that the Turkish 
aim remains the same as ever:
To enter Turan (a term denoting a common fatherland in Central Asia of all 
Turkic groups), now dubbed Russia’s ‘underbelly’, going from Nakhichevan and 
the plains of Karabakh, by wiping out Mountainous Karabakh, using Meghri 
(southernmost town of Armenia) as a highway. Isn’t it time to think that we are 
now facing Hamlet’s question; To be or not to be? (Balayan, 1991, p. 151).
The aforementioned author fears that the Turks have a clear purpose. The aim is to 
surround Armenia with a ‘Turkish noose’. He also intimates that the Turks see 
Karabakh as a provocation, an obstacle to the Pan-Turkic goal of reaching Turan, or 
Russia’s ‘underbelly’. As if to prove that Pan-Turkism remains a potent threat to the 
Armenians the author alludes to a small segment of a Pan-Turkic plan developed by 
Nazim, a ‘Young Turk’ leader and Secretary of the Ittihadve Terakke Party. The plan 
was hatched during the First World War:
In the Asian territories of the East, there are unlimited space and opportunities 
for development and expansion. Our forefathers have come fi-om Turan (Central 
Asia). And today throughout the Transcaucasus and on the other side of the 
Caspian Sea, toward the East, live Turkic speaking tribes, alas, under the 
occupation of our centuries old enemy, Russia. Only in that direction our 
political horizons lay tree. And it is our sacred task to fulfil our obligation by 
achieving the Union of Turkic tribes from the Mediterranean to the Aral Sea
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(Balayan, 1991,p.l54).
For the leaders of Pan-Turkism the very notion of Armenian statehood was 
loathsome. The existence of any Armenian state would sound the death-knell for the 
most ambitious of Pan-Turanic plans. Any such existence, propounded Nazim, would 
have to be countered by Pan-Turkism rather than Pan-Islamism since the latter had 
lost much of its appeal and internal dynamism.
The Karabakh Committee, the forerunner of the Armenian National Movement 
(ANM) was quick to respond to the issue of Pan-Turkism, particularly as the issues 
were central to those of democracy and independence for the Armenia of today. 
Levon Ter-Petrosian, then a leading member of the Karabakh Committee looked upon 
Zori Balayan’s speech at the June 1989 session of the Armenian Supreme Soviet 
(during the old regime) as a fundamentally flawed and short-sighted political 
programme. As well as voicing disappointment at Balayan’s speech Ter-Petrosian 
was quick to point out that some Armenian intellectuals were still ‘Feverishly 
preaching the politically bankrupt and dangerous mentality according to which 
Armenia, being surrounded by enemy peoples of another religion, can survive only 
when it is under the protection of another state’ (Petrosian, 1991, p. 155). Such a 
view, Petrosian intimated, leads the Armenian people to ‘moral bankruptcy’ and 
denies them the opportunity to become more influential in the political arena 
(Petrosian, 1991, p. 155). The Karabakh Committee saw the Pan-Turkic ideology as 
one which had lost its value as a political factor. This is especially so in today’s 
political climate since it seems as though most Turkic-speaking peoples have opted 
for the path of national development and internal reform. However, there is nothing 
to stop the ‘crusader calls’ against Pan-Turkism making it again a political factor and 
thus turning Armenia into a target for both Pan-Turkism and Pan-Islamism.
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The Karabakh Committee preferred to concentrate on other, more positive aspects of 
Armenia’s future. As well as rejecting the idea that Pan-Turkism is a permanent 
threat, the Committee also refused to ‘take on board’ the dangerous practice of 
placing Armenian hopes on an external saviour. The Committee members laboured 
systematically to act according to the principle that the Armenian people can achieve 
their national goals by relying on themselves, and only themselves. A ‘Russia’ is not 
needed for protection because the Turks are no longer the threat they were. As if to 
somehow strengthen their argument the Committee suggested that the raising of the 
issues of Pan-Turkism and of the Armenian territories occupied by Turkey at the 
moment had only one purpose: ‘To represent the Armenians as revanchists, to 
discredit them and legitimise this fear’ (Petrosian, 1991, p. 156).
This fear of the Turk and the Muslim, Pan-Turkism, pogroms, massacres and a new 
genocide can perhaps, to some extent be justified. However, in the past such fear has 
been exploited and manipulated to rationalise, and even welcome, the lack of 
independence and absence of democracy in Armenia. The Armenian National 
Movement has, for example, concluded that the spectre of Pan-Turkism is:
The scarecrow which distorts the nation’s view of the past, obscures other, real 
issues of today, and denies the Armenians the right to imagine the future, thus 
serving the interests of Russian imperialism alone (Libaridian, 1991, p.4).
It is indeed time for the Armenians to liberate themselves from their fixation with the 
Turkic threat. After all, in realistic terms, the threat seems, for the moment, to have 
receded; the Turks appear to be more preoccupied with their internal affairs and in 
gaining a foothold in most of the independent republics of Central Asia. There were 
however, Turkish warnings issued to the Armenians concerning the apparent
‘flagrant aggression’ in the region of Nakhichevan. The Turkish government 
discussed the possibility of sending troops to defend Nakhichevan, which many Turks
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still regard as virtually an extension of their territory (the 1921 Treaty of Kars gave 
Turkey a say in any change in the status of Nakhichevan). Luckily for the Armenians, 
the Prime Minister at that time, Suleyman Demirel, disliked the idea of any military 
adventures. Still, Nakhichevan rapidly became the region’s new flashpoint. The 
Turks and the Iranians are both at the present time vying for influence in 
neighbouring Azerbaijan and this could have damaging results for the Armenians, 
particularly since the two nations may well decide to side with Azerbaijan over the 
disputed enclave of Nagorno-Karabakh.
The fact remains that Armenia has, in the past, been subjugated by other, more 
powerful nations, including the Turks. Despite the memory of the Genocide which is 
still deeply etched into the Armenian psyche, the Armenians have managed to survive 
as a people. Once again, a particularly strong religious faith, a devotion to their 
language and culture, are the main (although not the only) factors which have greatly 
assisted them in the preservation of their Armenian identity. History has 
demonstrated that they are a particularly resilient people. It is almost as if they will 
continue to survive no matter what happens to befall them. But in the life of people 
and nations there are no guarantees. Their hand will be greatly strengthened if they 
(the Armenians) can achieve their internal goals and guarantee the irreversibility of 
the démocratisation of their countiy. In order to achieve such démocratisation and 
thus a fully independent Armenia, the nation must no longer continue to rely solely 
upon the protection of another power. In truth, the only way in which Armenia can 
rid itself of the stigma of being the vassal state of some imperial power is to dispel in 
large part their fear of the Turk. Only then, will Armenians have the courage to attain 
true statehood. After all, says Gerard Libaridian, an Armenian academic:
A nation cannot imagine a future if the only thing it can imagine the future 
bringing is further victimisation. The denial of the future justifies the denial of 
the present and mandates an obsessive treatment of our overburdened past
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(Libaridian, 1991, p.2).
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7.3 Establishing Relations with Turkey
Moorad Mooradian, a lecturer, writer and consultant on history and international 
relations, has suggested that aside from confronting Turkey, the Armenians should 
actually trade with their powerful neighbour. He seems to think that such a strategy 
would be in Armenia’s self-interest. The reason, suggests Mooradian, that 1918 
Armenia died a painful death was the republic’s failure to establish firm relations 
with its neighbours: ‘Asking Levon Ter-Petrosian and a reborn Armenia to repeat the 
identical error of not coming to terms with bordering states is tantamount to national 
suicide’ (AIM: Armenian International Magazine, January 1991, p. 51). This 
statement has some credibility chiefly because events have moved rapidly, and 
Armenia now has to fend for itself more hastily than it would have wished. It now 
has responsibility for a significant portion of its own security. To prolong the 
prospects of an active enemy, 57 million strong (Turkey) on one side, and another 
active enemy, (Azerbaijan, with a population of 7.7 million) on the other, is courting 
disaster. Whether Armenians like it or not, they are geographically imprisoned. They 
are surrounded by nations which have traditionally been unfriendly towards them. 
Most Armenians assume that they will encounter problems with Turkey and 
Azerbaijan. Georgia has not been, historically, friendly, and is becoming increasingly 
nationalistic.
It would be folly for tiny Armenia with its population of around 3.3 million, no access 
to the sea, no agriculture to speak of, sparse national resources and monumental 
energy problems, to shun a possible first step in the nonnalisation of relations with 
Turkey. Geopolitical realities make it essential for Armenia to continue to pursue 
discussions, and trade is an excellent starting point. Annenia suffered greatly from 
the economic bankruptcy of the Communist system and the people are not going to 
wait forever to derive benefits from ‘freedom’. Annenians want to eat.
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Emotional, diaspora Armenians urge fledgling Armenia to ‘fall on its sword’ over the 
Genocide issue, ‘....Payment of reparations and the return of occupied territories’. 
However, there are those that say; ‘When the ancient Romans ‘fell on their swords’ to 
prove their devotion-they died’ (AIM: Armenian International Magazine. January 
1991, p.51 ). Armenia must live.
Armenians have to appreciate the truth of the situation. They must look reality in the 
eye. Turkey has much more to offer the powers-that-be than an Armenia which has 
not long been recognised as a separate nation. Turkey has a million troops at its 
disposal and U.S. support. What incentive can there be for Turkey to surrender its 
territory or anything else to Armenia? Even with a neutral U.S. there is no nation in 
the world with the capability to force Turkey to pay reparations or cede lands to 
Armenia. Any concessions that are forthcoming on the part of the Turks must be won 
through diplomatic negotiation. Such negotiation cannot begin until Armenia gives 
up the long-standing policy of shunning all contact with its powerful neighbour. 
Armenia does not have the luxury of waiting for all outstanding issues between the 
two sides to be resolved first.
Firstly, nurturing greater trade links with Turkey could prove to be the first step 
towards some kind of reconciliation with the latter. Of course, such a step would fall 
far short of dependence upon Turkey as a trading partner. Armenia’s western 
neighbour would only be one of several trade agreements. The Armenian government 
has already begun the process with several other nations.
Secondly, even with a multitude of trading partners, Armenia desperately needs the 
benefit of salt-water ports. The least costly and most efficient route is through 
Turkey. Armenia is also talking with Georgia concerning the development of a rail 
route over treacherous mountain passes that are closed for weeks on end during the
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Transcaucasian winter months.
If it is rather imprudent to ‘patch up differences’ with those historical enemies-Turkey 
and Azerbaijan-is it not unwise to attempt the same with Georgia? The latter has not 
exactly been the staunchest of Armenia’s supporters. Besides, Georgian nationalism 
is restive. They can seize control and oust all non-ethnic Georgians. Thus, that 
hoped-for rail link to the outside world via Georgia is also tentative. The other 
alternative for a rail route is through Iran to the Persian Gulf. However, Muslim 
Fundamentalists could sever ties with Christian nations if they chose to. Iran, 
therefore, is a precarious choice. It appears that every option for a rail passage to an 
ocean is fraught with danger. For Armenia’s sake every possibility must be fully 
exploited.
Fourthly, establishing trade links with Turkey does not mean that Armenia will have 
to surrender anything. Mature nations ‘merely’ agree to differ when faced with 
certain issues. Armenia and Turkey can somehow work out a compromise where 
neither side will raise certain points in official political circles. This does not exclude 
Armenia from debating the Genocide and other related issues in the academic arena. 
It does not stop Armenia from providing governmental resources to wage an 
intellectual and public relations war.
It is a matter of approaching the problem from a different perspective. Once 
Annenians win some battles in academia and manage to convince a few Turkish 
intellectuals, it is possible that Turkish political opposition on this issue will erode.
Fifth, a trade agreement is not ‘etched in stone’. Both sides can break agreements 
perhaps utilising an ‘opt-out clause’ written into any ‘pact’ which the two sides may 
make. The Armenian government fully understands the dangers inherent in travelling
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the lonely road which Armenia now finds itself facing. The government also knows 
that achieving a consensus on dealing with Turkey within the Armenian political 
spectrum will reduce its efforts to the lowest common denominator. The Genocide 
killed 1.6 million Armenians. An emotional reaction when dealing with Turkey 
equates to a continuation of that Genocide which may well add 1997 Armenia to its 
list of victims. Coming to terms with its neighbours and skilfully compromising for 
its self-interest (i.e., trading with Turkey) is a sane approach which will undoubtedly 
enable Armenia to mature into an independent nation.
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7.4 The Diasporan Parties; Finding a New Path
It is time for the diasporan parties to replace the centrepiece of their long-held 
strategy-fear of assimilation. Such a strategy has been nothing more than a sure 
recipe for cultural stagnation and intellectual paralysis. It has also caused much of 
the problem it claims to have resolved and has become the survival mechanism for 
institutions that have managed to Tose’ more Armenians in every generation than 
they may have managed to ‘save’.
For many years the issue of the Genocide has paralysed the diasporans and 
consequently denied them the natural processes of growth and maturation. Gerard 
Libaridian has said as much:
At times it seems that there was nothing left to define us and distinguish us from 
others, other than our being the first victims of genocide in this century. The 
Genocide has become a negative form of self-definition. To paraphrase a friend, 
our death certificate has become our flag (Libaridian, 1991, p. 160).
The diaspora was angry at the Turk for what he had done, and the world for wanting 
to forget what the Turk had done. Politics, says Libaridian, was reduced to a set of 
angry reactions and the diasporans were unable to develop frameworks of real 
participation in the affairs of the states in which they lived, other than as supplicants. 
The memory of collective death became the fear of the future, the fear of one’s 
neighbours. The cry became familiar: ‘Turkey is there to massacre Armenians any 
chance it gets’ (Libaridian, 1991, p. 160). Since the Genocide was a causal factor in 
the creation of the diaspora, somehow all problems could be traced back to the Turk, 
and the diasporans thought they could absolve themselves of any responsibility. 
‘After all’, said the diasporan parties and institutions, ‘who among us would dare 
absolve the Turk of any guilt?’ (Libaridian, 1991, p. 161).
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As long as fear dominated their relations with the world, Armenian leaders could not 
be blamed for not placing the central issues of democracy, human rights and 
independence on the agenda. Both in Armenia and in the diaspora, participation in 
collective thinking and decision-making were replaced with fear and hatred. 
Promoters of fear and hatred became the strategists and perpetuated this collective 
paralysis. To a nation turned refugee and denied its past, inducing an abdication of 
history and a denial of a future seemed almost a natural progression based on a 
strategy of fear and hatred. The denial of a future for Armenia was clearly illustrated 
by the constant emphasis placed by leaders on the need for an Armenian ‘saviour’ or 
‘protector’:
If the question facing our nation is how to keep blood-thirsty and irrational 
Turkey and Turks from killing more of us, then the answer would be to seek a 
protector. The price of that protection is the loss of all other rights, including the 
right to question authority (Libaridian, 1991,p.l61).
The diaspora’s dominant value system (cultivated over many years) and many of its 
institutions and leaders have, however, been ‘knocked sideways’ by the ruling 
Armenian National Movement’s positive and realistic agenda for the Armenian 
nation. The challenge thrown down by the ANM has produced within the diaspora an 
organisational survival instinct and a ‘marriage of convenience’ between various 
parties and organisations. Such institutions, spurred into action by the ANM, have 
already begun to realise that building a cultural identity and political activities around 
the issue of the Genocide can only lead to a ‘dead end’. Perhaps they have also come 
to the conclusion that in order to formulate a strategy for the nation, they must 
consider the new realities in the world, in Armenia and in the environment within 
which Armenia must live and prosper.
Many Armenians, despite the obvious shift in diasporan institutional attitudes, feel
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that their organisations and institutions have thus far, been unable to fully articulate 
the values of an increasing number of Armenians. The latter are:
 No longer concerned with antiquated arguments; with obsolete disputes;
with petty quarrels whose sole function seems to have been to distract attention 
from strategies too long taken for granted; with internalised aggression 
characteristic of the mentality of the colonialised; with the politics of rhetoric 
and fear; with the psychology of the victimised (Libaridian, 1991, p. 160).
However, in spite of these criticisms, it appears as though the questioning of authority 
and orthodoxy in Armenia has inspired sufficient confidence in diasporans to ask 
some pertinent questions of their own: Has the much-heralded strategy of cultural 
preservation based on fear of the neighbour and on isolation produced results? Did a 
strategy of liberation based on anti-Turkism and anti-Communism, on fear of Pan- 
Turkism and hatred of the Turk, cause the return of an inch of Western Armenian 
territory? Did such a strategy even bring the Armenians closer to Turkish recognition 
of the Genocide? Lastly, did culture (the culture which the Armenians claimed to be 
preserving in the diaspora) help or hinder the process of political thinking, debate on 
strategies, the development of national interests? Such questioning is obviously 
indicative of a diaspora which sees the necessity for a revision in attitude and 
strategy. Such revision will take time but it is undoubtedly on the agenda. Patience is 
required on the part of all diasporan Armenians.
Despite the criticism directed at diasporan institutional strategy one should in no way 
deny or minimise the contribution such institutions have made in the past. Nor should 
their potential to do so in the future be underestimated. The political parties and the 
diaspora institutions have, in general, played a historical role and they have served the 
people as best as they could. They have, in tiying times and under trying 
circumstances, tried to help the diasporan communities and Armenia. In many ways 
they have succeeded.
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Although having played a historical and important role, the diasporans must now 
discuss to what extent and in what ways their organisations, especially political 
parties, represent diaspora Armenians. They must decide whether their organisations 
as currently structured and as they relate to each other, actually represent the best 
mechanisms by which to channel the diaspora’s contributions to the political and 
economic development of Armenia.
There are many who continue to place their faith in the core institutions, believing 
that they are the proper vehicles for the task that lies ahead. It must be mentioned 
though, that when the people of Armenia produced the new agenda and offered the 
diaspora the opportunity to participate in a meaningful way in the exercise of nation- 
building, the current leadership failed to transcend the limitations of diasporan 
thinking and behaviour. It found itself, because of its rigidity, unable to join forces 
with the democratic movement in Armenia.
The diaspora should now have the humility and courage to recognise that its 
institutions were not built to face the new, and bigger, challenges facing the nation; 
that in order for the diaspora to realise its great potential, its institutions must undergo 
actual transformations. It must also be realised that the skills, knowledge, talent and 
capital which could contribute to the development of Armenia abound in the diaspora, 
but that they abound in individuals-and talent can’t be easily mobilised by 
undemocratic institutions. States Libaridian: ‘The time has come to reassess the
issues and policies of the past decades....... to act in a way that makes real change and
real change possible. In the diaspora, words and claims have no impact on our 
economic and political survival’ (Libaridian, 1991, p. 167). In short, Libaridian is 
suggesting that it is not possible to transfer the logic, the institutions and, above all, 
the mentality of a diaspora into Armenia. This is, of course, correct. After all, if the 
diasporan organisations want to participate constructively in the making of Armenia’s
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future, they must fully share in the democratic and national values currently being 
created by the people of Armenia and its movement.
Self-critique is essential if the diaspora is to achieve a better understanding with 
Armenia itself. It is also necessary in that it will ensure the openness required for 
mutual trust. Above all, maximum co-operation and efficiency can be achieved when 
there is a sharing of values. For the first time, the diaspora can be part of Armenia, 
because it can share without any reservations, in the ideal of nation-building.
For the first time in many years, the Armenians, as a nation, have a positive agenda 
not based on the hatred and fear of the Turk. In order to contribute to Armenia’s 
rebuilding, the diaspora organisations must learn to cope with an environment where 
hatred and fear do not dominate the nation’s thinking. Libaridian supports this view, 
stating:
The Armenian nation faced a challenge in 1988. Armenia answered that 
challenge by democratizing and by setting a national agenda. The diaspora has 
yet to take up that challenge. Our organisations, including political parties, 
which have done much in the past, have an opportunity to play a major role in the 
new age as well. For that to happen, they must take up the challenge in the spirit 
that gave them their greatness many decades ago. They must, above all, 
transcend the limitations of diaspora life (Libaridian, 1991, p. 170).
The diaspora now has the opportunity to grow with history. If it does not seize this 
chance it will be crushed. Change must come even if it means having to rethink the 
compromises the diaspora made with history by force of events, by force of 
diasporisation. What is abundantly clear is that Armenians abroad, their political 
parties and organisations, cannot afford to allow the Genocide to dictate their thinking 
and agenda. Reason and not reflex reaction to the past must dominate their thinking 
at this juncture. This is of paramount importance not only for a healthy Armenia, but 
for a healthy diaspora too.
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8.0 Post-Soviet Developments in Armenia
The Republic of Armenia has been su^^cf^as discussed, to many conquests and 
rivalries over the centuries. Situated at the crossroads between Europe and Central 
and -Eastern Asia, there are few periods in Armenia’s history in which it has known 
independence. The long and protracted war over Nagorno-Karabakh which began in 
the Gorbachev period, still continues. This conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan 
has its roots in the early part of this century, a century which heralded the division of 
Armenian territories and the changing of boundaries (see section 6.0 concerning the 
question of Karabakh), In 1991 Azerbaijan and Armenia were granted independence, 
and in that same year the Soviet Union dissolved. The following January, Nagorno- 
Karabakh declared itself independent, however, Azerbaijan, still refuses to 
acknowledge such a status and under international law the area remains part of 
Azerbaijan. Today, the disputed territory is largely populated by Armenians. In 1921 
they accounted for 94% of the population, although by 1988 this figure had fallen to 
75%, a fact mainly due to Azerbaijan’s policy of promoting the settlement of Azeris 
(Panter, 1996, p.l).
Although Armenia consistently denys- any involvement in the conflict there is 
evidence that it has supported Karabakh in its struggle; many of the refugees from the 
conflict have fled to Armenia, and there have been attempts by the opposition and 
other influential nations to preesurise the Armenian Republic into a withdrawal of the 
Armenian Karabakhi forces from the enclave and Azeri occupied territory.
During the period of Soviet rule. President Gorbachev of the USSR chose, at first, to 
do nothing in response to Nagorno-Karabakh’s demands which were in conflict with 
Azeri claims to the territory. However, he finally made the decision to support 
Azerbaijan because of its Communist Party leadership; Armenian leaders at the time 
were non-Communist (Panter, 1996, p.2). With the demise of the Communist regime
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in 1991, the material benefits which those in many of the newly-independent states 
and republics thought would be forthcoming, simply, did not materialise. During 
Soviet rule Armenia’s energy requirements and the demand for industrial goods were 
met by other states in the Union, but the structural adjustment since 1991 has, for 
Armenia (and other republics), been harsh. Unemployment has been high and many 
have found their wages much lower since independence, with real incomes having 
continued to fall as inflation has increased. The eruption of the Karabakh conflict in 
1991 only served to worsen the situation for the Armenian economy. The conflict 
over Karabakh has primarily been an ethnic one; with the dissolution of the Soviet 
Union and the economic and political adjustments that have been encountered, 
conflict tensions between the two ethnic groups of Armenians and Azeri Turks have 
intensified. An analysis undertaken within the post-Soviet Caucasian republics by the 
UNHCR’S Regional Bureau for Europe, states:
 although these disputes are, more often than not, economic in nature (they
arise as a result of competition between different groups over access to scarce 
resources), they are often expressed in ethnic terms as different groups react to 
real or perceived discrimination by others (Panter, 1996, p.2).
Turkey has been keen to extend its religious, political and economic influence within 
the Caucasian region, especially in Islamic Azerbaijan. Close links with Azerbaijan 
may help Turkey to benefit economically since that republic possesses a wealth of 
natural resources. Links with the Azeris would also aid the Turkish government in 
extending its regional political dominance in the area, particularly since other 
powerful nations like Russia and Iran are likely to attempt to extend their political 
influence there too. Turkey has also maintained its call for the withdrawal of all 
Armenian forces from Azerbaijani territory, and the unconditional surrender of 
Nagorno-Karabakh to Azerbaijan. The Turks, it seems, are eager to obtain direct 
access to Azerbaijan, the Caspian Sea and Central Asia.
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A partial blockade was placed upon Armenia by Azerbaijan in 1988 and since then, 
very tight restrictions have been in place, with Turkey also following suit by 
preventing any access of transport or communication to the landlocked country of 
Armenia and thus also Nagorno-Karabakh. This blockade was a crucial blow to 
Armenia as the country produces very little of its own natural resources. With the 
closure of the Medzamor Nuclear Power Station after the 1988 earthquake, Armenia’s 
contribution to its energy supplies had fallen to 1% by 1990 (Panter, 1996, p.3). 
Some supplies have been brought through Georgia, however, this route is long, 
arduous, dangerous and expensive as vehicles are often hijacked or severely tariffed. 
With the increasing instability in Georgia, it is questionable as to how long this route 
can continue to be a transport route for supplies. Other supplies must be brought in 
by air or through Iran.
Armenia does have good agricultural land which it has been developing since 
independence in order to lessen the dependency factor. Farmers have been able to 
grow their own crops which has lead to a significant increase in crop production. 
Annenia had been developed during the period of Soviet rule to provide machine 
tools, computers and advanced technological products for the rest of the Union and in 
turn was dependent upon the Ukraine for cereals and petrol. This method of creating 
the dependency of one Soviet republic upon another was used in order that no one 
became self-sufficient and thus a threat to the cohesiveness of the Union. Nagorno- 
Karabakh has been increasing its productive activity, with a rise of more than double 
in wheat production since the cease-fire, but the shortage of fuel in Annenia has 
meant that factories and plants there are operating well below capacity and in winter, 
a time of peak demand, they are sometimes closed down altogether. Although this 
has caused a steep rise in unemployment in the countiy, some factories are still 
operating. Indeed, output in 1996 increased greatly (Panter, 1996, p.3). Such results 
will help Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh in the process of reform, but output is
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not comparable with pre-conflict levels. The whole country is dependent on 
electricity for power and heating, although there are some hydroelectric projects; one 
such project involves taking water from Lake Sevan in Eastern Armenia. This is, 
however, causing severe environmental damage as the water level is dropping at an 
alarming rate. The lake is already shrinking and the fishing industry is being 
adversely affected, thus compounding the existing economic problems. There still 
remains the possibility of using the nuclear power station, but this is not considered to 
be a safe option and it requires massive investment to ensure such safety. The 
crippling blockade has, however, caused the Armenian government to think about 
reopening the plant. This has prompted widespread regional and international 
concern, and has placed great pressure upon the parties involved to reach a solution. 
In spite of the difficulties there remains much potential for economic development in 
Armenia. However, such economic development relies heavily upon capital 
investment.
Azerbaijan is one of the wealthiest states of the former Soviet Union in terms of 
natural resources. Indeed, the vast oil and gas reserves are enough to ensure revenues 
for the next fifty years at least. Azerbaijan is very keen to develop these oil fields but 
it desperately needs foreign investment in order to exploit those resources 
(developments are, however, taking place as I write). Azerbaijan, it has been said, 
has the potential to become the world’s third largest oil-producing nation, behind 
Siberia and the Middle East. There is, therefore, great incentive for other nations to 
become involved. Azerbaijan is also keen to maintain Western involvement and its 
ties with Turkey, in order to prevent any Russian military presence on its soil. 
Because of the wealth in Azerbaijan it has, since the Soviet era, received strong 
support from Turkey and others interested in either a political or economic stake in 
the countiy. As Baroness Park of Monmouth stated in a speech at the House of Lords 
in December 1992:
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It must be clear that, first, Azerbaijan has powerful friends (and even Russia has 
recently granted it some industrial credits), and, given its oil, it can expect 
investment from the West as well as from ECO. Texaco is looking at the onshore 
oil fields and may help the Azerbaijani oil industry, which is in trouble. BP is 
also active (Panter, 1996, p.4).
The Western nations, among them Great Britain, have certainly expressed a strong 
financial interest in Azerbaijan. In fact, Britain is the republic’s second largest 
trading partner after Iran. The latter, however, although having many economic 
interests in Azerbaijan, is keen not to see the republic become a dominant force 
within the region. Iran has recently opened up its borders to allow some trade with 
Armenia, but it does not want to be seen as a supporter of Christian Armenia in 
preference to its Muslim neighbour. The British government have justified their 
financial involvement in Azerbaijan by suggesting that such investment is a necessary 
step on the way to overcoming the ruinous legacy of Soviet Communism. The British 
government sees trade as the most important means of helping these countries to 
establish themselves in the international community. The government has stated that 
it also intends to boost its trade with all the states, including Armenia and Azerbaijan, 
and claims that we, as a nation, should not be ashamed of trading with BP in that 
country (Panter, 1996, p.5). While it is true that economic progress, to a certain 
extent, is a key component, such investment is often spent on purchasing more 
weaponry and carrying out human rights violations. Sadly, this has certainly been 
true regarding Azerbaijan’s interest in Nagorno-Karabakh.
The Turkish attitude towards Armenia is gradually changing. It is aware of the 
benefits that could accrue from acting as the means by which to extend Western 
economic and political influence in Transcaucasia and is therefore much more 
prepared to maintain relations with Armenia. However, relations are by no means 
friendly, despite a suggestion by the Turkish Prime Minister on 22 March 1996 that 
his country would open up the border for some trade with Armenia if there was
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genuine progress made during the negotiations over the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.
This would partially lift the long-standing economic and transport blockade on
Armenia. It has been suggested (Panter, 1996, p.5) that this has merely been a ploy to 
Pasçsujde.
prossu-rrse the Armenian side in talks. Turkey has also, it seems, failed to act upon a 
promise that it made in 1992 to supply electricity to Armenia if Armenian troops were 
withdrawn from Nagorno-Karabakh.
Iran has little involvement with the countries embroiled in the conflict although, it 
must be said, that it has been acting more cordially towards Armenia recently. After 
all, it has no desire to see Azerbaijan become the dominant nation in the region. 
Besides, Armenia does not present a threat to Iran’s territorial integrity. However, 
developing good relations with Iran could mean the loss of Western, particularly 
American, support for Armenia.
The West has a vested interest in seeing a resolution to the conflict in the region, not 
least, because of the economic gains which would present themselves in the wake of 
such a solution. Azerbaijan, with its vast and virtually untapped oil reserves,beckons. 
Instability within the region has, naturally, ‘scared off potential investors in both the 
Armenian and Azeri economies. Despite the lack of confidence in the area as a 
whole, Azerbaijan does still benefit. Within the last year an international consortium 
has agreed to a deal with Azerbaijan which means that the resource will be exploited 
over the next thirty years. This deal is likely to run into billions of pounds.
Azerbaijan is certainly eager to come to an agreement with Armenia over the 
contested territoiy of Karabakh and thus show the West that it has political stability 
and the right environment for large investments. However, finding a solution 
acceptable to both parties could prove to be a rather difficult task. The leadership in 
the disputed enclave have no wish to be ruled by their Muslim neighbours, asserting
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that everything divides them, namely culture, language, and the War. Azerbaijan, 
however, is also adamant in its claims to the enclave, firmly believing that the 
Armenians should completely abandon what they (the Azeris) see as occupied 
territoiy.
The problems faced by the refugees and displaced persons caught up in the conflict, 
have been exacerbated by the economic situation in both Nagorno-Karabakh and 
Armenia. The conflict has crippled the country, severely hindered the redevelopment 
of the old and, the establishment of new industries, and caused severe hardship for the 
Armenian population. There are few employment prospects in both Armenia and the 
enclave, but since the advent of the cease-fire the economy is slowly ‘picking up’. 
However, a cease-fire is not peace. Without a peace agreement it will be difficult to 
focus upon domestic reform problems, problems, which if left unchecked, will further 
hinder the period of structural adjustment. Such an agreement would allow the 
Armenian government (and indeed its Azeri counterpart) to redirect resources away 
from defence spending to the economy and meeting-peoples’ needs.
The total number of persons displaced as a result of the conflict is estimated at 1.6 
million (Panter, 1996, p.6). This includes Armenians who have fled from Azerbaijan 
into Nagorno-Karabakh or to Armenia, and Azeri civilians who have fled Armenia, 
Nagorno-Karabakh and Karabakh-occupied Azeri territory. The implications of this 
conflict are by no means one-sided, for the civilians of both ethnic groups have 
incurred tragic losses. The victims are those on both sides. However, the Armenians 
have suffered under appalling conditions with scarce resources, severe winters and a 
crippling economic blockade.
The Armenians of Karabakh love their homeland which is steeped in heritage, culture 
and scenic beauty. Indeed, many civilians chose to remain in Karabakh at the height
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of the conflict despite the devastation and losses. Others have returned since the May 
1994 cease-fire in order to rebuild their lives. At times during the conflict the Azeri 
forces fired at least 400 Grad missiles per day upon the Armenian population of 
Stepanakert, Karabakh. Devastation in many parts of Karabakh has been total, 
destroying much of the infrastructure and buildings and, killing many. Many people 
have re-established themselves in the cities of Karabakh, where there is, at least, some 
infrastructure. Others have returned to their previous settlements where possible. 
With the help of international organisations, government programmes and the 
diaspora, the victims of war are gradually re-establishing themselves.
Surrounding Erevan, on the city’s outskirts, live those with nowhere to go. These 
people, many of them families, live in disused and rusty water tanks. Families of five, 
six or more are allocated a water tank on a small patch of land surrounded by rubble. 
There are no job prospects for these people despite many being of working age, 
skilled and educated. Many of the men are in the army or have died at war. These 
people are given some government support but this is veiy limited as the government 
is restricted in terms of resources. Armenians are still suffering in the wake of the 
1988 Earthquake, from which there are still 500,000 people displaced.
There are many organisations working in Armenia but fewer in Nagorno-Karabakh, 
mainly because of the fact that it is not internationally recognised but considered to be 
a rebel group factioned off from Azerbaijan. Any aid that goes into Karabakh must 
now be administered under the auspices of the government; the government sees it as 
essential that it knows exactly what is coming into the country and where it is to go. 
The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) is the largest group working in 
the region. They have a very effective system of providing relief supplies to the most 
vulnerable of the population in Karabakh. Christian Solidarity International (CSI) 
sponsors a prosthetic limb centre and a rehabilitation centre for the injured and
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disabled. The Halo Trust is working on de-mining the area and training the 
Karabakhis to also do so safely. There are other small-scale projects such as 
providing medicines for the hospitals and immunisation programmes. It is these 
needs which are crucial in the re-establishment of communities after the disruption 
and devastation of war.
There is no doubt, that in order for the nations involved in the conflict to prosper 
economically, and the resources of the region to be utilised (the oil fields of 
Azerbaijan, agriculture and industry in Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh), political 
stability and relative safety are needed. There is, therefore, an inherent interest for 
the West in seeking to establish a lasting peace in the region. Countries which have 
investments or are planning investment in Azerbaijan need to be convinced that 
continued unrest and a very shaky cease-fire agreement are a threat to their own 
interests; meanwhile, the conflicting parties must realise that inequalities and 
structural readjustment cannot be overcome by relying solely on international support. 
No progress can be made in this direction if the will for political change does not 
exist at the national level. However, Nagorno-Karabakh has much more to lose in 
this conflict than Azerbaijan, as Andrei Sakharov stated: Tor Azerbaijan the issue of 
Karabakh is a matter of ambition, for the Armenians of Karabakh it is a matter of life 
and death’ (Sakharov in Panter, 1996, p. 8). The cost of war, in both physical and 
spiritual terms, has, for the Armenians of both the Karabakh and the republic itself, 
been great. However, they will simply not ‘give up the fight’.
If a solution to the Karabakh problem cannot be found, a solution which is acceptable 
to both parties, any further economic progress within the two economies will be 
severely hampered. However, the civilian populations of both conflicting parties are 
likely to be the most seriously affected, particularly those families or individuals who 
have lost everything and have no means of support, little or no employment
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opportunities and few ears to hear their cry.
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9.0 Armenian Identity and National Cohesiveness
‘They shouldn’t really exist at all. They should have been destroyed, written out of 
history by its worst horrors. But they have survived. Instead of a footnote to the story 
of these border regions, the Armenians can be read like a kind of subtext’ (Marsden, 
1994, p. 10).
Armenia, as we have seen, is a small land-locked country which, in the past, lay 
between the powerful kingdoms of the East and West and at the crossroads of the 
world trade routes.
The thrice cursed, seven times beloved native land of Armenia, a countiy which 
was supposedly situated in the Garden of Eden but, destined to have a history 
worse than that of hell (Emin, 1981, p.94).
Armenia has had a turbulent existence yet the people have somehow managed to 
withstand all persecutions and hardships and have survived to this day. It is almost as 
if:
Innumerable hardships, constant strain and the need to resist evil, the amazing 
talent of finding a way out of any seemingly hopeless situation have sharpened 
the peoples’ wits and kindled their desire to build and create, which has been 
repressed for centuries. Provided with propitious conditions, the people can 
indeed work miracles...........
The Annenian people survived and are now setting about the rebuilding of their 
nation. But how have they managed to survive despite overwhelming odds? 
(Emin, 1981, p. 122).
The cultural uniqueness of the Armenian people is probably the result of having a
many ways unique. This sense of uniqueness has probably been enhanced, to some 
extent, by a diaspora which, although separated from its homeland, because of the 
1915 Genocide, still maintains an association between itself and that homeland. This
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region which Armenians around the world refer to as home, has become the focus for 
their collective dreams:
When an ethnie and ‘its’ homeland are separated, perhaps by external power, 
there often remains an ‘association’ or tie between people and territory. This 
association itself becomes an essential part of the collective memoiy and identity 
of the community. The land becomes part of its lore and a focus for collective 
dreams. Concepts of heaven are articulated with reference to the much-loved 
features of the land, exiled communities are measured by their distance from it, 
designs for its recovery and restoration are imagined, and members identify 
themselves by their ‘origins’ in the land, mixing territory with genealogy even
centuries after most physical ties with the territory have been surrendered as
has been the case with the Jews and, to some extent, with the Armenian 
communities in exile (Smith, 1986, p.29).
As has been stated, the Armenian form of Christianity has been reinforced by, and has 
itself reinforced the Armenian community and language. It also seems, that with a 
few exceptions, prolonged inter-state warfare by the great powers over the territory of 
Armenia has strengthened the state and ties between Armenians themselves:
In that sense, we may conclude that warfare between states serves to enhance and 
maintain ethnic identity in history (Smith, 1986, p.40).
The Armenians have retained an intense attachment to their original mountain 
kingdom and its sacred Gregorian centre, Echmiadzin. To Annenians around the 
world, the early Gregorian Church’s rites and liturgy as well as their sacred literature 
have held them together and have consequently inspired the subsequent renaissance 
of the early modem era:
 Armenians saw themselves as a chosen people, their heroes as Old
Testament warriors Sharing the role of ancient Israel, the unique Gregorian-
Armenian community of the faithful stood out as the tme repository of
Orthodoxy. Religion and ethnie converged to provide a dynamic impetus to
communal survival over the centuries and millennia (Smith, 1986, p.65).
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Those living in the diasporan communities were compelled to cultivate their myths 
and memories, family rituals and values and managed to keep alive a sense of 
collective dignity despite the danger of assimilation. Travel between the various 
diasporan enclaves inevitably strengthened the perception of diaspora cohesion and 
common destiny, whilst trade and intellectual exchange bound the various enclaves 
into regional networks and ultimately a near-global ethnic community. Hardly 
surprisingly, we find the concept of a collective historical destiny most fully 
formulated and elaborated by diaspora communities. Smith suggests that the most 
obvious and recurrent factors contributing to the survival or dissolution of an ethnic 
group are geo-political. In other words, ‘location’ and ‘sovereignty’ constitute for 
many observers the key to ethnic survival. Freedom from external interference in a 
compact and defensible territoiy exceeds all other variables in importance for 
ensuring the survival of distinct communities. However, the validity of such 
contentions can be questioned. For example, Smith goes on to say:
The Annenians in their natural fortress on a plateau cut across by huge mountain 
chains around Ararat, were continually conquered by larger neighbours: and if it 
is argued that their location acted as a magnet for expansionist powers (and hence 
was ‘unfortunate’), then again it only helped to augment the sense of 
Armenianness felt by the inhabitants (Smith, 1986, p.93).
Thus, it seems that others are of the opinion that the Armenians’ self-awareness has 
been strengthened by continual warfare in and around their Caucasian location.
A Little Nation
Compressed by evil power
For centuries and centuries on end
We grew as hard and durable as diamond
That nobody can ever split or bend
(Emin, 1981, p.98).
The Armenian diasporan communities looked with fervour upon their sacred centre.
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Echmiadzin in which, until the nineteenth century, probably the majority of 
Armenians were still resident. That, in itself, gave the scattered Armenian enclaves a 
certain cohesion, organisation and purpose. The invention of the Armenian sacred 
script in the early fifth century had created a new barrier to assimilation and a 
powerful weapon for religious education and evangelical work. It is interesting to 
gauge the effect of Armenia’s conversion in AD 301 to Christianity, at the hand of 
Gregory the Illuminator and the invention and use of a sacred script, by comparing the 
Armenians with a more southerly neighbour who did not do either, the Nabataeans. 
Like the Armenians, the Nabataeans can be dated back to the early Persian period and 
like the Armenians, under their celebrated king, Tigranes the Great (95-55 BC)^they 
were organised as a kingdom by the late second century BC. They also engaged in 
frequent warfare with Egypt and Seleucid Syria, as the Armenians did, caught 
between Rome, and later, Sassanid Iran. In both, there is evidence of an ethnic 
identity, at least among the upper classes, at this time. Yet, by the late Byzantine 
period, the Nabataeans were in decline, their kingdom having long been annexed by 
Trajan (106 AD). They were heard of no more whilst, the Armenians, though losing 
their kingdom on the field of Avarayr (451 AD), were able to maintain their lands and 
even restore their kingdom under the Bagratuni dynasty (856-1071 AD) and the 
subsequent principality in Cilicia. It is clear, states Smith, that unlike the Armenians 
and Jews, the Nabataeans were unable to evolve a distinctive culture and religion 
around their own sacred texts, and thereby introduce that conjunction of mobilising 
communal sentiment with conservative ritual forms which has so often ensured ethnic 
persistence. Undoubtedly, what saved a precariously placed Armenia was Tiridates 
Ill’s timely conversion to Christianity and its evolution along local lines during a 
period of political partition between Rome and Persia after 387 AD. This evolution 
led Armenian Orthodoxy into opposition with Chalcedon in 451 AD and to the 
severing of Armenian ecclesiastical ties with Constantinople at the Second Council of 
Dvin in 554 AD; the way was then paved for persecutions by Byzantine emperors who
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reconquered the homeland from Persia. There is no doubt that, both organisationally 
and emotionally, the ethnic Church provided exiled and migrant Armenians with a 
tangible expression of their identity, a framework for community and a latent political 
goal, the restoration of an Armenian kingdom or state:
 Staunch in the strongest possible contrast to the Phoenician, Nabataean,
Norman and, above all, Assyrian experiences in which more or less strong ethnic 
states were destroyed and their inhabitants absorbed without ethnic posterity. It 
illustrates our main thesis; namely, the central role of religious traditions and 
distinctive priesthoods and rites in maintaining ethnic identity. While not 
denying the importance of both location and autonomy, it is clear that 
priesthoods are more important than polities and homelands in safeguarding 
ethnic identity and securing ethnic survival over centuries. It is the complex of 
‘religious factors’ that is most likely to maintain the sense of ethnic individuality 
and community in premodem eras (Smith, 1986, p. 119).
Six components, isolated by Smith, may help to explain what exactly lies behind the 
Armenians’ extraordinary story of survival. The first of these he has termed the 
‘collective name’, by which, he believes, nations distinguish themselves and 
summarise their essence to themselves, ‘as if in a name lay the magic of their 
existence and guarantee of survival’ (Smith, 1986, p.24). It is as if, says Smith, a 
collective name ‘evokes’ an atmosphere and drama that has power and meaning for 
those whom it includes:
It (the name) acquires over generations an aura for members of the named 
community, especially when certain achievements and qualities are associated 
with that community. So, the name summons up images of the distinctive traits 
and characteristics of a community in the minds and imaginations of its 
participants and outsiders-as well as posterity-though these images may differ 
widely (Smith, 1986, p.24).
The Armenians also share the second element which Smith refers to as ‘a common 
myth of descent’. In other words, the Armenians believe that they necessarily belong 
together having originated from the same place at a definite period of time, having
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descended from the self-same ancestor, and sharing the same feelings and tastes. 
They feel that they are alike in culture and have a sense of tribal belonging based 
upon common family ties rather than upon any sense of genetic and blood ties:
I realized at that moment to be an Armenian, to have lived as an Armenian, was 
to have become something crazy. Not crazy in the colloquial sense of quirky or
charmingly eccentric or even of certifiably mad. But crazy: crazed, that deep
thing-deep where the deep-sea souls of human beings twist and turn (Michael J. 
Arlen in Marsden, 1994, p. 184).
The Armenians also share a sense of common history. That is to say that they nurture 
a flow of shared memories, memories which continue to unite successive generations 
of Armenians; experiences in history which are conveyed from family to family, and 
from generation to generation.
The Armenians are bound together and separated from outsiders by the distinctive 
traits of language and religion. They also have a territory with which their diaspora is 
closely associated, a land which remains a potent symbol of nationality for them.
Finally, the Armenians, suggests Smith, possess a sense of solidarity and identity 
which, in times of stress and danger can seem to override class, factional or regional 
distinctions within the community.
Other writers have put forward their own theories as to why the Armenians have 
survived for so long. It has been suggested that the main elements of their spiritual 
world are the result of their history and that these are the elements that have helped 
them to maintain such cohesiveness and identity and thus survive as a nation. These 
elements can be broken down, say others, into several easily defined areas.
The first of these is nationalism. No matter what passport an Armenian holds, he is
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always, either consciously or unconsciously, Armenian. This means that he or she is 
aware of the origins which hold a special place in his or her thoughts.
For the Armenian the family unit is of paramount importance. Armenian families are 
usually close knit, with the tradition of the ‘extended family’ still important. Thus 
cousins by marriage, even be they very distant, are considered to be of the immediate 
family.
Language, state other historians, has been an important factor in Armenian survival:
Armenian, although part of the general grouping of Indo-European languages, is 
a branch in its own right. This means that there is no real possibility of another 
language diluting its innate uniqueness. The written language too is unique; its 
alphabet was invented specifically for it, and is like no other (Dennett, 1991, p.4).
Religion, is also seen by other academics, as a major reason for Armenian survival. 
Most Armenians are members, be they luke-warm or devout, of the Armenian 
Apostolic Orthodox Church. The Church has a special place in the hearts and minds 
of Armenians generally, either as a religion, or as a means of transmitting (or 
preserving) culture, or (possibly) as a symbol of nationalism.
Exile, say some historians, has created a diaspora, a diaspora which, in turn, has 
helped to support the notion of a homeland and has kept that vision alive for many 
years. For centuries, as has been discussed, Armenians have been forced to leave 
Armenia, due to the country being in the path of every invading force that has passed 
through Asia Minor and the Caucasus. Armenia became, in times past, a theatre of 
perpetual war. Successive invasions ensured that Armenians are to be found 
throughout the world, either due to their voluntary or enforced movement, such as the 
deportation of the population of Djulfa to Isfahan by Shah Abbas the Great of Persia
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in 1605.
Pride has also helped to keep the ‘flame of nationalism’ burning. The Armenians, 
both individually and collectively are a proud people. They are keenly aware of their 
origins, feeding off them, and constantly reminding themselves and each other of 
them, both verbally, through events or, the written word.
Subjugation, has, perversely, given the Armenian people the will and courage to ‘fight 
on’. Being subject peoples for most of their history has, conversely, fuelled the 
Armenian spirit, not dampened it.
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Summary and Conclusion
Armenia’s history as we have seen, has been a turbulent one, for it has been 
characterised, more often than not, by a series of wars, conquests and partitions. For 
many hundreds of years Armenian territory has been fought over by countless powers 
including the Roman Empire, Iran, Byzantium, Russia and, of course, Turkey. 
Moments of independence have, unfortunately been all too rare, the last period being 
from 1918 until 1920. After this fleeting moment of self-determination the region 
was incorporated into the Soviet Union.
Despite being almost continually under the yoke of some foreign power or other, and 
situated at the crossroads between Muslim and Christian powers, the Armenians have 
somehow managed to retain to a high degree their own language, culture and religion. 
Hence a heightened national consciousness which was evident particularly during the 
Soviet Period.
Armenia, a largely mountainous country is situated on the borders of the Near East 
and forms what can be regarded as a natural barrier between Iranian Azerbaijan and 
the rest of the Anatolian Plateau. Almost everywhere it is higher than its surrounding 
neighbours and is cut off from them by natural barriers such a mountain peaks and 
great hills.
Armenia has a lack of access to the sea and because the republic is cut off from 
Russia by the main Caucasus range, its nearest maritime outlets are ports like 
Trebizond in Turkey, Batumi in Georgia and (formerly) Baku in Azerbaijan. Because 
it has remained landlocked it has suffered both economically and politically.
A land dotted with mountain systems and peaks, ravines and canyons, it is, in many 
parts, stark and uncompromising. Armenian winters are unrelenting and the summers
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are intense in heat. The severity of economic conditions are thus aggravated by the 
harsh climate of the mountainous and upland areas. The land is, for the most part, 
composed of soil which is volcanic in origin although there are some fertile pockets 
of land. From these fertile areas of land which are mainly to be found in the river 
valleys and on the mountain slopes, the Armenian people have been able to ‘eke a 
living’. In the main, however, the Armenians have been compelled to ‘wrest bread 
from among stones’.
A widely-scattered people, due, in great part, to the Genocide of 1915, this has not
6 w I AST / p. 9).
prevented the Armenians from making up about 88% of their population's With
origins shrouded somewhat in mystery, the Armenians, said to be the descendants of
the Urartians (around 1000 BC), speak a language which is an independent, one-
language sub-group within the Indo-European language family. They were originally
a pagan people but around 301 AD converted to the Christian religion. The invention
of the Annenian alphabet followed a century later.
The fortunes of the large majority of Armenian people and of Armenia itself have 
been intimately connected to the fate of the Russian Empire and its Soviet successor. 
Russian policy towards the Armenians tended to fluctuate between declarations of 
protection for fellow Christians to the persecution of a newly-conscious national 
minority. During the earlier years of Soviet rule the Russian policies of nativisation 
and modernisation were applied to the republics of the Union. The shifts in Russian 
perceptions of the Armenians were dependent on both changes in Russia’s interests in 
Caucasia and the developments taking place among the Armenians themselves.
After a brief period of independence in the earlier part of this century power was 
ceded to the Bolsheviks and the lengthy period of Communist rule began. A process 
began by which Soviet policy was directed toward preserving and nourishing many
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aspects of Armenian life, at renationalising Armenia. This programme of economic 
restoration and cultural revival was implemented in all the republics and was coupled 
with a process termed ‘modernisation’. The latter was a clear attempt to create closer 
ties between the central Communist government and the republics. This programme 
of reform continued well into the 1930s. Thus, the first decade of Soviet rule in 
Armenia established an Armenian political framework within which the economy 
could be restored and society embark upon a gradual and steady modernisation.
During the first phase of Stalinist rule the Leninist policy of ‘Korenizatsiia’ 
(‘Nativisation’) was continued and intensified but this eventually gave way in the 
mid-1930s to a policy of Russification. Local nationalities were once again reduced 
to a secondary level. The policy of collectivisation was also introduced at this time. 
Stalinist policies effectively removed the last vestiges of Armenian self-rule and self­
definition but this did not preclude nationalist sentiment and tension seething just 
below the surface of the Armenian psyche.
The economic and social paralysis into which Stalinism had led the country 
persuaded Krushchev and his allies to break gradually with the more repressive 
aspects of the past. Déstalinisation, as it became known, reached its zenith in the 
years between 1956 and 1962 and this ultimately meant a reduction in the control of 
the periphery by the centre.
By the 1960s, instead of promoting assimilation, Soviet development had led to the 
consolidation of nations. Instead of Russification, there was greater awareness of 
national cultures and devotion to national language. Instead of brutal repression of 
nationalism, in the post-Stalinist period there were not only concessions made to 
nationalism, but often subtle encouragement of it. It was an era of the revival of 
nationalist expression which culminated in 1988 with the conflagration over
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Nagorno-Karabakh.
The events of 1988 (the earthquake and the explosion over the Nagorno-Karabakh 
question) were traumatic for the Armenian people. Nevertheless, these disasters have 
not prevented the Armenians from continuing to work towards the consolidation of 
their newly-independent republic. Their spirit has not been dimmed and the flame of 
national feeling still bums as brightly as it ever did. Once again, this time in 1991, 
the Armenian people created their own independent republic. The old Soviet order 
had crumbled and they were one of fifteen republics which now had to create a 
politically and economically viable sovereign state from the ashes of the Communist 
regime. The task of establishing a democratic regime from the chaos of the old still 
continues.
So what exactly has enabled the Armenian people to reach this particular stage in 
their history, what lies behind their extraordinary story of survival? How and why 
have this ancient people managed to preserve a sense of national identity and 
cohesiveness when so many other civilisations have perished? Futhermore, is it 
possible for them to forge a new and lasting democratic nation from all that remains?
Their sense of cultural uniqueness is probably the result of a number of factors and 
has been maintained despite the numerous obstacles they have encountered 
throughout the centuries. Described as the ‘crossing place’ of the Near East, Armenia 
has seen countless wars take place upon its soil and has been subject to many 
partitions wrought by competing powers such as Russia, Turkey and Persia.
In conclusion, I have isolated what I believe to be the main factors which have 
contributed to this sense of nationhood and which have greatly aided the Armenian 
people in their struggle for survival.
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No institution has had a greater impact in shaping the national culture of the 
Armenians than the Armenian Apostolic Church. It has, for centuries occupied an 
important and special place in the hearts and minds of Armenians either as a religion 
or, as a means of transmitting and preserving their culture. It has also become a 
symbol of nationalist feeling. It is probable that the Armenians may have ended up 
being assimilated by one of the great powers which surrounded and ultimately sought 
to dominate them, had it not been for the unifying force of the Christian faith. 
Indeed, it was the Church in the form of St Mesrop-Mashtots who gave the 
Armenians their alphabet early in the fifth century AD, and opened up opportunities 
for education and evangelical work in the native tongue.
Tormented for centuries by wars and disasters, the Armenians certainly would not 
have survived until now had they not owned, a most powerful weapon-a written 
language. Instead of triumphing with the sword they triumphed with the pen, 
destroying their enemies, and passing down their hopes, faith and dreams to 
successive generations of Armenians. Indeed, the love which binds the Armenian 
people to their native language and spiritual culture is truly amazing. It is almost as if 
they instinctively sense that language and literature are their most powerful weapon in 
the eternal struggle for existence.
It may well be that the Christian faith and the Armenian language are the cornerstones 
upon which the Armenian nation has been founded, the cornerstones which have 
allowed them to survive. There are, however, other, contributory factors.
The large diaspora which has been created over the centuries has remained closely 
associated with its Armenian homeland and has, itself, through that association, 
enabled that homeland to become a potent symbol of nationalism for Armenians all 
over the world. Armenian political parties in the diaspora have also played a large
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part in transmitting to their fellow diasporans, a national heritage and a conservatism 
almost untouched by the great changes which have been brought about by modernity. 
Thus, in their own way, those Armenians who are scattered to the four comers of the 
earth, have helped, and are helping, the Armenian nation to survive. Diasporan 
institutions and political parties have also made quite a contribution to the political 
and economic development of Armenia. They have, in general, played an important 
and historical role and have served the people as best as they could. They have, in 
difficult times and under trying circumstances, tried to help both their own 
communities and Armenia. In many ways they have succeeded.
Fear of the Turk and the Muslim, Pan-Turkism, pogroms, massacres and a new 
genocide have remained. It should be noted, that in the past, such fear has been 
exploited and manipulated to rationalise, and even welcome the lack of independence 
and absence of democracy in Armenia. Armenians have, over the years, developed a 
much-heralded strategy of cultural preservation based on fear of the neighbour and on 
isolation. Although the diasporans and their political parties have aided Armenia 
both politically and economically and in many other ways, it must be said, that they 
have also have tended to encourage (perhaps unwittingly) this fear (see section 7.4). 
It seems to have been a strategy of liberation based on anti-Turkism and anti­
communism, on fear of Pan-Turkism and hatred of the Turk. However, in some 
bizarre way, this strategy seems to have helped to ensure the survival of the Armenian 
people. Although minor contributory factors in the survival story, they are factors 
nevertheless.
On careful examination of Armenian political history over the last 300 years, it is not 
difficult to see that, with a few exceptions, the Armenian people have relied upon 
some external force to protect them from invasion; namely the West and Russia. 
However, such reliance on other powers for protection has become, for the
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Armenians, instinctive. It is possible to conclude that such reliance has, more often 
than not, culminated in the ‘Russification’ of Armenia and assimilation which has 
taken place over many years. It is, on the other hand, possible to argue that protection 
by other powers may well have enabled the Armenians to retain their land physically 
(although this would not completely account for the retention of their sense of 
cultural uniqueness and national identity).
The concurrent policies of ‘Modernisation’ and ‘Nativisation’ which were introduced 
in the early years of Soviet rule may also have had an impact in that they may actually 
have encouraged nationalist sentiment within the Armenian Republic. It is quite clear 
that such sentiment bubbled just below the surface during the Stalinist era, at a time 
when a policy of ‘Russification’ was being encouraged by the authorities. Strangely, 
this new concept probably had the reverse effect in that it more than likely 
encouraged strong resistance from the nationalities who were keen to keep alive their 
dream of survival and, ultimately, independence. It was not long before the emotions 
and ideas which had been boiling below the surface in most of the republics were 
allowed to burst forth. The late 1950s and the early 1960s provided the stage for the 
new wave of nationalist expression.
It may well be that Armenia, a land ravaged by warfare and tom to shreds by covetous 
neighbours could, ironically, have found itself strengthened by the continual warfare 
in and around the Caucasian region. Adversity itself may well have imbued the 
Annenians with a heightened sense of identity and cohesiveness.
It is also true that the Armenians’ concept of a common history and myth of descent, 
their collective name and their shared sense of solidarity  ^ and identity may be other 
elements which have helped to ensure their survival as a people. Of importance also 
is the fact that the Armenians have a territory which is closely associated with their
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diaspora, a land which is a potent symbol of nationality for them. Strong family ties, 
nationalistic feeling, exile, subjugation, pride and self-belief have also played a part 
in this epic story.
What emerges, is a complex interplay of factors which have, I believe, enabled the 
Armenian people to battle against adversity and triumph over it. In short, these are 
the elements which have inspired them to struggle on, to attempt the seemingly 
impossible, to survive, unlike many of their neighbours.
Ultimately, the distinctive traits of language and religion are the main factors which I 
consider to have bound the Armenians together and which have, I believe, separated 
them from outsiders.
Having discussed just how and why it is possible for the Armenian people to have 
survived thus far, I have devoted a somewhat smaller portion of my thesis to a rather 
brief discussion concerning the question of whether, now that the republic is 
independent, it can actually achieve strategic and political viability as a sovereign 
state capable of defining and managing its own interests or whether its survival 
mandates continuing as a vassal state of an imperial power in return for protection. In 
short, could Armenia achieve true independence (if indeed, the concept of 
independence can be readily defined) and having achieved it, could the country and 
the Armenian people continue to survive? I believe that this topic in particular, 
merits further examination, and that which has been briefly explored here could well 
serve as the basis for more detailed research at a later date.
Having managed to survive up to this point in histoiy it would not be unreasonable to 
expect the Annenians to overcome many more obstacles. However, it is not 
absolutely certain that the Armenians, or indeed, any other people for that matter, can
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surmount every problem encountered. Surely religious faith, language and culture 
alone are not enough to ensure such survival? New ways forward must be examined, 
discussed, explored.
The way perhaps, to secure ‘true independence’, thus ensuring the longevity of the 
Armenian people and their nation, would be to seek a new path. Perhaps a change in 
attitude and strategy towards their neighbours would be the best way in which to 
begin to rebuild their shattered nation, move forward.
In my thesis I have attempted to deal, (as I have said, somewhat briefly), with the 
concept of how Armenia could possibly manage the monumental task of successfully 
transforming itself from vassal state of an imperial power to that of sovereign state. 
This is essential to its future existence. The transition is not likely to be smooth, 
indeed, the present bears that out.
For the last 300 years Armenia has relied upon what can be termed a ‘third force’ for 
its protection. This ‘third force’ has, for the most part, been Russia. Although such 
reliance may have, strangely, contributed to the survival of the Armenian people, 
history, unfortunately, has shown that the Armenians have not benefited too greatly 
when relying on some outside power for protection. The only correct path for the 
republic to follow is that of moral and intellectual sovereignty. This can only be 
achieved, true independence can only be attained, if no reliance is ever placed on an 
outside power again. Allies, of course, may be sought and relations with them 
cultivated but total reliance must be ruled out.
Of course, Armenia is free to organise its own affairs and protection but whether it 
can actually do so depends very much on whether or not a Pan-Turkic threat is still 
perceived by the republic as existing. There are those who vehemently argue that a
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Pan-Turkic threat to the integrity of the Armenian people still exists. The prevailing 
mood in Armenian governmental circles suggests that a cautious stance with regard to 
Turkey should be adopted. However, Armenian politicians also stress that 
cautiousness should not preclude the establishment of relations with Turkey. Being 
wary of its neighbours should not prevent Armenia from achieving its internal goals 
and from guaranteeing the irreversibility of its own démocratisation. In order to 
achieve such démocratisation Armenians must tone down their hatred and fear of the 
Turk. If this is done then the republic will undoubtedly be on the road to true 
statehood.
It has been argued that Armenia should even trade with Turkey and other neighbours. 
Coming to terms with their neighbours and skilfully compromising for Armenia’s 
self-interest (i.e., trading with Turkey) is a sane approach, an approach which will 
enable Armenia to mature into an independent nation.
As regards foreign policy, Armenia has a difficult task ahead. After all, the republic 
has had little experience in the field of foreign affairs. In view of this, Armenia 
should let its domestic interests determine its foreign policy agenda. The country’s 
leaders should undoubtedly think in global terms, but act locally since the arena for 
the fulfilment of their interests does not yet transcend the boundaries of the Caucasus 
(the Armenians, moreover, have enough to deal with in Nagorno-Karabakh!). There 
is nothing to stop the Armenians however, from pursuing an active foreign policy 
agenda in their own region. This, of course, should be done by Armenia taking 
initiatives, making propositions and not simply reacting to events. Engaging in 
alliances with neighbours should be considered carefully as the competing interests of 
the three neighbouring powers might catch Armenia in the middle of an escalating 
race for control of the region.
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The republic is still going through a tough time economically. The path to true 
independence also lies in the direction of attaining economic prosperity. It seems that 
the best way for Armenia to become more economically prosperous is through cross­
republic trading and economic pacts. Basically, co-operation in this sphere must be 
maintained with neighbours.
Diasporan political parties and organisations must reform their thinking and agenda. 
For many years they have placed great emphasis on the Genocide and fear and hatred 
of the Turk. True, they have had every right to, considering how badly the Armenians 
have suffered at the hands of foreign powers over the years. The time has come, 
however, when reality must be ‘stared in the face’. International relations have, by 
the ending of the Cold War and the consequent collapse of the Soviet Union, been 
transformed beyond recognition. It is a time for new beginnings. If a change in 
attitude and strategy is not forthcoming on the part of the diasporans then they will 
find it increasingly difficult to continue to make a realistic and worthwhile 
contribution to the future of a democratic and independent Armenia. No contribution 
to the political and economic development of the republic can be made under such 
circumstances. The diaspora must learn to cope with an environment where fear and 
hatred do not dominate the nation’s thinking. This is important for both a healthy 
diaspora and a healthy Armenia.
It seems that the whole question of whether Armenia can actually achieve strategic 
and political viability as a sovereign state capable of defining and managing its own 
vital interests turns upon whether Armenians in both the diaspora and the republic 
itself can conquer their fear and hatred of the Turk and Islam. This will be no mean 
feat considering the partitions wrought upon Annenia by competing powers over 
hundreds of years and the Genocide perpetrated by the Turks at the beginning of this 
century.
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Such fears must be transformed into cautiousness for only when such action has taken 
place, will the Armenians be able to set about the task of rebuilding their nation, of 
moving forward. Only with this change in attitude will the republic be able to rely on 
itself for protection, avoid manipulation by external powers, develop trade links with 
Turkey and other neighbours, solve its economic problems and increase its prosperity.
If such a revision in attitude towards the Turkish and other Islamic nations takes place 
and the latter continue to co-operate with the Armenians then indeed, there is a way 
forward for the republic. Although it cannot be predicted whether Armenia’s 
neighbours (most importantly, Turkey) will continue to reassess their own past 
behaviour and current positions and respond positively to an opportunity to achieve 
real peace and security in the region, it must be hoped that links with the Turks will 
be maintained. One hopes that the events in Nagorno-Karabakh will not eventually 
overshadow the newly-found confidence that Armenia is showing in the conduct of its 
relations with neighbours like Turkey. After all, for the first time since 1918 Armenia 
has the chance to achieve true independence. This will, unfortunately, remain elusive 
if Turkey is not cultivated as an ally.
Certainly, the Armenians should not forget the Genocide, but they must begin to see 
themselves as the citizens of a nation-state rather than the helpless victims of a 
horrific episode in history. Besides, for far too long the fear of Pan-Turkism and the 
spectre of another genocide have been the vehicles through which the denial of 
sovereign thinking and sovereignty have been internalised. Annenia cannot afford to 
let the chance to attain true independence slip by. If it does, the nation will be 
inexorably doomed. The republic can indeed achieve strategic and political viability 
as a sovereign state, but only if a change in attitude and agenda is initiated. Their 
faith has kept them alive, their language has inspired them and imbued them with a 
sense of pride in their heritage. These are surely the main reasons for their survival to
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the present day. However, in order to build upon such admirable foundations, in 
order to continue to exist, the Armenians must eliminate their fear of annihilation by 
the Turk. Only then will they, free from outside manipulation, be firmly on the road 
to true independence. This is, for Armenians everywhere, the way forward. With 
their religious faith as their breastplate, their language as their sword and the adoption 
of this new strategy, they will surely continue to exist.
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Were they to ask me where one can meet the most miracles on this planet of ours, 
I would name Armenia first of all (Rockwell Kent in Marsden, 1994, p. 180).
I should like to see any power of the world destroy this race, this small tribe of 
unimportant people, whose wars have been fought and lost, whose structures 
have crumbled, literature is unread, music is unheard, and prayers are no more 
answered. Go ahead, destroy Armenia. See if you can do it. Send them into the 
desert without bread or water, bum their homes and churches. Then see if they 
will not laugh, sing, and pray again. For when two of them meet anywhere in the 
world, see if they will not create a New Armenia (William Saroyan in Marsden,
1994, p.KO.
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In the Armenian Mountains
The way was weary and the night was dark.
And yet we survived 
Both sorrow and gloom.
To the summits we strive, to breathe free in the stark 
Steep heights of our land.
The Armenian Mountains.
We cany from our old treasure, our thought. 
Brought into life
By the fathomless soul of our people.
On their age-old way 
In our lofty land.
The Armenian Mountains.
How many times 
Did savage hordes 
Harry and ransack 
Our caravan
In our blood-smeared land. 
The Armenian Mountains.
Yet, plundered and slaughtered.
Our caravan 
Sought its way out 
From among the rocks,
Counting the scars of its countless wounds 
In our mournful land.
The Armenian Mountains.
As we gaze with dolorous, longing eyes 
At the earth in its gloom.
At the distant stars;
Ah, when will the dawn break at last 
Over our green 
Armenian Mountains.
(Hovannes Toumanian in Emin, 1981, Pp. 178-179).
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